Hafeez S. Amarshi

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained during a search of his residence, arguing that the search warrant was invalid due to deliberate misrepresentations and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court found that the affiant deliberately misled the issuing justice regarding the confidential informant's criminal history, motivation, and the corroborative police observations.

After excising the inaccurate information, the court concluded that the remaining ITO was not sufficiently reliable to support the warrant, resulting in a breach of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the serious nature of the police misconduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice on July 4, 2016.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding that a reasonable person in the officer's position would have believed reasonable and probable grounds existed to arrest the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's analysis, finding that she stated the correct test, correctly examined the totality of the circumstances, and that those circumstances supported the objective reasonableness of the search.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a criminal trial for possession for the purpose of trafficking, the defendant alleged police planted drugs.

The Crown did not call Officer Dobbs, a search team member facing an outstanding assault charge (ABH) from an unrelated incident where a prior judge made negative credibility findings against him.

The defence sought to call Officer Dobbs and cross-examine him on the ABH charge details to impeach his credibility.

The court ruled that the defence could call Officer Dobbs and cross-examine him from the outset, citing the interests of justice and the Crown's strategic decision not to call him.

However, the scope of cross-examination on the ABH charge details was limited by the collateral fact rule and the principle against introducing prior judicial credibility findings (Ghorvei), preventing the jury from inferring guilt or prior disbelief.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine.

The trial judge had found the appellant in possession of cocaine concealed under the driver's seat of the vehicle he was driving.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in considering that the appellant was in the presence of a person known to be an active member of the drug trade.

The Court of Appeal applied the proviso, finding that the other factors established beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was in possession of the cocaine.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty of trafficking in crack cocaine and simple possession of crack cocaine.

The court considered the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, her employment history, her role as a caregiver for her mother, and the fact that her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached by police delay in facilitating access to counsel.

Emphasizing the principles of denunciation and deterrence while acknowledging the strong mitigating factors, the court imposed a blended sentence consisting of a 90-day intermittent jail sentence for the trafficking charge and an 18-month conditional sentence for the possession charge.

The offender was convicted of four counts of trafficking in cocaine.

At sentencing, he brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of s. 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code, which eliminated conditional sentences for offences with a maximum penalty of 14 years or life, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the provision did not result in grossly disproportionate sentences and was not overbroad.

The offender was sentenced to 90 days of intermittent imprisonment followed by two years of probation.

The offender was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police seized 188.72 grams of powder cocaine and 20.75 grams of crack cocaine from his apartment.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 3 to 3.5 years, while the defence argued for a non-custodial sentence, citing exceptional circumstances and case law on addict traffickers.

The court rejected the defence's argument, finding no evidence the offender was an addict and concluding he was a commercial trafficker.

However, emphasizing rehabilitation for a youthful first offender, the court sentenced him to two years less a day in reformatory and two years of probation.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking 0.77 grams of crack cocaine.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 12 to 13 months, while the defence submitted that a 5-month sentence was appropriate.

The court considered the accused's guilty plea, remorse, and lack of aggravating factors as mitigating circumstances.

The accused was sentenced to 5 months in custody, less 3 days of pre-sentence credit, followed by 2 years of probation and a lifetime firearms prohibition.

The accused was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking in Methylone, Ketamine, and Cannabis.

An application to exclude evidence under the Charter was dismissed.

The court considered sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence, noting the commercial nature of the drug enterprise and the lack of significant mitigating factors.

A total sentence of 23 months incarceration was imposed, reduced to 8 months after credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by two years of probation with specific conditions, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The applicant, charged with trafficking in crack cocaine, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence seized from her vehicle, alleging violations of her s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The court found no s. 8 violation, concluding the search was lawful pursuant to a warrant and as a search incident to arrest, despite the searching officer being unaware of the warrant.

The court found that the applicant's s. 10(b) rights were breached due to an inadequate informational caution upon arrest and an unjustified delay in facilitating access to counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the reliable, non-conscriptive evidence seized from the vehicle should not be excluded, as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Deepu Sawh, charged with four counts of trafficking crack cocaine, sought a judicial stay of proceedings based on entrapment after the Crown closed its case and guilt was admitted.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to investigate Sawh based on a detailed and reliable confidential informant tip, and the undercover officer's initial interaction was a legitimate investigative step, not an inducement.

The court emphasized that the reasonable suspicion inquiry should focus on the collective knowledge of the investigative team.

The offender was found guilty of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a sentence of two and a half years' incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's mental illness, lack of prior drug record, and the delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation, along with a ten-year weapons prohibition.

Following a conviction for trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime arising from a street‑level undercover drug buy, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment.

The court reviewed the entrapment doctrine from R v Mack and subsequent jurisprudence, including the principles governing random virtue testing and bona fide police investigations targeting areas of suspected criminal activity.

Evidence showed the undercover officer conducted an opportunity buy in an area reasonably suspected of significant drug activity and did not induce the accused beyond offering an opportunity to sell drugs.

The court rejected the accused’s claim that the officer exploited sympathy or persisted unfairly.

The accused failed to meet the burden of establishing entrapment as an abuse of process.

The accused sought exclusion of cocaine and cash seized during execution of a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act telewarrant, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court held that the Information to Obtain did not comply with s. 487.1(4) of the Criminal Code because it omitted the required statement explaining why it was impracticable to appear personally before a justice, rendering the telewarrant invalid and the search warrantless.

However, the court rejected allegations that police failed to provide a copy of the telewarrant or denied access to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court found the breach was at the less serious end of the spectrum, the impact on privacy interests was significant, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits strongly favoured admission.

The exclusion application was dismissed and the evidence admitted.

The accused brought a motion under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for alleged breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from charge to the anticipated trial was approximately 31 months, with about 19 months attributed to institutional or mixed institutional delay.

Applying the Morin framework, the court considered the reasons for delay and whether actual or inferred prejudice had been established.

The accused alleged stress, bail restrictions, housing issues, and inability to travel, but the court found these harms were not caused by the delay or were self-inflicted due to failure to seek bail variations.

Given the seriousness of the charges and absence of demonstrated prejudice, the court concluded the delay did not justify a stay.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Police officers attended a known problem house to check on tenants and observed the accused flee into a bathroom upon seeing them.

The officers detained the accused and conducted a pat-down search, finding crack cocaine in his pocket.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the investigative detention was lawful but the search violated s. 8 based on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) because the officers acted in good faith according to the law as it was understood at the time.

Sentencing for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under s.5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of proceeds of crime under s.354(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The offender had a significant prior criminal record including related drug trafficking offences and had committed the offence shortly after release from a previous custodial sentence.

Despite strong aggravating factors and the Crown seeking a sentence of 2½ to 3 years, the court gave weight to credible evidence of sustained rehabilitation during more than two years on strict bail conditions, including stable employment and family support.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, the court imposed a custodial sentence followed by probation and community service.

Two accused were jointly tried for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession, with one accused also charged with possession of proceeds of crime.

Crack cocaine was discovered during an inventory search of a vehicle following a traffic stop and planned tow for lack of insurance.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including proximity to the drugs, possession of cash and cell phones, and suspicious movements in the vehicle.

The court held the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either accused had knowledge of the drugs in the vehicle.

Given the limited visibility of the bag, lack of direct evidence, and several reasonable alternative inferences, the circumstantial evidence did not establish knowing possession.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude the drugs on the basis of alleged breaches of ss. 8 and 9.

Police observed a known drug user behaving suspiciously and subsequently watched him enter the accused’s vehicle.

During the encounter an officer observed a baggie of suspected crack cocaine in plain view in the vehicle door pocket, leading to the accused’s arrest and a search that revealed additional drugs.

The court rejected the accused’s version of events alleging an unlawful strip-style search and fabrication by police, finding the officers credible and concluding that the detention, arrest, and search were lawful.

The Charter application was dismissed and the drugs were admitted into evidence.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The charges involved four counts of trafficking in cocaine.

The total delay from charge to trial was approximately three years and four months, including about fourteen months of institutional delay in the Superior Court.

The court found that a nine‑month delay after an adjourned trial date resulted from systemic scheduling failures despite a judicial direction that the trial be set within three months.

The accused established significant prejudice arising from restrictive bail conditions requiring separation from his family and the inability to pursue employment or education opportunities.

Balancing the relevant Morin factors, the court concluded that the delay was unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings.