Paul Lewin

The applicant was charged with possessing psilocybin for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He filed a Notice of Constitutional Question challenging the constitutionality of section 5 of the CDSA as it relates to psilocybin, alleging violations of section 2(b) (freedom of thought) and section 7 (liberty and security of the person) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the prohibition on trafficking infringes the rights of others to access psilocybin for its thought-related benefits.

The court found that section 5(2) of the CDSA does not infringe either section 2(b) or section 7 of the Charter.

The court rejected the applicant's broad interpretation of freedom of thought and found that psilocybin, as an unpredictable and scientifically nascent substance, does not constitute a protected tool of thought under the Charter.

The applicants, charged with cannabis and proceeds of crime offences, brought Charter applications to exclude evidence seized from their residence and coffee shop.

They alleged breaches of ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court found multiple s. 8 breaches: the search warrant contained the wrong address (rendering it a warrantless search), the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to disclose reasonable grounds to search the apartment, and the police executed a 'no-knock' entry without justification.

The court dismissed the s. 7 claim that police planted evidence.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the seized cannabis and cash.

The City of Toronto brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to shut down several medical cannabis dispensaries operating in violation of its zoning by-laws.

The dispensary operators brought a cross-motion seeking an interlocutory exemption from the by-laws and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, arguing that the existing regulatory scheme failed to provide reasonable access to medical cannabis.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the balance of convenience favoured the City, as there is a presumption that validly enacted laws serve the public interest.

The court granted the City's injunction but declined to issue an order directing police enforcement, noting the lack of statutory authority for such an order in a civil proceeding.

The operators' cross-motion was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of production of and possession for the purposes of trafficking in marijuana, and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the police violated their Charter section 8 rights by obtaining energy consumption data from their electricity provider, Horizon Utilities, without consent or judicial authorization.

The appellants contended that this data was used to obtain a search warrant for their residence.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the energy consumption data, and that the police examination and use of that data without judicial authorization constituted a breach of section 8.

However, the court found that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the police had acted reasonably given the state of the law at the time, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits outweighed the Charter breach.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application to qualify Detective Constable Charlie Rau as an expert witness on possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis marihuana, including production, valuation, and trafficking.

The defendant opposed, challenging the officer's methodology and expertise.

The court applied the two-step Mohan test, focusing on reliability and proper qualification.

It found the officer qualified based on extensive experience and training, rejecting the strict application of Daubert factors for non-scientific expert evidence.

The court admitted the expert evidence but imposed specific limitations on its scope, particularly regarding medical users, edibles, and extracts.

The appellants, a doctor and a nurse, were charged with fraud and forgery related to Health Canada's Medical Marijuana Licensing Scheme.

At the preliminary inquiry, they were committed for trial on fraud but discharged on forgery.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to the Superior Court, which quashed the discharge and remitted the matter, finding the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to assess the whole of the evidence against the correct elements of forgery.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to properly define the essential elements of forgery, failing to consider the whole of the evidence, and improperly weighing inferences.

The accused was sentenced for possession of marijuana contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused had previously been sentenced to a conditional sentence of two years less a day for trafficking in cocaine.

Within two weeks of the conditional sentence order, the accused breached two conditions: failing to remain in his residence and breaching the condition to keep the peace and be of good behaviour by possessing marijuana.

The accused acknowledged both breaches and pled guilty to the possession charge.

The court imposed a fine of $150 plus victim fine surcharge for the possession offence and suspended the conditional sentence order, directing the accused to serve 87 days in custody (90 days less 3 days pre-trial custody credit), with amended conditions upon release including 75 hours of community service.

The accused pleaded guilty to production or cultivation of cannabis marihuana.

Police discovered 99 marihuana plants in various stages of growth at the accused's residence.

The accused had previously obtained licenses from Health Canada to possess and produce medical marihuana for pain management resulting from catastrophic injuries sustained in a 2004 motorcycle accident.

The accused's production license had expired, and although he submitted a renewal application before expiration, he did not diligently follow up with Health Canada.

The Crown sought a six-month jail sentence, while the defence argued for a significant fine given the medical necessity and exceptional circumstances.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years' probation, finding that the exceptional circumstances and medical necessity rendered imprisonment disproportionate.

At a preliminary hearing, the court considered whether there was sufficient evidence to commit four accused persons to trial on various charges related to marijuana production and trafficking conspiracies.

The court discharged two accused (Tuan Vu and Thu Tran) on conspiracy charges, finding that while they may have facilitated or furthered the commission of crimes, the evidence was insufficient to establish they were parties to the formation of the conspiracy agreement itself.

The court applied the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. J.F., which restricts party liability in conspiracy cases to conduct that aids or abets the formation of the agreement.

The court also discharged one accused (Cong Nguyen) on a count involving a warehouse conspiracy, finding that merely selling equipment with knowledge it would be used for illegal purposes does not constitute conspiracy.

Two accused were committed to trial on trafficking and conspiracy counts.

Health Canada sought to quash a subpoena issued to Louis Proulx, its Manager of Litigation, or alternatively to excuse him from testifying at a preliminary inquiry.

The respondent, charged with offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, sought to call Proulx to provide evidence regarding the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations and Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations, as well as to identify Health Canada employees who could provide such evidence and produce related documentation.

The respondent intended to use this evidence to support an anticipated constitutional challenge to section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act at trial.

The court found that the subpoena was tantamount to an improper order for third-party document production and that the requested evidence, relating to the constitutionality of legislation rather than to the charges or alleged Charter breaches during investigation, arrest, or detention, was not properly discoverable at the preliminary inquiry stage.

The accused applied to exclude text messages found on another person's cell phone, arguing that the police search violated her section 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The police had searched the cell phone of an arrestee incident to her arrest for drug possession and found text messages from the accused relating to an alleged drug transaction.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused had standing to challenge the search but that the search was lawful as a cursory search incident to arrest.

The court also found that even if there had been a breach, the evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The respondent was charged with producing marihuana and successfully argued at trial that the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) violated s. 7 of the Charter because physicians were boycotting the scheme, rendering the medical exemption illusory.

The trial judge struck down the MMAR and stayed the charges.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in his factual findings and misapprehended the evidentiary record.

The Court held that the respondent failed to provide medical evidence that he or the patient witnesses qualified for an exemption, and there was no evidence of a systemic boycott by physicians.

The trial judge's orders were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of trafficking in cocaine involving five transactions between October 2010 and April 2011.

The Crown sought a sentence of 30 months imprisonment, while defence counsel sought a conditional sentence of two years less one day.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day to be served in the community with stringent conditions including house arrest, 240 hours of community service, and a three-year probation period.

The court found that while trafficking in cocaine is a serious offence requiring deterrence and denunciation, the defendant's exceptional personal circumstances, strong family and community support, rehabilitative prospects, and the nature of his involvement as an intermediary rather than a major dealer justified a conditional sentence as an exceptional case.

Several civil liberties and HIV/AIDS organizations brought motions to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

The Crown opposed the interventions, arguing the appeal was fact-based and the interventions would be duplicative or prejudicial.

The court granted the motions to intervene, finding that the proposed interveners would provide unique viewpoints on the broader legal and constitutional issues without causing injustice to the parties or prejudicing the appeal process.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude drugs discovered during a search following his arrest for possession of marijuana.

Police approached a vehicle after observing the accused leave an after‑hours club and arrested him after the passenger was found with marijuana.

The court held that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused and that the arrest was based on speculation that he knew about the passenger’s marijuana.

The resulting search and detention violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, and the court rejected the Crown’s argument that the interaction constituted a lawful investigative detention.

Applying the framework in Grant, the court concluded the police conduct demonstrated a deliberate disregard for Charter rights and excluded the seized drugs.

The appellant was convicted of incest and 46 counts of forgery.

The Crown alleged that the appellant's co-accused and husband was actually her son, and that they had fathered children together, including a deceased child.

The appellant appealed, arguing that DNA warrants used to compare their blood with the deceased child's blood violated her Charter rights, and that the trial judge erred in failing to give a W.(D.) charge regarding exculpatory defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the DNA comparison between the two accused breached section 8, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2).

Furthermore, although the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt and credibility, the curative proviso applied due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appeal was dismissed.