Helen Isabel How

This criminal trial concerned charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon against the defendant, Paul Nelson, stemming from a stabbing incident.

The defence argued self-defence.

The court found the complainant's testimony unreliable due to inconsistencies and intoxication.

Based on video evidence and eyewitness accounts, the court determined that the complainant initiated the physical altercation by ambushing and brutally beating the defendant.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill the complainant, noting that the stabbing occurred while the defendant was being severely assaulted and was an attempt to escape.

Furthermore, the court found that the Crown failed to disprove self-defence, as the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe force was being used against him, acted for self-protection, and his response, while involving a knife, was not unreasonable given the relentless nature of the attack and limited options for de-escalation.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of all charges.

This case involves a criminal trial where the accused, Dwight Whittaker, faced charges related to offences against peace officers.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

During the trial, a Charter motion was heard seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging violations of the accused's s. 7 and 12 rights.

The court found that while the accused was guilty of the charges arising from the courtroom incident, the conduct of a court officer, Officer Dicks, in the holding cells prior to the courtroom incident was unlawful and egregious, constituting clear violations of the accused's s. 7 rights.

Specifically, Officer Dicks used excessive force, including punching the accused and standing on him, which was deemed humiliating and unlawful.

Considering the egregious nature of the Charter violations and the racial context (Black accused, White officer), the court found that a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate remedy to distance the administration of justice from such conduct.

All charges were stayed.

The defendant brought a Charter motion to stay proceedings or exclude evidence, alleging excessive force by police (ss. 7, 12) and violations of his rights to be informed of charges and to counsel (ss. 10(a), 10(b)).

The court found that the police use of force, including pepper spray, was reasonable and proportionate given the defendant's non-compliance and aggressive resistance.

The court also found that the defendant was informed of the reasons for his arrest in a timely manner and that any delay in advising him of his right to counsel was justified by the dynamic and volatile situation, and that he ultimately exercised his right to counsel.

The motion for Charter relief was dismissed.

The accused was charged with causing a disturbance contrary to section 175(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for allegedly shouting profane and misogynistic comments at women in a public park.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of a civilian witness who observed the conduct and called police.

The accused testified in his own defence, denying the allegations.

The court acquitted the accused on three independent grounds: (1) the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt; (2) material inconsistencies between the civilian witness and the police officer undermined the reliability of the Crown's evidence; and (3) even accepting the Crown's evidence, it failed to establish the legal elements of causing a disturbance, specifically the requirement of an externally manifested interference with the ordinary and customary use of the public place.

The applicant was charged with having a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration while having care and control of a motor vehicle.

He was arrested on September 28, 2013, with trial initially scheduled for December 11, 2014.

The trial was adjourned due to Crown failure to disclose the correct breath room videotape, and rescheduled to June 2, 2015.

The applicant brought a Charter application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) claiming the delay infringed his right to be tried without unreasonable delay.

The court found that the Crown's conduct was responsible for the adjournment and the subsequent delay, resulting in approximately 19.5 months of total delay, which exceeded the Morin guidelines.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand after being pulled over for a suspected Highway Traffic Act violation involving excessive rear seat passengers.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the initial detention and the ASD demand on Charter grounds, arguing the stop was arbitrary and pretextual.

The court found the initial detention was lawful based on a legitimate seat belt investigation, that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on detecting an odour of alcohol on the defendant's breath, and that the defendant clearly and repeatedly refused the ASD demand.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on an approved screening device test and breathalyzer results.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to demand the approved screening device test under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The officer's testimony was equivocal and inconsistent with his notes and the testimony of other Crown witnesses.

The court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter due to the serious Charter breach and credibility concerns regarding the officer's investigation and testimony.

Without the breathalyzer evidence, the Crown failed to prove impaired driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both counts were dismissed.

The Crown brought an application under section 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code seeking an assessment order to determine whether the accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of committing the offences so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility.

The accused had pleaded guilty to public mischief and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence did not establish reasonable grounds to believe an assessment was necessary.

The evidence consisted of observations of odd behaviour and a statement by the accused that he was schizophrenic and receiving treatment, which was insufficient to meet the threshold for ordering an assessment.

The accused was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual assault after engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse with a partner for approximately fourteen months after learning he was HIV-positive and failing to disclose his status.

The complainant later tested positive for HIV and had developed AIDS, although it could not be proven that infection occurred after the accused learned of his status.

The court held that non-disclosure of HIV status vitiated consent through fraud under s. 265(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.

In determining sentence, the court weighed the accused’s lack of criminal record and positive community reputation against the repeated risk imposed on the complainant and the breach of trust inherent in the conduct.

A custodial sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence was required.