ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-00000008-0000(Woodstock)

DATE: 20210922

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

E.J.C.

Defendant

G. Christakos, for the Crown

J. Battin for the Defendant

HEARD: September 13, 14 & 15, 2021

RESTRICTION ON PUBLICATION

By court order made under s. 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, information

that may identify the person described in this judgment as the complainant may

not be published, broadcasted or transmitted in any manner. This judgment

complies with this restriction so that it can be published.

MCARTHUR J.

Introduction

1E.J.C. is charged with three counts of sexual assault on A.T. between March 1 and 31, April 1 and 30 and June 1 and July 31, all in 2006, contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada and a single count of assault with a weapon (a kitchen table) on A.T. between September 1 and October 31, 2010, contrary to Section 267(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

2A ban on the publication of A.T.’s identity and any information to serve to identify her is in effect.

3This is the decision of the court in this case.

The Legal Issues

4The ultimate question in this case is whether the Crown has proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The key issues are credibility and reliability.

Applicable General Legal Principles

5The test in a criminal trial is not which side I believe more but whether the Crown has proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the evidence must be considered in determining whether the Crown has met its burden.

6E.J.C. is presumed to be innocent unless and until the Crown has proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt lies far closer to absolute certainty than it does to a balance of probabilities.

7In assessing the credibility of the witnesses in this case, I also apply the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. W.D. as applied by subsequent cases and commentary such that:

a. I cannot properly resolve a criminal case by deciding which conflicting version of events is preferred;

b. If I believe evidence that is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused, I cannot convict the accused;

c. Even if I do not entirely believe the evidence inconsistent with guilt of the accused, if I cannot decide whether that evidence is true, there is a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted;

d. Even if I entirely disbelieve evidence inconsistent with guilt, the mere rejection of evidence does not prove guilt; and

e. Even where I entirely disbelieve evidence inconsistent with guilt, the accused should not be convicted unless the evidence that is given credit proves the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

8In assessing credibility of all witnesses, I have considered the general integrity and intelligence of the witness, each witness’s opportunity to observe, capacity to remember and accuracy in statements. It is also important to determine whether the witness is honestly endeavoring to tell the truth, whether sincere, frank, biased, reticent and/or evasive.

9The important issues in this case are that of the witnesses’ credibility and reliability. A valuable means of assessing the credibility of a witness is to examine the consistency between what the witness said in the witness box and what the witness has said on other occasions, whether on oath or not. I also have assessed what is testified to in the context of all the evidence in the case and not on an isolated basis including any inconsistencies and whether these are inconsequential or material and significant to the case. Where an inconsistency is significant, then this court has paid careful attention to it when assessing the reliability of the witness's testimony.

10The role of confirmatory and contradictory evidence can be especially important when assessing the evidence of some witnesses. However, confirmatory evidence in particular, need not directly implicate the accused or confirm the Crown witness’ evidence in every respect. Rather, the confirmatory evidence should be capable of restoring the trier's faith in the relevant aspects of the witness' account.

Summary of the Crown’s Case

11E.J.C. and the complainant, A.T., are the parents of a daughter and son, now ages 10 and 8 years of age respectively, who reside with the complainant. Defence counsel admitted at the outset both identity and jurisdiction in this case.

12The complainant first met E.J.C. soon after she moved with her mother to a small-storied apartment building in Woodstock in October 2005. She was then age 15 and E.J.C. was approximately age 34. The complainant’s mother had first invited E.J.C. over to their apartment located two floors apart.

13The complainant and her mother came to attend E.J.C.’s apartment where they would socialize, play video games and smoke marijuana. The complainant and a couple friends would also regularly, twice a week, go to E.J.C.’s apartment.

14In the early part of 2006, E.J.C. had worked in a pool service business. The complainant eventually became involved working in the business in the spring and summer. As a result, the complainant testified they developed a one on one relationship, hung out more frequently and went out on drives together. The complainant testified she regarded E.J.C. as a cooler, older big brother.

15The first of four incidents was around her grandmother’s birthday in March 2007. The complainant was driven by and attended a concert with the defendant. After the concert, she returned with the defendant to his apartment, hung out, smoked marijuana and listened to music with the defendant. While the complainant was watching television, the defendant, who had been playing music, walked and sat to her right side on a futon mattress. When she turned toward him, his penis was exposed out of his pants, he made comments how beautiful and mature she was and asked her to touch his penis and that it had been so long since that had happened.

16The complainant testified that he begged her many times to touch his penis and then reached over across her, grabbed and guided her hand to his penis and cupped his hand around hers onto his penis and let go. She testified she stroked his penis once or twice and then stopped. She was in shock, got up and left and went home and sat in her room. About 2 days later, the defendant handed her a letter and apologized to her. She had no recall of confronting the defendant about this and thought it might have been a mistake.

17The complainant testified that she started to trust the defendant again and that things went back to the way it was before.

18The second incident was two to three weeks later in early to mid-April, 2006. The complainant was hanging out at the defendant’s apartment and went to the washroom and was washing her hands. The defendant came in behind her, shut the door and touched her with his hands under her underwear toward her vaginal area and inserted his fingers in her vagina. She could feel his penis become more erect on her lower back area and she cried. The touching stopped and she went directly home, crying and tried to stay away from her mother.

19A couple days later, the complainant saw the defendant in the hallway. He was accusatory and angry toward her. She testified she felt like she was part of the wrongdoing and felt like two criminals bound together by the bad things they had done. She testified that her friends slowly drifted away through this time and that her friends were into other hard drugs like ecstasy unlike her and the defendant.

20The complainant continued to hang out every other day with the defendant. She also continued to work for the defendant in his pool service business.

21The third and most serious incident was in late June or early July 2007. The complainant testified she went to the defendant’s apartment where the defendant played his music and they smoked marijuana. The defendant was described to be in an unusual mood. She testified she got up to go to the washroom and was passing by him when the defendant grabbed her upper arm and pushed her through the bedroom doorway and onto his bed, landing sideways onto her hip and then onto her back when her shoulder was pushed by the defendant. She testified that he pulled down her pants and underwear, was between her legs and slowly inserted his penis into her vagina. Her pants and underwear around her ankles.

22She testified that she was not sure how long this went on for, was crying throughout, was panicked and had said to him in a soft begging tone, “no, no, no.” She indicated that before he inserted his penis into her fully, the defendant “clicked into reality” and asked her “are you okay?” and she responded “no”. She testified she could not recall how this ended, whether she fell asleep, went home, etc. She testified that he did not ejaculate on or inside of her.

23After this incident, she said that the defendant spoke to her and made various comments about her teenage fire, possible CAS reporting, among others. Notwithstanding these incidents, the complainant testified that they maintained their communications and she continued to go to his apartment quite often.

24In the summer of 2008, the complainant worked in a fair. She testified that her and the defendant struck up a romantic relationship in the fall of 2008.

25In March 2010, the complainant became pregnant with their daughter. When she was approximately 8 months pregnant, the complainant visited the defendant who was living at a residential facility called Blossom Park. The complainant explained this residence was for mentally ill persons. While sitting at the dining room table with the defendant at one point, the defendant became agitated and angry, stood up and pushed the table forcefully. The table went into the complainant’s solar plexus area. She testified that this was intentional, she screamed, was angry and stormed out.

26M.T., the mother of A.T., also testified and confirmed first meeting the defendant at the apartment building. She testified that she discovered her daughter had attended alone to the defendant’s apartment when she was 15 years old. She testified she made a point to speak to the defendant that her daughter was off-limits and reminded him a number of times through until the complainant was 17 years of age. She stated that the defendant and complainant were in a relationship after she was 18 years of age.

27M.T. also confirmed in cross-examination that there was a dispute about access by the defendant to the children and she eventually spoke to the police in relation to the allegations in this case, although she was unsure as to dates.

Summary of the Defence Case

28E.J.C. testified. He is now 50 years of age.

29He denied any sexual assault or an assault with a kitchen table involving the complainant at any time.

30E.J.C. went to Grade 10 and then started working in a family business referred to as the Home Centre that involved pools and saunas. He also worked a short time as a dishwasher at a local motel and returned to work at the Home Centre and also traveled with a band. When he met the complainant, he was working at the family business.

31E.J.C. moved in with the complainant on November 1, 2010. The complainant was 20 years old and soon, on December 7, 2010, gave birth to their daughter E. A son was born in 2013. E.J.C. testified he played a major role in the household and home located on the 17th Line, Innerkip.

32At some point in 2010, E.J.C. testified that he voluntarily admitted himself into Woodstock General Hospital and dealt with Dr. Fernandes who diagnosed him as schizophrenic. E.J.C. stated he questioned this since the doctor only spent 5 minutes with him. He otherwise voluntarily discharged himself. He indicated that he had resided at Blossom Park, a low-income housing project. He testified did not live in the main house and had a caseworker who he regularly talked to. He testified that he had not been legally diagnosed with any mental health issues.

33He testified that the complainant left from the rural property with the children to a place that he discovered was a shelter. The complainant had told him in late 2014 that she wanted to move and later told him that she was going to leave for another person in Hamilton. He testified to an incident of blind rage by the complainant over a situation with their daughter. He said that he backed off.

34When the complainant did leave the home, he asked her about seeing the children. He testified that her response was that she was going to say she was age 15 and he raped her and commented to him to the effect - what did it matter since he did not then see his other older children from an another earlier relationship. He regarded her responses as a subtle threat and did not want to escalate the situation.

35After not seeing the children for months, E.J.C. hired a lawyer and brought an application in family court in Woodstock in the summer of 2015. Much was made in chief and cross-examination about para. 8 in the Application as to violence. E.J.C. as noted earlier denied any assaultive behavior. After speaking with his lawyer, he did not raise any conduct of the complainant since he felt it would not benefit the children.

Essential Elements

36The Crown must prove each of the essential elements of the offence of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. The essential elements of sexual assault are as follows:

a. Touching;

b. The sexual nature of the contact;

c. The absence of consent;

d. The intention to touch;

e. Knowledge, recklessness or blindness about the lack of consent.

37The essential elements of assault with a weapon likewise involve the similar elements referred to above absent the sexual nature of contact and include the element of a weapon, in this case alleged to be the kitchen table.

Assessment and Analysis of the Evidence

38The assessment of the evidence must necessarily take into account all of the evidence, content and context of the allegations made. In this case and if true, the allegations through the main Crown witnesses can only be seen as sudden, opportunistic and intrusive assaults.

39The following is the analysis and commentary of the significant features in the evidence of this case and important submissions made by the Crown and defence that are central to this decision.

General Comments and Context

40The Crown’s case involved the evidence of the complainant and her mother, M.T. E.J.C.’s evidence will be reviewed later in these reasons. I will make references to the witnesses and additional evidence where necessary for these reasons.

41As to the evidence of A.T., she was measured, capable, intelligent, articulate and poised in giving her evidence. She answered the questions put to her in a stoical manner. She was responsive and firm in her presentation and not combative. As to how she testified I found her demeanor generally favorable, however, in this case I have also considered the content of her evidence, the inconsistencies, the presence and absence of confirmatory evidence and other significant features in relation to all of the other evidence in this case.

42It is not necessary to comment further on the evidence of M.T.

The Access Dispute

43The allegations against E.J.C. arise during an ongoing custody and access dispute between him and the complainant. This dispute started in late 2014 and involved an initial court application by E.J.C. in the summer of 2015. Features of this family court proceeding will also be addressed in these reasons.

44The access problems continued through to this trial. The Crown submitted that the access dispute played no part in the allegations and, if true, was not significant. The access issues require further examination in this case.

45As mentioned, E.J.C. brought an application for custody and access in the summer of 2015. It was obvious that E.J.C. was sincere and wanted to have visitation with both children. Exhibit #1 as filed involved the various documents including application, answers, affidavits and notice of motions in the family court proceeding.

46Each of E.J.C. and the complainant filed documents in the family court in August of 2015. There is no refence by either party to any violence despite the claims for custody, access and child support and restraining requests.

47The complainant conceded on cross-examination that she did not make the assault complaints that are also the subject matter of these charges until after she went to the police in April of 2018. Soon after the defendant was criminally charged.

48Prior to this and since about 2013, the conflict between the complainant and the defendant was more about matters around supervised access and involved E.J.C.’s mental instability.

49An order was made on December 19, 2016 (formally issued on March 30, 2017) pursuant to Minutes of Settlement between the parties. For the purposes of this decision, the parties agreed that the complainant would have custody of the children and the defendant would have access generally every other weekend and Wednesdays in the afternoon and into the early evening.

50Despite this court order, access problems persisted throughout 2017 and into 2018. In essence, the complainant had eventually unilaterally moved with the children and was either unable or unwilling to arrange the Wednesday access that was a specific term of the court order.

51On April 24, 2018, the complainant went to the police and provided a statement in relation to the allegations in this proceeding. The defendant was charged shortly after and was initially prohibited by terms of release from communicating directly or indirectly with the complainant.

52The defendant soon after brought a contempt motion in the summer of 2018 and requested enforcement of visitation requirements against the complainant as previously court ordered. In her affidavit sworn September 2, 2018, the complainant referenced the charges against the defendant and that the defendant had the release restrictions as a result of the criminal charges preventing contact with her. It was in relation to the complaint to the police, this was the first time allegations of a criminal nature were raised and then raised in the family court proceedings.

53By order of Justice Paulls dated January 31, 2019, the complainant was found in contempt of the prior court order. In the proceeding before Justice Paulls, the complainant in her submissions before that court stated she thought the defendant, after getting charged, had decided to take off, like he did with his first two children years earlier.

54The defence position was clear from the complainant’s cross-examination where she then denied that she proceeded with the charges hoping that the defendant would give up on access to the children.

55After the contempt finding and order, the complainant in February 2019 brought a motion to vary the prior custody, access and residential distance in relation to the children to permit her to move to Toronto and eliminate the Wednesday access. In that proceeding the complainant again referred to the allegations of sexual assault and referred to the defendant as her accused rapist and that he seduced her at the tender age of 15. This was denied by the defendant in those proceedings.

56On August 23, 2019, a further court order was made expanding the residential area to 200 km and thereby permitted the complainant to move to Toronto and required her to provide the transportation of the children for visitation to the defendant. The complainant did not provide transportation on some occasions and particularly on a weekend proximate to this trial.

57Contrary to the Crown’s submission, the complainant had ample motive and did use the criminal allegation to thwart the pursuit of access by the defendant. The finding of contempt by Justice Paulls clearly meant the complainant intentionally disregarded and went against a proper court order in relation to access by the defendant. The complainant had also consistently resisted proper and court ordered access throughout prior to raising the criminal allegations and since then through to the time just before this trial.

58On all the evidence, I find the complainant did use the criminal allegations as an additional strategy in the ongoing access dispute. The access dispute provides a necessary feature and context for the evidence in this case.

First incident – March 2006

59As to this first incident, on cross-examination, the complainant strongly disagreed with many suggestions put to her by defence counsel.

60The evidence of the complainant did involve some features as to what hands were used and what and who touched who in her evidence. The complainant testified that she went directly to her mother’s apartment after leaving the defendant’s. The complainant was 15 years of age at this time.

61The complainant’s mother’s evidence was that she spoke to the defendant at some point around this time. She also testified that she became aware of a relationship between the complainant and the defendant when she was age 18 years. There was no other evidence of note nor significance as to the relationship involvement, perceptions or concerns between the complainant or her mother over the 2006 period in particular.

62There was a complete absence of evidence in the Crown’s case that, if the warnings were made by the complainant’s mother as she testified, that there was no other suspicions or any other follow up in any way by the mother over the next 3 to 4 years, particularly where the complainant lived most of the time with her mother and the concern was about sexual conduct between them. This would have been expected particularly since the complainant worked along with the defendant in the pool business, frequently hung out with the defendant otherwise and went for drives with him according to her testimony.

Second Incident – April 2006

63The complainant was very clear in her examination in chief that the defendant had put his hands, plural, down her pants.

64In her initial and lengthy statement to the investigating officer taken on April 24, 2018 at the police station, the complainant clearly stated that the defendant put his hand, singular, “on my hip and put his hand down…” There could not on any generous interpretation find on the evidence that there was reference to hands, plural, or both hands.

65The complainant’s response on cross-examination when confronted with the video audio of the interview was problematic and troublesome. She maintained that she did not believe that she said hand. She clearly did. Faced with the obvious contradiction, the complainant remained unmoved and steadfast in her response.

66Both the Crown and defence counsel indicated that this was a minor inconsistency. Although not every inconsistency needs to be explained, there are two features; first, such an inconsistency could not be explained at this trial by being confused or mistaken. Secondly, was the complainant’s attitude toward the contradiction. These features combined to be somewhat troubling. Standing alone, such an inconsistency may be minor and of little consequence.

67However, this inconsistency takes on some added significance in view of any additional and more serious inconsistencies and the other concerns raised earlier above.

Third Incident – Summer 2006

68The third incident is the most serious. Not only did it involve forced and sustained vaginal intercourse, but the complainant was detailed about various features including there had been no ejaculation by the defendant.

69The complainant also specifically testified that she was wearing pants and a belt. This was of significance since this feature was inextricably associated with and explained the difficulty of removing her pants and underwear before intercourse by the defendant in her trial testimony. Her evidence in chief left no doubt that it was the defendant who was solely responsible for her pants and underwear being pulled down to her ankles This was obviously a significant and material feature of this incident.

70On cross-examination, the complainant was emphatic that she had never said that she just pulled her pants down. However, her trial evidence was contradicted by her initial police statement where she stated to the effect that “I just pulled my pants down”. Despite the clear indication from the video audio of the police statement recorded in this regard, the complainant’s response at trial was that she disagreed and stated to the effect “It did not sound like what I said.” To the contrary, it did.

71In these circumstances, the import of the statement “I just pulled my pants down” might suggest a resignation, an acquiesce or another purposeful act of that person. That clearly was not what the complainant conveyed in her evidence at trial. Such an inconsistency is not only material in this case, but the lack of any explanation as well as the failure to acknowledge the obvious inconsistency goes well beyond a carelessness with the truth. It directly goes to the heart of this case - the veracity of the complainant before the court.

72The defence maintained this was a material inconsistency. The Crown submitted this was a gap in the complainant’s evidence and suggested that the complainant may not have actually accurately heard or understood the evidence. The latter was an effort to provide an explanation. This however is speculation on the Crown’s part and was never clarified. There is a material inconsistency. I find no satisfactory explanation was provided. Left this way, this feature reflects adversely on the credibility of the complainant’s evidence and diminished confidence in her testimony.

73In addition, the inconsistency referred to earlier takes on somewhat increased significance. In view of these problematic features, it is difficult to give appropriate credit to the complainant’s testimony in relation to this most serious incident and also had negatively affected the complainant’s evidence overall.

74This court is mindful that the complainant was testifying to events that would have taken place in her mid to late teens and not as a child. Our Supreme Court of Canada has directed that, in general, where an adult is testifying as to events which occurred when a child, that witness’s credibility should be assessed according to criteria applicable to that person as an adult witness. The presence of inconsistencies, particularly as to peripheral matters such as time and location, should be considered in the context of the age of the witness at the time of the events to which the witness is testifying. Such peripheral matters may require the court’s scrutiny where the circumstances are not dealing with events when a child. See R. v. W.R., 1992 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1992]2 S.C.R. 122.

75In addition, this court is most mindful and cognizant to avoid impermissible stereotypes or making finding not on the evidence or absence of evidence. Victims of sexual assaults do not have to raise the alarm or continuously fight back. It is well-recognized by the court that to do so otherwise entertains such pernicious and impermissible stereotypes. This type of reasoning simply should not be permitted. See R. v. Davidson, [2018] O.J. No. 3426.

76Furthermore, even though there is evidence that the complainant maintained substantial and ongoing contact with E.J.C. after all incidents complained of, this court places no consideration on this evidence in this case. The court must not place any reliance on stereotypical views as to how victims of sexual assault would behave including any expectation that a victim of sexual abuse would make attempts to avoid the perpetrator. See R. v. A.B.A., [2019] ONCA 124 and R. v. A.R.J.D., 2018 SCC 6

Fourth Incident – Fall 2010

77This last incident was approximately 4 years after the three other more serious sexual assault allegations.

78By this period of time, the defendant resided at Blossom Park and in relation to some mental health issues as described by the complainant. The agitation of the defendant around food as described by the complainant and the pushing of the table were described by the complainant as being intentional. This latter point was essentially a conclusory statement by the complainant.

79In addition, the evidence was that the defendant and the complainant resumed a relationship together for approximately another four years that included the birth of their son in 2013. It was indeed curious that the resumption of the relationship made nary a mention of concern by the complainant in them coming to live together for the next few years.

80Such evidence must also be considered in the circumstances and context immediately around the incident and given all of the evidence taken in the case. This is important as well in view of the substantially changed relationship, conflicts and the legal dispute that arose between the complainant and the defendant involving the custody and access of their children. The court is most aware of the concern that any incidents could, and this court finds, did become fodder for a narrative that was used to gain an advantage in the legal dispute.

81There were some other inconsistencies in the evidence, however, it is not necessary to make any further reference to these based on the inconsistencies referred to above and other findings made or yet to be made.

The Access Dispute

82As to the gap between the date of the incidents complained of and the complainant going to police on April 24, 2018, the court ought not in any way make any adverse inference or cast any requirement to make a complaint to the police at the earliest opportunity. There are various reasons well-known to the courts why victims of sexual assault might delay the disclosure. This mere fact alone is insignificant. Where raised by the Crown in the evidence, the court must, like any evidence, give it proper consideration in the context of all of the evidence.

83In this case, the defence submitted that an adverse inference can reasonably be made that the complainant raised the issues of such allegations to effectively prevent and discourage the defendant from exercising and pursuing his visitation to the children. This inference is not only reasonably supported on the general evidence but also by the complaint’s own statement in submission before Justice Paulls.

The Defence Case

84I have also carefully reviewed the defence evidence of E.J.C. who testified.

85E.J.C. is certainly not a sophisticated witness. He demonstrated a simple and average intelligence throughout his evidence and the proceedings. He was respectful and not combative throughout his evidence, both in chief and in cross-examination.

86Although many of his answers meandered tangentially well-beyond the questions asked at times, E.J.C. was not evasive. There was evidence in this case from the complainant that E.J.C. may have some mental health challenges, but I am careful not to attribute negative inferences to some of his lengthy and ponderous responses to this. In fairness, E.J.C.’s manner, appearance and conduct was less sophisticated, rather simple, passive and withdrawing in its nature.

87There was a basic cogency and coherence in the defendant’s evidence despite mainly minor inconsistencies and his meandering and ponderous responses. There were also times when his feelings of being a victim seemed obsessive. The inconsistencies and problematic features however I find were of little consequence and did not undermine his credibility or reliability to the extent to lead to the rejection of his evidence.

88I am aware that it is my duty to evaluate the accused’s evidence in the context of all of the evidence adduced at trial. I have assessed the accused’s evidence in light of the whole evidence and, in so doing, compared his evidence with that of all other witnesses.

Findings

89I cannot reject the evidence of E.J.C. in this regard after considering his evidence in chief and cross examination and in view of the totality of all of the other evidence in this case.

90Even if I had rejected E.J.C.’s evidence in relation to all of these incidents, I had concerns with the overall reliability of the evidence of A.T. The problematic features of her evidence as outlined earlier do not leave the court with confidence in the reliability of her evidence in this regard. In view of these doubts and concerns, the proof of the offence of assault and sexual assaults as alleged is insufficient. A finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not possible in view of these concerns.

Conclusion

91In summary, based on the test established in R. v. W(D), I cannot reject the evidence of the defendant. This raises a reasonable doubt with respect to the criminal allegations of sexual assaults and the assault with a kitchen table.

92Even if I had rejected the evidence of the defendant, I would have found the Crown had not discharged its burden to prove essential element that the acts occurred beyond a reasonable doubt based on the insufficiency of the evidence and the reliability and credibility concerns in the Crown’s case as referred to earlier.

93For reasons provided, the charges of sexual assaults and assault with a weapon against E.J.C. are dismissed.

Justice M.D. McArthur

Released: September 22, 2021

COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-00000008-0000 (Woodstock)

DATE: 20210922

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

E.J.C.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

McArthur J.