Simon Heeney

The accused was charged with dangerous driving and related offences after allegedly hitting a police officer with a motorcycle.

During the trial, the Crown attorney berated a police witness in the courthouse hallway for providing testimony that contradicted the Crown's theory, stating 'we protect our own'.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an abuse of process.

The court found that the Crown's conduct, which included yelling, using profanity, and improperly aligning with the victim officer, compromised police independence and undermined the integrity of the justice system.

Concluding that no other remedy could address the ongoing harm to the administration of justice, the court granted the motion and stayed the charges.

The offender, Connor Madison, was found guilty of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of Stephon Knight-Roberts.

The court was tasked with determining the period of parole ineligibility, which is statutorily set at a minimum of 10 years for second-degree murder.

Considering the brutal and prolonged nature of the offence, the offender's armed presence despite recognizances, and the devastating impact on the victim's family, balanced against the offender's Indigenous background, difficult upbringing, mental health issues, and genuine remorse, the court fixed the parole ineligibility period at 13 years.

This ruling provides the judge's reasons for not allowing the defence of self-defence to be put to the jury in a second-degree murder trial.

The accused, Connor Madison, was found guilty by a jury.

The court concluded that the defence of self-defence lacked an "air of reality" because the evidence indicated the accused's actions were an act of revenge for a prior robbery, rather than a response to an ongoing threat.

The victim was unarmed and no longer posing a threat when the fatal stabbings occurred, and the accused's conduct was deemed unreasonable in the circumstances.

This ruling concerns the admissibility of a post-arrest statement made by the accused, charged with second-degree murder, to the police.

The Crown sought to admit the statement for cross-examination, while the accused sought to exclude it, alleging violations of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and that the statement was involuntary due to a lack of operating mind and an oppressive atmosphere (including the absence of face masks during the COVID-19 pandemic).

The court found no Charter violation, determining that delays in providing counsel were justified by safety and practical considerations, and that the accused's repeated requests for counsel during the interview did not trigger a right to a second consultation under the *Sinclair* framework.

The court also concluded that the accused possessed an operating mind and that the interview conditions, including the lack of masks, did not create an oppressive atmosphere given the prevailing public health understanding at the time.

The statement was deemed voluntary and admissible for cross-examination, though specific portions where the accused asserted his right to silence or requested counsel were deemed inadmissible for direct cross-examination.

This ruling addresses three pre-trial applications by the Crown regarding the admissibility of evidence in a second-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct (possession of a knife two hours before the stabbing), contemporaneous discreditable conduct (robbery of a gun from the accused by the deceased), and after-the-fact conduct (failure to assist the victim, calm departure, disposal of evidence, and flight).

The accused conceded the admissibility of the gun robbery evidence but opposed the others, arguing lack of probative value or undue prejudice.

The court granted all three applications, finding the evidence relevant to material issues such as intent, self-defence, and the overall narrative, with probative value outweighing any prejudicial effect.

The accused, Ferenc Feher, applied to the Superior Court of Justice for a review of a detention order issued by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The original detention was based on secondary grounds due to an inadequate release plan and concerns about proposed sureties.

On review, the court considered a new proposed release plan featuring an additional residential surety and a plan for daily employment.

The court was satisfied that the revised plan adequately addressed the secondary ground concerns, leading to the overturning of the detention order.

The accused was released on terms, including three sureties pledging a total of $25,000 without deposit, continuous supervision, non-contact orders, and prohibitions on possessing firearms.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to commit murder, drug trafficking, and firearm possession, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the strict release plan, which included house arrest, electronic monitoring, and supervision by the applicant's parents, adequately addressed the secondary ground concerns.

On the tertiary ground, although the charges were extremely serious and the Crown's case appeared strong, the court held that the applicant's Type 1 diabetes placed him at higher risk of severe complications from COVID-19 in a congregate setting.

Balancing the strict release plan, the health risks, and the need to flatten the curve, the court granted the application for release.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder following a targeted shooting, applied for judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed release on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the applicant's extensive criminal record and history of breaching court orders justified detention on the secondary ground.

Furthermore, the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offence involving firearms, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice necessitated detention on the tertiary ground.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The accused, charged with dangerous driving and firearm offences, sought a bail review after being denied bail on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the proposed addition of a GPS ankle monitor constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that the strict supervision plan, including house arrest with two sureties and electronic monitoring, addressed the secondary ground concerns.

Balancing the factors under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code, the court found that detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for interim judicial release was granted.

Rachard Holder was convicted by a jury of attempted murder, pointing a firearm, and intentionally discharging a firearm, and by the judge of possession of a firearm contrary to an order.

The charges stemmed from a premeditated shotgun shooting of Steven Cseko, who had intervened in a domestic dispute.

The victim suffered catastrophic, permanent injuries.

The Crown sought a life sentence, while the defence proposed ten years.

The court found the shooting to be cold-blooded and senseless, with a lack of remorse from the offender, indicating a high likelihood of future dangerousness.

Considering aggravating factors such as the offender's escalating criminal record, breach of court orders, premeditation, and the horrific impact on the victim and community, the court imposed a life sentence for attempted murder.

The convictions for pointing a firearm and intentionally discharging a firearm were stayed under the Kienapple principle.

A concurrent one-year sentence was imposed for the breach of the weapons prohibition order.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA sample, and a non-communication order with the victim and his family.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, sexual exploitation, threatening bodily harm, common assault, and assault with a weapon against his stepdaughter over a six-year period.

The court found the offender was in a position of trust and that the aggravating factors, including the prolonged nature of the abuse and threats of violence, outweighed the mitigating factor of having no prior record.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the sexual interference charge was stayed.

The court imposed a global penitentiary sentence of 8 years, emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA order and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, sexual exploitation, threatening bodily harm, common assault, and assault with a weapon arising from prolonged abuse of a child in his care.

The court held that delayed disclosure and imperfect recall of dates and peripheral details were not credibility markers of fabrication, particularly in historic child sexual abuse cases.

Relying on the complainant's internally consistent evidence, corroborative eyewitness evidence for one incident, and rejecting the accused's evasive and implausible testimony, the court found the Crown proved all counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

Convictions were entered on all six counts.

The respondent, a young person, was convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless discharge of a firearm arising from the Danzig Street mass shooting.

The Crown applied under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to have an adult sentence imposed.

The court considered the seriousness of the offences, the respondent's background and progress in custody, and the societal interest in accountability and public protection.

Finding that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold the respondent accountable, the court imposed an adult sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for seven years.

During a trial for second-degree murder and other offences arising from a block party shooting, the Crown brought an application to admit an intercepted statement of a witness for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The witness, who had previously described the shooting and his subsequent attempt to murder the accused in retaliation, claimed at trial that he had fabricated the story to impress other youths in detention.

The court found that the statement met the criteria for threshold reliability, given the availability of the witness for cross-examination, the video recording of the statement, and substantial corroborative evidence.

The necessity criterion was also met because the witness effectively disavowed his earlier statement.

The application was granted.

The Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert on Toronto street gangs and to opine that the young person was a member of a specific gang.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey frameworks for expert evidence.

The court found that the officer lacked the necessary specialized knowledge, experience, and validated methodology to be qualified as an expert, particularly regarding the identification of specific individuals as gang members.

The application to qualify the officer as an expert was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit three statements made by the young person to police following two separate shooting incidents, including a mass shooting where the young person was a victim.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the statements, arguing they were involuntary due to the young person's medical condition and alleged police oppression, and that the police failed to provide a caution under section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that the young person had an operating mind, was not subjected to threats or oppression, and was interviewed as a victim rather than a suspect or detainee.

All three statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

The accused was charged with first degree murder arising from a fatal shooting in a Toronto bar.

The court ruled on several pre-trial evidentiary motions, including the admissibility of motive evidence, post‑offence conduct, hearsay statements of the deceased, and lay opinion recognition evidence based on surveillance footage.

Evidence of animus between the accused and the deceased and evidence of the accused’s alleged attempt to disguise his appearance after the offence were admitted as relevant circumstantial evidence.

Lay opinion identification evidence from a witness familiar with the accused was also admitted under the Leaney recognition rule.

However, hearsay statements attributed to the deceased describing a prior altercation were excluded for lack of threshold reliability under the principled hearsay exception.

A disclosure motion involving alleged alternate suspects and informant privilege was deferred pending an in camera and ex parte hearing.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a violation of his section 8 rights regarding an unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that the police officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, including aggressive driving, physical indicia of impairment, and the accused's uncooperative behaviour.

The court further found that the breath samples were taken within a reasonably prompt time as required by the Criminal Code.

The accused was found guilty of both charges, with the over 80 charge being stayed on the basis of the Kienapple principle.

The defendants appealed a jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs $1.475 million in damages for a defamatory newspaper article about the plaintiff's proposed golf course expansion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in his treatment of the emerging defence of public interest responsible journalism by conflating it with qualified privilege and failing to have the jury determine the article's meaning first.

The trial judge also made reversible errors in his jury charge regarding the defence of fair comment, malice, and the presumption of falsity.