Craig Kelly Fraser

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry on a charge of first degree murder.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to properly analyze exculpatory evidence relating to identification and timeline, and that there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The court reviewed the limited role of a preliminary inquiry judge under s. 548(1) of the Criminal Code and the principles from appellate jurisprudence governing circumstantial evidence at the committal stage.

It concluded the preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the whole of the evidence and did not exceed the limited weighing permitted in circumstantial cases.

The evidence, if believed, was capable of supporting inferences of identity and planning and deliberation, making committal appropriate.

The accused applied for judicial interim release on charges of second degree murder and arson arising from a contract arson of a variety store that resulted in a death.

The court found the Crown's circumstantial case to be strong and the proposed release plan involving family supervision to be inadequate.

The application was dismissed, with the court finding the accused failed to show cause for release on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The Crown sought a ruling that statements made by the accused to police during two interviews in 2006 were voluntary and admissible at trial.

The defence argued the statements were induced by promises of protection for the accused’s family and that the failure to provide Charter cautions violated ss. 7 and 10(b).

The court held the accused was not detained in relation to the investigation and that the interviews were investigative in nature while he was incarcerated on unrelated matters.

Applying the legal detention test, the court found no inducements or promises of favour tied to providing information.

The statements were therefore found to be voluntary and admissible.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, sought to vary a s. 516(2) non-communication order to remove his common-law spouse, a material witness for the Crown, from the list of prohibited persons.

The applicant argued the order unfairly interfered with their relationship and their intention to marry.

The court dismissed the application, finding strong evidence that the spouse had previously expressed fear of the applicant, sought police protection, and that the applicant had a history of threatening and counseling the murder of other witnesses.

The court held that the societal interest in protecting witnesses and ensuring a fair trial justified the continued non-communication order.