Michael Edward Webster

This decision addresses a pre-trial application by two accused, Nicole Fife and Leonida Pilliatis, seeking to exclude evidence obtained by police, alleging breaches of their Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms rights.

The court found that while the initial detention of both accused was lawful, Ms. Fife's Charter rights were breached by the police failing to promptly inform her of the reason for detention and her right to counsel, and by interrogating her after she invoked her right to counsel.

Mr. Pilliatis's Charter rights were not breached.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court excluded the evidence (drugs and statements) against Ms. Fife due to the seriousness and impact of the Charter breaches, but found the evidence admissible against Mr. Pilliatis.

Three offenders pleaded guilty to multiple firearms offences, including aggravated assault and reckless discharge of a firearm, following a planned shooting at a taxicab that wounded one passenger.

One offender also pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered the serious aggravating factors of the public shooting alongside mitigating factors, including guilty pleas, youth, and exceptionally harsh pre-sentence custody conditions exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Global sentences of 6 years were imposed for two offenders and 7.5 years for the third, before applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash an order committing them to stand trial for attempted murder and related offences concerning an unidentified passenger in a taxi.

They conceded there was sufficient evidence to commit them regarding the identified passenger, but argued there was no evidence they targeted the unidentified passenger.

The reviewing court found that circumstantial evidence, including a plural racial slur and continued shooting after the identified passenger was hit, provided the requisite scintilla of evidence to support the committal.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder following a targeted shooting, applied for judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed release on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the applicant's extensive criminal record and history of breaching court orders justified detention on the secondary ground.

Furthermore, the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offence involving firearms, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice necessitated detention on the tertiary ground.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The applicant, Jeremy McDermott, charged with robbery and weapons offences, sought to exclude evidence (seized items, informal utterances, and formal statement) under ss. 10(b) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his right to counsel.

The court found that while the police properly informed McDermott of his rights at the scene, there was an inordinate and unexplained delay of over two hours at the police station in facilitating his access to duty counsel.

This delay constituted a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant factors, the court determined that the police conduct was not deliberate or systemic, and the weapons and spontaneous utterances were not causally or temporally connected to the breach, thus admissible.

However, the formal video statement, being self-incriminating evidence obtained after a significant denial of the right to counsel, was excluded as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision determining whether the accused should be committed to stand trial on first-degree murder or second-degree murder charges.

The Crown alleged that the accused planned and deliberately murdered the victim by shooting him in the head.

The Crown's primary evidence was surveillance video showing the accused entering the victim's apartment with a gun pointed at the victim's back.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence existed for second-degree murder but contested first-degree murder.

The court found that while the surveillance video evidence of the gun was significant, when considered in the context of all evidence—including the accused allowing the victim to leave the apartment briefly, the absence of evidence of animus between the parties, and the lack of evidence of a struggle—the evidence did not support a reasonable inference of planning and deliberation required for first-degree murder.

The court discharged the accused on first-degree murder but committed him to stand trial on second-degree murder.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit of 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging that police violated his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by failing to inform him immediately of his right to counsel and by failing to facilitate his access to counsel at the first reasonable opportunity.

The court found that the police breached both the informational and implementational duties under section 10(b).

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the seriousness of the state conduct and the officer's ongoing ignorance of fundamental constitutional obligations.

The accused was charged with robbery with a firearm, pointing a firearm, unauthorized possession of a firearm, and breaching probation and prohibition orders.

The victim testified that the accused and an accomplice entered an apartment, put a gun in his mouth, held a knife to his throat, and stole his money and shoes.

A key witness recanted her prior statements, prompting a successful KGB application by the Crown.

The court found the victim's testimony credible and, relying on R. v. Charbonneau, concluded the unrecovered weapon was a real firearm.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude a firearm found on his person during a search incident to arrest.

Police officers approached a parked vehicle to investigate a suspected Liquor Licence Act offence after observing open beer cans in plain view.

The accused argued his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights were breached by the investigation, his detention, and his subsequent arrest for drug offences after cocaine was found on the driver.

The court dismissed the application, finding the police lawfully investigated the liquor offence, the initial questioning did not constitute a detention, and the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused based on a constellation of facts.

The United States of America sought the extradition of Osayi Edison Omoruyi on charges related to an international fraud scheme.

The Attorney General of Canada applied for a committal for prosecution under the Extradition Act, alleging Omoruyi participated in inducing victims to send funds to Nigeria, representing the Canadian offence of possession of property obtained by crime.

The defense challenged identification and the fungible nature of money.

The court, acting as an extradition judge with a limited screening function, found sufficient admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case for committal, including strong circumstantial evidence linking Omoruyi to the fraudulent transfers.

Omoruyi was committed into custody to await surrender.

The offender was found guilty of trafficking in crack cocaine and simple possession of crack cocaine.

The court considered the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, her employment history, her role as a caregiver for her mother, and the fact that her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached by police delay in facilitating access to counsel.

Emphasizing the principles of denunciation and deterrence while acknowledging the strong mitigating factors, the court imposed a blended sentence consisting of a 90-day intermittent jail sentence for the trafficking charge and an 18-month conditional sentence for the possession charge.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of sexual offences and internet luring involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by focusing on evidence relevant to the accused's subjective belief about the complainant's age, rather than the objective steps taken to confirm that belief.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused applied for judicial interim release on charges of second degree murder and arson arising from a contract arson of a variety store that resulted in a death.

The court found the Crown's circumstantial case to be strong and the proposed release plan involving family supervision to be inadequate.

The application was dismissed, with the court finding the accused failed to show cause for release on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and assault against a 14-year-old complainant.

The court found that the accused groomed the complainant by providing him with marihuana, cigarettes, and a place to stay, thereby establishing a position of trust.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as incredible and internally inconsistent, applying the W.(D.) test.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for traffic violations.

After being arrested on an outstanding warrant, he was placed in a police cruiser.

Upon arrival at the station, an ounce of crack cocaine was found in the cruiser where he had been seated.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing he was unlawfully detained and searched when police asked for his name during the traffic stop.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the passenger was not detained and asking for identification did not constitute a search.

On the merits, the court found the circumstantial evidence, including feces on the drug packaging and the accused's movements during a pat-down, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the cocaine.

The accused was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking but acquitted of possession of proceeds of crime.

Following a jury conviction for trafficking in crack cocaine, possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, the court considered an appropriate sentence for a street-level transaction involving a very small quantity of drugs.

The offender had a prior criminal record but no previous drug convictions and had reportedly overcome earlier heroin addiction through treatment programs.

The court weighed aggravating factors including trafficking in a vulnerable neighbourhood and the harmful nature of crack cocaine against mitigating factors such as the small quantity involved, the absence of recent criminal activity, and evidence of rehabilitation.

Applying the sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and parity under the Criminal Code, the court concluded that a conditional sentence was appropriate.

A conditional sentence of 12 months with a period of house arrest followed by probation was imposed.

The young person was tried for first degree murder as a party to a targeted shooting.

The Crown alleged the young person acted as a lookout and getaway driver for the principal offender, who had previously been convicted of the murder.

Relying on surveillance videos, cell phone records, and witness testimony, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the principal offender committed the planned and deliberate murder.

The court further found that the young person drove the principal offender to and from the scene, was present during the shooting, and intended to assist in the murder.

The young person was found guilty.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown sought to admit two statements made by the young person accused to the police: a spontaneous utterance upon arrest and a videotaped statement at the police station.

The court found the videotaped statement was made voluntarily and in full compliance with section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, rendering it admissible.

However, the spontaneous utterance was ruled inadmissible because the police failed to advise the accused of his rights under the YCJA immediately upon arrest, despite having a reasonable opportunity to do so.

The young person, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained from multiple search warrants and a warrantless search of his cell phone incident to arrest.

The court held that the young person had standing to challenge the seizure of text messages from third-party cell phones, as text messages carry a reasonable expectation of privacy akin to telephone conversations.

However, the court upheld the validity of the search warrants.

Although the warrantless search of the young person's cell phone breached section 8 of the Charter, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach inconsequential.

In a judge-alone trial for first degree murder involving a young person, the prosecution sought to admit text messages showing the accused's involvement in planning robberies with firearms.

The defence argued the messages constituted inadmissible prior discreditable conduct.

Applying the principles from leading authorities on similar fact and discreditable conduct evidence, the court held that such evidence may be admitted where its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The messages were found relevant to the accused’s knowledge of planned criminal activity and to rebut any innocent explanation for association with a co‑accused on the day of the murder.

Because the trial was before a judge alone, the risk of misuse was reduced.

The text messages were admitted for a limited purpose.