COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-00000141-00BR
DATE: 20200520
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
– and –
G.D.
Applicant
S. Heeney and B. Gluckman, for the Respondent
R. Posner, for the Applicant
HEARD: May 8, 2020.
REASONS FOR DECISION
SCHRECK J.:
[1] G.D. is charged with conspiracy to commit murder and a number of drug trafficking and firearm possession charges. It is alleged that he and others were heavily involved in trafficking significant amounts of cocaine and fentanyl and search warrants executed at addresses and on vehicles he was associated with resulted in the seizure of significant amounts of controlled substances and a number of firearms. Intercepted communications suggest that he was involved in a plan to “set up” an unknown individual in some way. It is the Crown’s theory that the plan was to kill this person.
[2] G.D. applies for judicial interim release on strict conditions supervised by his parents as sureties and supported by electronic monitoring. He has no criminal record and has been on bail in the past for several years without incident.
[3] The Crown opposes G.D.’s release on the secondary and tertiary grounds. Because of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, this application was heard by way of teleconference. Both parties filed materials electronically and I heard evidence from both sureties. After hearing submissions from counsel, I reserved my decision for four days, following which I advised the parties that the application was granted with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
I. FACTS
A. The Allegations
[4] Because there is a publication ban, I will not set out the allegations in great detail. They are extremely serious and if proven would make the applicant liable to a very long term of imprisonment.
[5] In April 2020, the police began a drug trafficking investigation in which the applicant, L.H. and J.B. were the primary targets. In addition to conducting surveillance on these individuals, an authorization was obtained to intercept their communications. The surveillance and the intercepted communications strongly support the allegation that the applicant and others were involved in trafficking significant amounts of cocaine and fentanyl.
[6] Intercepted communications on dates in April suggest that the applicant was making arrangements to “set up” an unknown male whom he did not like. The applicant was to pay an identified woman to “party” and flirt with the male at a specific location until he left. Later the same day, the applicant made arrangements to meet with J.B. and L.H. At around the same time, the applicant made two calls to an unidentified male and asked him to retrieve a key from a lockbox at a certain address. While the applicant and the unknown male were speaking, another male could be heard in the background saying that he was going to shoot somebody. Whether this person was with the applicant or the party to whom he was speaking is unknown.
[7] At the time of these calls, surveillance showed that the applicant was at a condominium unit on York Street which was later discovered to have been leased by his uncle. As a result of the intercepted communications, the decision was made to arrest the applicant and the others. Members of the Emergency Task Force attended the condominium unit on York Street, where they found the applicant, L.H., and five other people. A handgun was found in plain view on the bedroom floor next to L.H. All of the individuals in the apartment were arrested.
[8] The York Street address was sparsely furnished and did not appear to be lived in, which suggests that it was being used as a “stash house” to store drugs. In the unit, the police later found a cocaine press, a money counter, a scale, significant amounts of piperidone (a fentanyl precursor), and a quantity of cash.
[9] The following day, J.B. was arrested outside his residence. A search of his home resulted in the seizure of eight kilograms of cocaine, over three kilograms of piperidone, 69 grams of fentanyl and approximately $22,000 in cash.
[10] The same day, another address that the applicant and others had been seen entering was also searched. Like the York Street address, it did not appear to be inhabited. This unit contained a safe in which there was a loaded handgun with the serial number removed as well as 972 grams of fentanyl. The police also found another significant quantity of piperidone.
[11] The applicant’s car was searched and found to have a hidden compartment in it. Inside this compartment was 109 grams of fentanyl, a pair of gloves and a magazine with ammunition in it. Elsewhere in the car were two ski masks and some duct tape.
[12] A search of another vehicle that had been driven by L.H. resulted in the seizure of another handgun. Intercepted communications suggest that the applicant was aware of the presence of this gun.
B. The Applicant
[13] The applicant is 25 years and until his arrest was living with his parents in a Toronto suburb. He completed high school and has a diploma in marketing from a community college. For the past several years, he has operated his own personal training business.
[14] The applicant has no criminal record. In 2013, he was charged with offences unrelated to the current allegations and was on bail with his parents as his sureties until he was acquitted of the charges in 2017. There is no allegation that he failed to comply with his bail conditions during this period.
[15] When he was seven years old, the applicant was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes. He requires insulin injections three or four times a day. It is not in dispute that as a diabetic, the applicant is at risk of suffering more severe symptoms if he contracts COVID-19.
C. The Proposed Plan of Release
[16] The applicant proposes that he be released on a recognizance in the amount of several hundred thousand dollars with his parents as his sureties. He would be subject to house arrest enforced by electronic monitoring through Recovery Science Corporation (“RSC”).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Overview
[17] Because the applicant has been charged with conspiracy to commit murder, an offence enumerated in s. 469 of the Criminal Code, his initial bail hearing must take place in this court by virtue of s. 522(1). It is clear from s. 522(1) that the onus is on the applicant to show cause why his detention is not justified on any of the three grounds set out in s. 515(10).
[18] The respondent accepts that the applicant has demonstrated that he will attend court if released, so his detention is not justified on the primary ground in s. 515(10)(a). The respondent opposes his release on the other two grounds. The onus is therefore on the applicant to show cause why he should not be detained on the secondary ground in s. 515(10)(b) or the tertiary ground in s. 515(10)(c).
B. The Secondary Ground
(i) The Nature of the Inquiry
[19] Section 515(10)(b) of the Code states that detention is justified on the secondary ground where it is necessary for the protection or safety of the public “having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice.” In this context, a “substantial likelihood” means “a probability of certain conduct, not a mere possibility. And the probability must be substantial, in other words, significantly likely”: R. v. Manasseri, 2017 ONCA 226, at para. 87.
(ii) The Secondary Ground Concerns in This Case
[20] In this case, the Crown submits that the fact that the applicant was deeply involved in drug trafficking where he stood to make significant profits gives rise to serious secondary ground concerns. The prospect of further profits is motive for him to continue trafficking drugs. As well, counsel for the respondent suggests that the applicant may owe debts to others from whom he obtained his supply and that the need to satisfy those debts is also a motive for him to continue. Counsel acknowledges that there is no evidence to support this, but submits that this is a reasonable inference. I do not agree and am not prepared to speculate in this regard.
[21] I do agree that the nature of the allegations gives rise to significant secondary ground concerns. If the allegations are true, the applicant was making substantial profits and would have a strong motive to continue doing so. However, as was recently noted by my colleague, Dawe J. in R. v. Tully, 2020 ONSC 2762, at para. 23:
… the relevant question is not whether secondary ground concerns exist, but whether they can be adequately addressed by the proposed release plan, having regard to all of the relevant factors. [The applicant] does not have to show that he is unlikely to ever reoffend under any circumstances or for all time, but only to establish that the risk of his reoffending in a way that would jeopardize public safety can be reduced to tolerable levels during the time he will be on bail by the restrictions and supervision he will be under as provided in the bail order.
(iii) The Proposed Plan
[22] In this case, the proposed plan is very strict and would require the applicant to remain in his residence at all times with few exceptions and to be in the company of a surety when not in his residence. The supervision by the sureties would be supplemented by electronic monitoring through RSC. The technology employed by RSC is such that RSC would be notified every time the applicant leaves his residence and his movements would be tracked by GPS. The police would be alerted in the event of a prohibited departure from the residence and would have access to any of the tracking data on request. When the applicant is permitted to leave the residence, one of his sureties would have to contact RSC by telephone to notify them and the surety’s identity would be confirmed by voice recognition software.
[23] I recognize that electronic monitoring has its limitations. While it can reveal where an individual is, it cannot reveal what he is doing. More importantly, it cannot directly prevent a person from breaching his bail. It can only afford evidence that he has done so after the fact: R. v. Jesso, 2020 ONCA 280, at paras. 24-27. However, what it can do is make it virtually certain that any breach will be quickly detected, which can have a deterrent effect. As was observed by Nordheimer J. (as he then was) in R. v. Doucette, [2016] O.J. No. 852 (S.C.J.), at para. 5, “electronic monitoring does significantly reduce the likelihood that an accused person will commit an offence … because the accused has to know that in addition to the watchful eyes of his sureties, there is an electronic eye on him that will automatically alert the authorities if he strays out of the designated area.” See also R. v. B.M.D., 2020 ONSC 2671, at paras. 56-58; R. v. Rajan, 2020 ONSC 2118, at paras. 32-33; R. v. T.L., 2020 ONSC 1885, at para. 22.
(iv) Opportunity to Commit Further Offences
[24] As I understand the respondent’s argument, the Crown is not really concerned that the applicant will remove the electronic bracelet or leave the residence when he is not supposed to. However, the allegation in this case is not that the applicant personally sold controlled substances to others, but rather that he was a person who was fairly high up in the distribution hierarchy and who directed others to engage in drug trafficking. As counsel for the respondent correctly points out, offences of this nature can be committed virtually anywhere. As was observed by Nordheimer J. (as he then was) in R. v. Chan, [2002] O.J. No. 5418 (S.C.J.), at para. 8, this type of offence “can be carried out with a few well-placed communications.” The concern that the applicant will continue to traffic in drugs by communicating with others from his home was the primary focus of the respondent’s concerns.
[25] It is evident from their testimony before me that both proposed sureties are alive to this concern. They have promised that they would ensure that the applicant does not have access to any type of communication device other than the residence telephone, which he would only be permitted to use in their presence. I accept their evidence that they will take these steps. I note that the applicant’s parents successfully supervised the applicant for four years while he was on bail on earlier charges. This supports the conclusion that they are responsible sureties, but more importantly it suggests that the applicant is amenable to their direction.
[26] Counsel for the respondent suggested that despite the sureties’ efforts, the applicant could secretly make telephone calls while they were sleeping. This was not suggested to the sureties during cross-examination, so they were unable to address this concern. It could probably be easily addressed by ensuring that the telephone handsets are in a secure location while they sleep. In any event, no release plan is completely foolproof. Indeed, even a detention order would not ensure that the applicant does not communicate with others to facilitate drug trafficking. He would not be the first person to engage in such activities while in custody. However, as noted earlier, there is no onus on the applicant to establish that there is no possibility that he could commit further offences if released, only that there is not a substantial likelihood that he would.
(v) Conclusion on the Secondary Ground
[27] While it may be possible for the applicant to commit further offences if released, the proposed plan, which includes constantly being in the company of responsible sureties with a track record of successfully supervising him and electronic monitoring, satisfies me that there is not a substantial likelihood that he will do so. He has therefore met his onus on the secondary ground.
C. The Tertiary Ground
(i) The Nature of the Inquiry
[28] Section 515(10)(c) provides that detention is justified on the tertiary ground if it is necessary to “maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances.” Public confidence refers to the perception of reasonable members of the community who are informed about the philosophy behind the bail provisions in the Code, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case. It does not take into account the perceptions of those prone to emotional reactions, those who do not have knowledge of the circumstances of the case or who disagree with society’s fundamental values: R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 328, at paras. 75-80.
[29] The tertiary ground is conceptually distinct from the primary and secondary grounds. The latter relate to an assessment of the probability that the accused will behave in a certain way, that is, fail to attend court or commit further offences. The tertiary ground is not concerned with predictions about the accused’s behaviour but, rather, with public perception. Having proper regard for the views of reasonable members of the public while disregarding views that may be based on purely emotional reactions or misunderstandings is not an easy task: St-Cloud, at para. 81. Furthermore, there is not necessarily a direct correlation between detention and the maintenance of public confidence. In some cases, detaining an accused without justification will undermine public confidence: St-Cloud, at para. 86.
(ii) The Statutory Factors
[30] Subsections (i) to (iv) of s. 515(10)(c) provide a non-exhaustive list of circumstances which the court should consider in relation to the tertiary ground: (i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, (ii) the gravity of the offence, (iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and (iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment.
[31] All four factors clearly favour detention in this case. The Crown’s case with respect to the trafficking and firearm possession charges is, in my view, very strong. Based on the information available to me, unless the applicant is able to exclude the evidence because of some sort of Charter violation (and at this point there is nothing to suggest that there has been any such violation), his conviction on those charges is virtually inevitable.
[32] The counselling to commit murder charge is not as strong. While there is significant evidence that the applicant was planning to do something nefarious to another person, the only direct evidence of any plan to kill someone comes from the statement made by an unknown person during a telephone call between the applicant and another party that seemed to be about an unrelated matter. However, there is abundant evidence that the applicant and his co-accused had access to several firearms and were in possession of duct tape. While not overwhelming, the evidence on this count could easily sustain a conviction.
[33] The offences are very grave. Only actual murder is more serious than counselling to commit murder. Fentanyl, the drug that the applicant is alleged to have trafficked, has now supplanted heroin as the deadliest of illegal substances: R. v. Olvedi, 2018 ONSC 6330, at paras. 12-14. The gravity of the possession of firearm offences is obvious, especially given the increase in gun violence this city has seen in recent years: R. v. Delchev, 2015 ONCA 448, 323 O.A.C. 19, at para. 20.
[34] The circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged offences include planning if not the death of another person, at least an intention to do him some harm. Moreover, drug trafficking and firearm possession offences committed together has been said to be a “toxic combination”: R. v. Wong, 2012 ONCA 767, at para. 11.
[35] Finally, if convicted the applicant is liable to a penitentiary sentence which is likely to be in the double digits.
[36] While the enumerated factors set out in subsections (i) to (iv), all favour detention in this case, those factors are not exhaustive: St-Cloud, at paras. 66-71. As was observed in T.L., at para. 33, determining whether detention is necessary on the tertiary ground is not a “‘tick-off-the-box’” exercise. Section 515(10)(c) requires the court to have regard to “all the circumstances.” In this case, there are three additional circumstances which are, in my view, relevant: (1) the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic; (2) uncertainty with respect to when the applicant is likely to be tried; and (3) the strict release plan.
(iii) The COVID-19 Pandemic
(a) The Pandemic
[37] At the time these reasons were prepared, over 4,600,000 people worldwide have been infected with the coronavirus that causes COVID-19 and over 315,000 have died as a result. There are over 77, 000 cases in Canada, almost 23,000 of which are in Ontario, and over 5,800 deaths, over 1,900 of which are in Ontario.[^1] Most governments, including those of Canada and Ontario, have attempted to control the spread of the disease by implementing various strategies to minimize contact between individuals. This is commonly referred to as “flattening the curve.”
(b) Dr. Aaron Orkin
[38] The applicant filed an affidavit by Dr. Aaron Orkin, a physician and epidemiologist. Dr. Orkin’s credentials are impressive. In addition to a medical degree, he holds a graduate degree in public health and is a doctoral candidate in clinical epidemiology. He practices emergency medicine at two Toronto hospitals and is the Medical Director of the St. Joseph’s Health Centre COVID-19 Assessment Centre. He is also responsible for planning a COVID-19 response strategy for Inner City Health Associates, an organization which provides health services to people experiencing homelessness. He has authored and co-authored numerous peer-reviewed publications, including several relating to health care for individuals in prison. Dr. Orkin was not cross-examined and his evidence was not challenged by the respondent.
[39] In his affidavit, Dr. Orkin discusses COVID-19 outbreaks in what he refers to as “congregate living facilities”, a public health care term that refers to settings where many people live together, such as long-term care facilities, homeless shelters, and correctional institutions. Dr. Orkin states:
Preventing outbreaks in congregate living facilities is a top priority for a flatten-the-curve strategy, for four reasons:
(1) First, outbreaks in tight spaces happen extremely quickly and are near-impossible to control once they occur. Global experiences with cruise ships are a case-in-point.
(2) Second, people living in congregate living facilities tend to have underlying comorbidities that make them more prone to serous adverse outcomes (ICU admission or death) from COVID-19. This is true in long-term care facilities, homeless shelters, and prisons.
(3) Third, outbreaks in congregate living facilities can overwhelm health care systems, meaning that scarce resources are consumed by local congregate living outbreaks before the epidemic takes hold in the general population.
(4) Fourth, outbreaks in congregate living facilities serve as tinder for the fire in more generalized outbreaks. Unlike cruise ships, people in congregate living settings including the staff who work there transfer disease into the general population.
Therefore, preventing disease in congregate living facilities is critical for flattening the curve across the entire population. All this means that protecting congregate living settings and preventing outbreaks there is about protecting the health of the entire population.
[40] While Dr. Orkin recognizes that courts must take several considerations into account is determining whether an individual should be released, he states that from a public health perspective,
… [e]very person who is discharged from a correctional facility to a private residence is an opportunity to flatten the curve and improve health for the individual involved, other inmates in the facility in question, staff at the facility in question, and the public.
(c) The Applicant’s Diabetes
[41] The applicant suffers from Type 1 diabetes. Counsel filed two articles about the risk COVID-19 poses to diabetics and the respondent has not challenged the information contained in them.[^2] It appears that diabetes is a risk factor for the severity of COVID-19 and diabetics are more likely to be admitted to an intensive care unit if infected than are members of the general population. A study in China revealed that mortality appeared to be three times higher in people with diabetes compared with the general mortality of COVID-19.
[42] While the respondent filed evidence about steps being taken to control the transmission of COVID-19 in Ontario correctional institutions, Crown counsel accepts that there is a greater likelihood of infection in a congregate setting such as a detention centre and that the applicant is at greater risk because of his diabetes. Crown counsel acknowledges that the pandemic is a factor which must be considered on the tertiary ground. However, he submits that in this case, concerns about COVID-19 are outweighed by other factors. He also points out that prior to his arrest, the applicant did not appear to be practicing social distancing. He left his home on several occasions and was in the company of six other people in a small apartment at the time of his arrest.
[43] The fact that the applicant is more likely to suffer complications, require hospitalization or even die if he contracts COVID-19 is clearly an important factor: R. v. Kazman, 2020 ONCA 251, at paras. 17-19; Jesso, at para. 36; R. v. T.D., 2020 ONSC 2654, at paras. 24-25. A reasonable member of the public who may lose confidence in the administration of justice if an individual is released may well take a different view upon learning that detention puts the individual’s health at risk.
[44] I put little weight on the fact that the applicant failed to social distance before his arrest. It was undoubtedly unwise for him not to remain at home. However, his carelessness does not mean that he has forfeited his right to have his health and safety considered by the court. In any event, there is a significant difference between being in the company of five or six people known to him for limited periods of time and being housed in a congregate setting with hundreds of people for an unknown length of time.
(d) Flattening the Curve
[45] Aside from the risk to the applicant’s health, the COVID-19 pandemic is also relevant to the tertiary ground in another way. Based on Dr. Orkin’s evidence, reducing the inmate population to the extent possible contributes towards flattening the curve, which benefits not only inmates, but society as a whole. This point was made by my colleague, Molloy J., in T.L., at para. 36:
It is in the interests of society as a whole, as well as the inmate population, to release people who can be properly supervised outside the institutions. It better protects those who must be housed in the institutions (because there are no other reasonable options), those who work in the institutions (because they perform an essential service), and our whole community (because we can ill-afford to have breakouts of infection in institutions, requiring increased correctional staffing, increased medical staffing, and increased demand on other scarce resources).
See also Kazman, at para. 18; R. v. Hearns, 2020 ONSC 2365, at paras. 11-14; R. v. J.S., 2020 ONSC 1710, at para. 19; R. v. Kandhai, 2020 ONSC 1611, at para. 7; R. v. Williams, 2020 ONSC 2237, at para. 124; R. v. Ali, 2020 ONSC 2374, at para. 98; Rajan, at paras. 69-70.[^3]
[46] The attempts to flatten the curve have required many people to make significant sacrifices. People have lost their jobs when their workplaces have stopped operating, students have missed school, people have been unable to visit family and friends and have foregone the opportunity to go to restaurants, parks, theatres and sporting events. All of these sacrifices were made to minimize the circumstances in which large groups of people congregate and thereby facilitate the spread of the virus. A reasonable person who has made these sacrifices would expect the courts to do what they can towards the same goal. Keeping people in congregate settings undermines the efforts we have made. To be sure, some people must remain in custody to prevent them from endangering the public. But if those concerns can be addressed in some other way that does not undermine our efforts to control the pandemic, public confidence in the administration of justice is enhanced.
(iv) Delay
[47] Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, both the Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Court of Justice ceased operations on March 17, 2020. At this point, no trials will take place in either court before July at the earliest and jury trials will not resume before September. The delay before the courts resume operations may very well be longer, depending on the course of the pandemic. Once the courts do resume, there will be a considerable backlog. In these circumstances, there will undoubtedly be a significant delay before the applicant can have his trial: T.L., at para. 34; Ali, at para. 88; Tully, at para. 35.
[48] In R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18, at para. 50, the Court considered the length of time during which an individual is detained pending trial in the context of detention reviews held pursuant to s. 525 of the Code:
In determining whether the detention remains justified under s. 515(10) , the judge should also consider whether the time that has already elapsed has had — or the anticipated passage of time will have — an impact on the appropriateness or proportionality of the detention. In particular, it is necessary to be sensitive to whether the continued detention of the accused person could erode public confidence in the administration of justice: see, e.g., McCormack, [2014 ONSC 7123], at para. 29.
In my view, the same principles apply at an initial bail hearing where it is anticipated that there will be a lengthy period of time before the trial can take place. While there are cases where reasonable members of the public would expect an individual to be detained before trial, that expectation will likely be premised on the trial occurring within a reasonable period of time.
(vi) The Proposed Plan
[49] The release plan being proposed is very strict. Except for absolutely necessary outings, the applicant would be confined to his home at all times. He will be in effect “imprisoned in the community”: R. v. Middleton, 2009 SCC 21, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 674, at para. 97. The strictness of the plan is relevant to the tertiary ground for the reasons explained by Trotter J. (as he then was) in R. v. Dang, 2015 ONSC 4254, 21 C.R. (7th) 85, at para. 58:
An accused person’s release plan may be relevant to whether public confidence in the administration of justice is capable of being maintained: see R. v. B.(A.) (2006), 2006 CanLII 2765 (ON SC), 204 C.C.C. (3d) 490 (Ont. S.C.J.), at p. 501. This is explicitly recognized in the newly enacted amendment (S.C. 2012, c. 1) to s. 29(2)(c) of the YCJA. A reasonable and knowledgeable member of the community may take a different view of a case in which an accused person charged with a violent offence is released into the community with virtually no supervision, compared to a situation where a strict plan has been put in place to monitor the accused. The plan goes to the core of s. 515(10)(b), but it may also impact on the application of s. 515(10)(c). The bail decision does not involve a stark choice between absolute freedom on one hand, and detention on the other. Realistically, it is a choice between release on conditions and detention. I see nothing wrong with this reality being reflected ins. 515(10)(c).
See also Tully, at para. 32; Ali, at para. 71; J.S., at para. 10; R. v. Mercury, 2019 ONSC 4585, at para. 41; R. v. Deko, 2019 ONSC 2468, at para. 36.
(vii) Conclusion on the Tertiary Ground
[50] This is a close case. The applicant is facing extremely serious charges that appear to be based on strong evidence. All four of the enumerated factors in s. 515(10)(c) of the Code favour his detention. At the same time, detaining him puts his health at risk and undermines our efforts to slow the spread of COVID-19. The alternative to a detention order is a release plan that amounts to imprisonment within his home under the supervision of sureties I have found to be responsible as well as electronic monitoring. Having considered all of the circumstances, I do not believe that a reasonable member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant is released on the proposed plan. He has therefore met his onus on the tertiary ground.
III. DISPOSITION
[51] For the foregoing reasons, the applicant is ordered released on a recognizance in the amount of $500,000 with his parents as sureties and on the following conditions:
- Remain in his residence at all times subject to the following exceptions:
(a) While attending or travelling to or from a scheduled appointment with a medical professional, dentist or lawyer, provided he is in the company of a surety.
(b) While attending or travelling to or from a scheduled court appearance, provided he is in the company of a surety.
(c) For any medical emergency involving himself or members of his immediate family.
He is to enter into and be bound by the terms of the contract with Recovery Science Corporation
He is not to possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code, including any firearms, ammunition, explosives or prohibited or restricted devices
He is not to possess any non-medically prescribed drugs
He is not to be in personal possession of any electronic device that is capable of transmitting written, audio or video communications, including but not limited to telephones, smartphones or computers.
He is not to have direct or indirect communication with any of his co-accused (whose names are to be specified in the order) except through counsel for the purpose of preparing his defence.
He is not to have direct or indirect communication with his brother and uncle (whose names are to be specified in the order) except while in the company of a surety.
[52] I wish to thank all counsel for the quality of their materials and their helpful submissions.
Justice P.A. Schreck
Released: May 20, 2020
COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-00000141-00BR
DATE: 20200520
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
G.D.
REASONS FOR DECISION
P.A. Schreck J.
Released: May 20, 2020
[^1]: https://covid19.who.int/; Public Health Agency of Canada, “Daily Epidemiology Update – May 18, 2020”, pp. 1-2.
[^2]: S. Madsbad, “COVID-19 Infection in People With Diabetes” (2020), Department of Endocrinology, Hvidovre Hospital, University of Copenhagen; J. Hartmann-Boyce et al., “Managing Diabetes During the COVID-19 Pandemic” (2020), Oxford COVID-19 Evidence Service Team, Centre for Evidence Based Medicine, University of Oxford.
[^3]: Cf. R. v. Jeyakanthan, 2020 ONSC 1984, at paras. 28-34; R. v. Halovich, 2020 ONSC 2709, at paras. 45-46; R. v. Brown, [2020] O.J. No. 1432 (C.J.), at paras. 59-60.