Stephanie Heyens

A police sergeant was charged with assault causing bodily harm after using force to arrest a highly intoxicated individual with a lengthy criminal history and known propensity for violence.

The sergeant employed a "grounding" technique that resulted in the arrestee's face striking the ground, causing a laceration to the cheek.

The court found that while the sergeant had reasonable grounds to arrest and was entitled to use necessary force, the force employed was unnecessary, disproportionate, and unlawful.

The arrestee had become compliant before the sergeant applied force, and the sergeant's stated justifications for the use of force were contradicted by video evidence.

The court convicted the sergeant of assault causing bodily harm, finding that the injury met the statutory threshold for bodily harm.

The offender was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police seized 188.72 grams of powder cocaine and 20.75 grams of crack cocaine from his apartment.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 3 to 3.5 years, while the defence argued for a non-custodial sentence, citing exceptional circumstances and case law on addict traffickers.

The court rejected the defence's argument, finding no evidence the offender was an addict and concluding he was a commercial trafficker.

However, emphasizing rehabilitation for a youthful first offender, the court sentenced him to two years less a day in reformatory and two years of probation.

The defendant was charged with six offences arising from a police search of his residence: five counts of unsafe storage of non-restricted firearms and one count of ammunition storage.

The defendant challenged the validity of the search warrant under section 8 of the Charter.

The court conducted a blended trial and Charter voir dire.

The court found the search warrant was validly issued based on reliable information from a complainant regarding the defendant's firearm possession and concerns about safe storage.

The defendant was found guilty on three counts (unsafe storage of a .22 calibre rifle, unsafe storage of an SKS rifle in an unlocked case, and unsafe storage of a loaded Chiappa shotgun) and not guilty on three counts (two rifles stored in a glass cabinet and ammunition storage).

During a trial for conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances, the Crown sought to introduce ten recorded conversations obtained via a room probe.

The accused opposed the admission of the evidence, arguing the audio quality was too poor to be reliable.

Following a voir dire, the court found that eight of the recordings were largely inaudible and lacked sufficient context to permit a fair and reliable assessment of their substance.

Portions of two recordings were found to be sufficiently clear to meet the threshold test for admissibility, subject to the Crown satisfying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule at trial.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand after being pulled over for a suspected Highway Traffic Act violation involving excessive rear seat passengers.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the initial detention and the ASD demand on Charter grounds, arguing the stop was arbitrary and pretextual.

The court found the initial detention was lawful based on a legitimate seat belt investigation, that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on detecting an odour of alcohol on the defendant's breath, and that the defendant clearly and repeatedly refused the ASD demand.

The defendant was convicted.

The Crown applied for mandamus after a trial judge declined to correct an erroneous sex offender registry order made following conviction for two counts of sexual assault.

The sentencing judge had imposed a 10‑year registration order under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act when the Criminal Code mandated a lifetime order for multiple designated offences.

The court held that the sentencing judge possessed inherent jurisdiction to correct the error because the duration of a SOIRA order is determined by a mechanical statutory calculation rather than a substantive sentencing discretion.

As the trial judge declined jurisdiction and no clear appeal route existed for such an order in summary conviction proceedings, the Superior Court granted mandamus.

The matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice to correct the order.