REASONS FOR DECISION ON BAIL REVIEW APPLICATION

[1] Roger Mercury brings a bail review pursuant to s. 520 of the Criminal Code based on an assertion of a material change in circumstances.

The Charges

[2] Mr. Mercury is charged with 17 counts involving allegations of possession for the purpose of trafficking of a variety of drugs, including heroin, cocaine, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine, as well as firearms offences arising out of possession and storage of two handguns and ammunition.

[3] The charges arise out of searches conducted with warrants on November 1, 2017. The searches were conducted on a residence and a vehicle associated to Mr. Mercury. Mr. Mercury was arrested at the time of the execution of the search warrants. He had just been observed arriving at the residence in the vehicle at issue, and at the time the police entered the residence, he was located in the only bedroom of the residence. One firearm was found in the residence, and one in the vehicle. Drugs were found in both the residence and the vehicle.

[4] The quantities of drugs alleged are not insignificant, but are street level amounts. For example, one count involves 10 grams of cocaine, one count involves 10 grams of crystal meth, and one count involves 10 grams of heroin, and another count involves a further 11 grams of heroin. The two firearms at issue were a .25 calibre semi-automatic handgun, and a .22 calibre revolver. The semi-automatic was located in the residence. According to the synopsis, this firearm was loaded, with one live round in the chamber, and six rounds in the magazine. The revolver was located in the vehicle. Crown counsel was unable to clarify if the firearm found in the vehicle was loaded. Also found in the vehicle were 96 rounds of ammunition of the same caliber as firearm found in the residence. Mr. Mercury was subject to two weapons prohibition orders at the time of his arrest.

[5] Mr. Mercury’s trial is scheduled for October 15, 2019.

Prior bail proceedings

[6] Mr. Mercury’s initial bail hearing was conducted on November 7, 2017, before Justice of the Peace Churley. The Crown sought Mr. Mercury’s detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds. I note that several of the charges against Mr. Mercury give rise to a reverse onus. Because he was subject to two a firearms prohibitions at the time of his arrest, the firearms charges are a reverse onus under section 515(6)(a)(viii). In addition, the counts of possession of schedule I drugs for the purpose of trafficking are a reverse onus pursuant to s. 515(6)(d).

[7] In the initial bail hearing, Mr. Mercury proposed a release involving a house arrest bail with exceptions if in the company of his surety, with his father as a surety, and with Mr. Mercury living at his parents’ home.

[8] Justice of the Peace Churley found that Mr. Mercury’s detention was required on the secondary ground. She reached this conclusion relying on the seriousness of the allegations and in particular the toxic mix of guns and drugs, Mr. Mercury’s criminal record, and on her conclusion that the release plan and surety proposed at that time was inadequate. In particular, there was a concern that Mr. Mercury’s father was not a sufficient surety because Mr. Mercury had accumulated his criminal record while living with his father, and had previously breached release conditions while his father was his surety. Because she found that Mr. Mercury’s detention was necessary on the secondary ground, Justice Churley did not go on to consider the tertiary ground.

[9] Mr. Mercury brought a bail review in this court. It was heard in April 2018 by Justice Campbell. At the time of that bail review, Mr. Mercury proposed a second surety in addition to his father, and also GPS monitoring. Justice Campbell dismissed the application for review. He held that Mr. Mercury’s detention was necessary on the secondary and tertiary grounds. His reasons on the secondary ground were similar to those of the initial justice, and in particular noted the seriousness of the allegations, and Mr. Mercury’s criminal record, including the history of breaching release orders. On the tertiary ground, Justice Campbell found that the Crown made a strong showing on all four of the listed criteria, and that even considering the stricter proposed release plan, Mr. Mercury’s detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

[10] There was a further bail review application in September 2018 that was summarily dismissed on the basis that there was no material change.

[11] For purposes of clarity, I note that there was some suggestion at Mr. Mercury’s initial bail hearing that he was on a recognizance at the time he was charged. I was advised by counsel during the bail review that this information turned out not to be correct, and he was not subject to any recognizance at the time of his arrest.

[12] By way of background, I note that Mr. Mercury is 30 years old. He is a Canadian citizen, and has established roots and family connections in the Toronto area. He has a grade 12 education. He is in a relationship with one of the proposed sureties, Ms Ashley Dayle. He has children from a prior relationship. He has a criminal record of some significance. I will not list every offence, but I note the two most serious entries. In 2010, he was convicted of break and enter and robbery, and sentenced to two years concurrent on each count. In 2014, he was convicted of possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm, and possession of a firearm or ammunition contrary to a prohibition order. He was sentenced to 1 day in jail on top of 408 days pre-trial custody. It is not entirely clear if the 408 days refers to actual pre-trial custody, or the grossed-up credit for pre-trial custody. Before me Crown counsel made the submission that it likely referred to actual pre-trial custody. However, at p. 8 of the transcript of the initial bail hearing, it appears to be stated that it refers to credit for pre-trial custody (and actual was 280 days). I do not view the difference as significant for present purposes. Mr. Mercury also has three adult findings of guilt for failing to comply with release orders, the most recent in 2014.

Nature of a review under [s. 520](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html) of the [Criminal Code](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html)

[13] A reviewing judge may intervene where the justice who made the detention order erred in law, or gave excessive or insufficient weight to a relevant factor. A reviewing judge may also intervene where there is a material and relevant change in the circumstances of the case. In considering a bail review based on an asserted material change in circumstances, a reviewing judge should consider the new information following the Palmer criteria for fresh evidence, but applied flexibly and adapted to the bail context: R. v. St.-Cloud, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 328, 2015 SCC 27 at paras. 120-138.

[14] I note as well, in light of the fact that Mr. Mercury already had a bail review in April 2018 before Justice Campbell, that it is well-established that s. 520 of the Criminal Code permits successive bail reviews, particularly where a material change in circumstances is asserted: R. v. Saracino (1989), 47 C.C.C. (3d) 185, 1989 CanLII 7197 at pp. 190-92 (On. H.C.); R. v. Durrani, 2008 ONCA 856 at para. 29.

[15] Mr. Mercury does not allege any error of law or improper weighing of facts by either the initial justice or by Justice Campbell when he heard the first bail review. Rather, Mr. Mercury argues that three factors taken in combination constitute a material change in circumstances such that he now is able to meet his onus for release under the secondary and tertiary grounds. These are the proposal of two new sureties, a tightened proposed plan of release, and evidence about medical issues of Mr. Mercury that are not being adequately addressed at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

[16] Crown counsel does not contest that the asserted new circumstances are sufficient for the court to hear the review. However, Crown counsel argues that they are insufficient to change the result under the secondary and tertiary grounds.

[17] I am satisfied that the new information of the new sureties and the failure of the institution to attend to Mr. Mercury’s medical needs, meets the Palmer criteria for me to review the decision to detain Mr. Mercury, in the sense set out at para. 138 of St.-Cloud.

[18] As noted above, both the initial justice and Justice Campbell were satisfied that Mr. Mercury did not need to be detained on the primary ground. And Crown counsel did not raise the primary ground before me. Thus, I will consider only the secondary and tertiary grounds in relation to the new information.

The Secondary ground

[19] The secondary ground is concerned with the protection or safety of the public, and whether there is a substantial likelihood that a defendant will commit further offences if released.

[20] It is important to bear in mind that the test under the secondary ground does not require a defendant in a reverse onus situation to show that there is no risk that offences will be committed, or that it is certain that offences will not be committed. Rather, the court must consider whether the defendant has shown that his detention is not necessary for the protection or safety of the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including any substantial likelihood that the defendant will commit a criminal offence is released from custody. Further, in making this assessment, the court must consider if conditions of release can be crafted that address the risk such that detention is not necessary under the secondary ground: R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, 1992 CanLII 53 at pp. 736-740.

[21] The plan of release that is proposed before me is in many ways similar to the plan proposed to Justice Campbell in April 2018. It involves release on a recognizance, with two sureties, house arrest, and GPS monitoring.

[22] However, the proposed plan has been modified in three important respects. First, two new sureties are proposed, Ms Ashley Dayle and Ms Phylicia Thomas. Importantly, Mr. Mercury’s father is no longer proposed as a surety. This change removes the particular weaknesses that were associated with his father as a proposed surety.

[23] Second, although the two new proposed sureties work largely from home, and thus have a significant ability to directly supervise Mr. Mercury, in addition, Ms Dayle has installed video monitoring inside her home as part of her security system, which gives both sureties the ability to monitor Mr. Mercury remotely if they have to leave the home for some reason.

[24] Third, because Ms Dayle lives in Hamilton (and Ms Thomas has moved in with her), and the proposed release has a residence requirement and a house arrest, the effect of the proposed terms, if release is granted, would be to remove Mr. Mercury from the community where he is alleged to have offended. Although the house arrest proposal means he would not be out of the residence except for limited exceptions, removing him from the community where he is alleged to have offended provides an addition safeguard against re-offending.

[25] In my view both Ms Dayle and Ms Thomas are suitable sureties, who have shown in their evidence on the review that they take the obligations of being a surety seriously. Ms Dayle is in a relationship with Mr. Mercury, and has been for four-and-a-half years. Importantly, during the time she has been in a relationship with him, until the charges currently before the court, he had not committed any offences. There was a gap in his record since the November 2014 convictions. Ms Dayle works as an event planner, running her own company. She generally works from home, which gives her flexibility to supervise Mr. Mercury. Although at times she has to leave the home to view venues for her work, she will have Ms Thomas for back-up (discussed below), as well as the GPS and camera system to assist her in monitoring Mr. Mercury. I note that Ms Dayle explains in her affidavit that she did not previously propose herself as a surety, because she had (incorrectly) believed that she was not eligible to act as a surety because she received a conditional discharge three years ago in relation to an assault charge.

[26] Ms Dayle has been a surety once before for an individual facing charges under the Youth Criminal Justice Act. Before she undertook that responsibility, she had encouraged the individual to turn themselves in when she became aware of the pending charges. She then supervised the individual on a residential surety release with a curfew. There were no breaches.

[27] Ms Dayle is prepared to pledge $20,000.00 in support of Mr. Mercury’s release, which is a significant sum of money in light of her income and savings outlined in her affidavit.

[28] Ms Thomas is a long-time friend of Mr. Mercury’s. She has known him for 13 years, and Mr. Mercury is also close with some of her siblings and her mother. She testified that there had been a gap in her contact with Mr. Mercury from about four years ago, due to the dissolution of a relationship she was in, and the fact that Mr. Mercury was friends with the partner she was splitting from. However, in the past six months, she has resumed contact with Mr. Mercury. She speaks to him by phone approximately three times per week now. Ms Thomas has known the other proposed surety, Ms Dayle, for four years. Ms Thomas is a full-time student at Durham College in the paralegal program. She is also a registered early childhood educator, and works part-time from home as a hair stylist. Many of her classes are taken remotely. This combined with her work from home gives her flexibility in her schedule to supervise Mr. Mercury. For purposes of supervising Mr. Mercury, Ms Thomas has moved into Ms Dayle’s three bedroom townhouse (along with her daughter).

[29] Ms Thomas has also previously acted as a surety, on four occasions. Each of the prior releases for which she was a surety involved supervising a house arrest bail. On three of the releases there were no breaches. On the fourth, she learned that the individual she was supervising, who was a former partner of Ms Thomas, had snuck out of the house. She located him, called the police to revoke his bail, and stayed with him until the police arrived to arrest him.

[30] Ms Thomas is prepared to pledge $5,000.00 in support of Mr. Mercury’s release, which is a significant sum of money in light of her income and savings outlined in her affidavit.

[31] In my view the long term relationships of both Ms Dayle and Ms Thomas with Mr. Mercury, make them well-placed to supervise him. They both know him well and based on that knowledge are of the view that he will be amenable to their supervision. Although Ms Dayle and Ms Thomas both testified that they were surprised by the charges against Mr. Mercury, they agreed that the fact of the charges concerned them. They are both open-minded about the possibility that Mr. Mercury may be found guilty, and accept that the court will ultimately decide the outcome of these charges.

[32] Further, neither Ms Dayle nor Ms Thomas proposes themselves as a surety with blind faith in Mr. Mercury. The proposed plan includes GPS monitoring. In addition, Ms Dayle has taken steps prior to the bail review to have a movable camera installed within her home as part of her security system so that when she or Ms Thomas are not in the home, they can monitor Mr. Mercury remotely. Both Ms Dayle and Ms Thomas have an app installed on their phones to use the camera. In addition, both Ms Dayle and Ms Thomas gave evidence that they will impose rules of the home that Mr. Mercury not possess a phone, not have friends over unless approved in advance by the sureties, and complete any household chores as directed.

[33] Crown counsel argues that Ms Dayle is not a suitable surety because, although Mr. Mercury told her about having a criminal record at the start of their relationship, told her he had served jail time, and told her it related to a firearms charge, she did not inquire into all the particulars of his criminal history early in their relationship, and only did so recently in relation to the bail review application. Respectfully, I disagree with Crown counsel. Mr. Mercury did not hide his criminal record from her. She was aware that he had a record and had served jail time. Within the context of their relationship, before bail supervision became an issue, I am not prepared to fault Ms Dayle for deciding she did not need to know all the particulars. Ms Dayle explained, and I accept her explanation, that in the context of the start of their relationship, her focus what on the future, and discussing with Mr. Mercury what he was going to change so that he would not end up in jail again. What a person chooses to want to know in the context of an intimate relationship is a different thing from what a person ought to know when they are offering to be a surety. Once Ms Dayle decided to propose herself as a surety, she responsibly found out the details of Mr. Mercury’s record.

[34] In all of the circumstances, I find Ms Dayle and Ms Thomas to be suitable sureties. They have carefully considered the obligation to the court that they are offering to take on. I accept that they will conscientiously carry out their responsibilities as sureties if Mr. Mercury is released.

[35] I have considered the apparent strength of the Crown’s case. Although counsel for Mr. Mercury makes the point that he will challenge the Crown’s case at trial, and that is what cross-examination is for, there has been nothing filed on the application for review to attempt to show weakness in the Crown’s case. Thus, I proceed on the basis that at present the Crown’s case appears strong, as was found by the original justice and Justice Campbell.

[36] I also cannot ignore Mr. Mercury’s criminal record, and his history of breach of release orders. I also take into consideration, although he is presumed innocent, that the allegations against him in relation to the two firearms involve allegations that he breached two weapons prohibition orders.

[37] These factors mean that the court must carefully consider whether the proposed release plan is sufficient to address the risk that he may reoffend. In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied with the new proposed sureties, and the tightened plan of release, and removal of Mr. Mercury to Hamilton the risk he poses to reoffend can be sufficiently minimized to address secondary ground concerns. He will be under house arrest, with strong sureties, with GPS monitoring, and removed to a different community.

[38] For these reasons, I find that with the two named sureties, and the strict release plan proposed, Mr. Mercury has discharged his onus to show that his detention is not necessary on the secondary ground.

The Tertiary ground

[39] The tertiary ground is concerned with public confidence in the administration of justice.

[40] Section 515(10)(c) requires the court to consider all of the circumstances, and in particular the four listed criteria in order to determine if the detention of the defendant is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. It is important to bear in mind in assessing the tertiary ground that the defendant is presumed innocent. It is also important to bear in mind that even if all four of the criteria are met, the court must consider all of the circumstances, including the proposed release plan: St.-Cloud at paras. 37-88.

[41] Where there may be tertiary ground concerns, the terms of a proposed release plan, if sufficiently strict, may be sufficient to address those concerns. In other words, depending on all of the circumstances, the confidence in the administration of justice of a reasonable and well-informed member of the public may not be diminished even where the Crown makes a strong showing on the four St.-Cloud factors, if a defendant is released on a restrictive bail plan: R. v. Dang, 2015 ONSC 4254.

[42] That said, St.-Cloud is also clear that the tertiary ground is a distinct ground that can provide a basis for detention by itself. The application of the tertiary ground is not limited to rare or exceptional circumstances or to certain types of crimes: St.-Cloud at paras: 50-54, 87.

[43] I do not propose to go one by one through the four St.-Cloud factors. The reason for this is that the defence does not challenge Justice Campbell’s assessment that the Crown can make a strong showing on each of the four factors. Rather, the defence argues that the combination of the failure of the jail to attend to Mr. Mercury’s basic medical needs, and the two new sureties and strong release plan change the consideration of whether in all of the circumstances his detention is necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

[44] I will not repeat the information about the new sureties and the proposed plan of release, as I have addressed them in relation to the secondary ground. But they have relevance under the tertiary ground in terms of the balance in relation to public confidence when considering all of the circumstances.

[45] I will briefly summarize the issues relating to the failure of the Toronto South Detention Centre to address Mr. Mercury’s medical needs as they relate to the tertiary ground. Mr. Mercury’s health issues arise out of two events. In 2015, an intruder broke into his home and shot him 16 times. Subsequently, Mr. Mercury was involved in a motor vehicle collision in which his lower spine was injured, and a prior injury from the shooting was aggravated in his femur. He was still recovering from the collision at the time of his arrest.

[46] Mr. Mercury outlines a number of areas in his affidavit where the institution has failed to provide medical care he requires. Mr. Mercury explains in his affidavit that since being incarcerated, his medical condition has deteriorated. He has developed a medical condition in his abdomen. In essence, his body is trying to eject stitching from a prior surgery. This has created a protrusion which leaks extensively, and causes him ongoing pain. As a result, the bandage must be changed every day. This problem has been ongoing for months. There is a surgery that can be conducted to resolve this issue. Arrangements for the surgery are still subject to consideration by the institution (as well as arrangements for a surgery he requires on his arm related to the 2015 shooting),[^1] but to date, the only treatment he is receiving is the changing of the bandages.

[47] In addition, Mr. Mercury has a metal rod in one of his legs as a result of the shooting. He requires specialized orthotics to mitigate pain in his leg. This condition has become very painful while he has been incarcerated. The institution has not provided Mr. Mercury with orthotics, because programs for orthotics was cancelled due to abuse by other inmates. Mr. Mercury relies on orthotics to assist him with pain management. Without orthotics, walking has become very painful for him. The shoes Mr. Mercury currently has do not assist him with pain management. Mr. Mercury states in his affidavit that the nurse at the institution previously ordered that he needs orthotics, but the order was physically destroyed by another staff member at the institution.

[48] Finally, the institution will only provide Mr. Mercury with Tylenol or Motrin for pain management, which he finds insufficient to address the pain caused by his medical conditions (both the abdominal issue, and his leg).

[49] Crown counsel makes the point, specifically in respect to the orthotics, that it is difficult to believe that the Toronto South Detention Centre would not be able to deal with Mr. Mercury’s need for orthotics. I note that Crown counsel did not make any submissions in relation to adequacy of pain medication.

[50] Regarding Crown counsel’s submission about the failure to provide orthotics, I agree that from the perspective that provision of orthotics appears to be a relatively non-complex medical issue, one would have thought that it would be something that the institutional authorities would be capable of providing. By way of example, if I were sitting as a sentencing judge, and an individual were making the submission that he should have a shorter sentence or not be sent to jail because the jail could not accommodate his medical needs, in the absence of evidence, I would have assumed a jail could accommodate something like providing orthotics: R. v. H.S., 2014 ONCA 323 at para. 38.

[51] However, I am unable to reach this conclusion on this bail review for two reasons. First, this is not a situation of an absence of evidence about whether the institution is addressing a defendant’s medical needs. As I have outlined above, Mr. Mercury provided detailed affidavit evidence about the failures to address his medical needs. Crown counsel chose not to cross-examine Mr. Mercury on his affidavit. Crown counsel also chose not to file any responding evidence (or documentation) from the Institution asserting that they do, in fact, provide orthotics, or addressing the other medical issues. Thus, there is uncontroverted evidence before me of a failure of the institution to address Mr. Mercury’s basic medical needs.

[52] Second, in addition to the specific evidence from Mr. Mercury, the conclusion that the Toronto South Detention Centre is failing to meet his reasonable medical needs is supported by evidence that the failure of the Toronto South Detention Centre and its predecessor institutions to properly address medical needs of inmates is an ongoing and systemic problem: R. v. Fermah, 2019 ONSC 3597 at paras. 6-8, 47-62, 70, 73; R. v. Allen, [2013] O.J. No. 6233 at paras. 3-4 (SC).

[53] As noted above, St.-Cloud is clear that a court considering the tertiary ground must consider all of the circumstances, and not just the four factors listed in s. 515(10)(c). St.-Cloud is also clear that even where the Crown can make a strong showing under the four listed criteria, detention is not automatic, and the court must consider whether in all of the circumstances detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice: St.-Cloud at paras: 66-71. I note than among a non-exhaustive list of possible factors that a court may consider as part of its assessment of all of the circumstances, Justice Wagner, as he then was, writing for the court, included the personal circumstances of the defendant, including his physical or mental condition (at para. 71).

[54] St.-Cloud is clear that a reasonable and well-informed member of the public, about whose confidence in the administration of justice s. 515(10)(c) is concerned, is familiar with the basics of the rule of law, and the fundamental values of our criminal law. These include the presumption of innocence, the right to liberty, and the rights guaranteed by the Charter: St.-Cloud at paras. 72-87.

[55] In my view, the failure of correctional authorities to address necessary medical treatment for a person in pre-trial detention is a circumstance that must be considered when assessing all of the circumstances under the tertiary ground. Further, in my view and reasonable and informed member of the public would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if a defendant, even one facing very serious charges, and with a significant criminal record, is released pending trial under a very strict release plan, where the record shows a failure of institutional authorities to attend to the medical needs of the defendant. Part of confidence in the administration of justice is humane treatment of individuals held in pre-trial detention, including attending to their medical needs. The failure of the institution to meet its responsibilities in this regard itself affects confidence in the administration of justice.

[56] My conclusion in this regard is supported by the comments of Justice Nordheimer when he was a member of this court in Allen at para. 4:

It remains the fact, however that if the correctional officials in this province cannot run a detention system that ensures that inmates receive basic medical care, sufficiently tailored to individual health ailments, then they can expect that in appropriate circumstances, this court will address those failures by releasing accused persons, so that they can receive that medical care, where a release can be fashioned that ensures that [sic] the degree possible the protection of the public. And I will add that the public should expect the court to invoke that remedy to address such failures.

[57] As I have outlined above in relation to the secondary ground, in my view the very strict proposed release addresses concerns for safety and protection of the public. The nature of a release plan is also a factor to be weighed under the tertiary ground. In my view, considering all of the circumstances, including the new sureties, very strict release plan, and the need for Mr. Mercury to have his medical needs addressed (which the institution has failed to do), I am persuaded that Mr. Mercury has discharged his onus that his detention is not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

Conclusion and disposition

[58] For these reasons, I find that Mr. Mercury has met his onus to show that his detention is not required on either the secondary or tertiary grounds. As I have noted above, the Crown has never relied on the primary ground in relation to these charges.

[59] I grant Mr. Mercury’s release on a recognizance in the amount of $25,000.00, with Ashley Dayle and Phylicia Thomas as named sureties. Subject to hearing from counsel, my preliminary view is that he should be bound by the following conditions:

Keep the peace and be of good behavior;
Reside at 77 Tindale Court, unit 17, in Hamilton, Ontario, with both named sureties, and be amenable to the rules and routine of the household;
Remain within the boundaries of the property at 77 Tindale Court, Unit 17, except:
- In the presence of one of the sureties;
- To attend court as required;
- To attend his lawyer’s office for the purpose of preparing his defence;
- To attend scheduled medical appointments in the presence of one of his sureties;
- For medical emergencies involving himself or a member of his immediate family;
At his own expense, to be subject to GPS monitoring by Recovery Science Corporation (RSC), which shall include:
- Entering into RSC’s Participant Agreement and complying with its terms;
- Wearing a GPS ankle bracelet at all times;
- Permitting RSC to install supplementary equipment as it deems necessary;
- Complying with RSC leave notification and battery charging requirements; and,
- Cooperating fully with RSC staff;
Present himself at the door of his residence as required by police;
Not to possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code;
Not to possess any non-medically prescribed drugs.

[60] Counsel may propose changes to these conditions, or additional conditions.

Justice J. Copeland

Released: August 2, 2019

COURT FILE NO.: CR-18-10000508-0000

DATE: 20190802

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

ROGER MERCURY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Justice J. Copeland

Released: August 2, 2019

[^1]: Mr. Mercury’s affidavit also included an issue regarding the institution refusing to allow him to have the required surgeries performed by the specialist who has been treating him. During submissions on the review, counsel agreed that the court should not consider that issue, as a decision regarding arrangements for the surgeries is apparently still under consideration by the institution.

R. v. Mercury, 2019 ONSC 4585

Case Summary

REASONS FOR DECISION ON BAIL REVIEW APPLICATION

The Charges

Prior bail proceedings

Nature of a review under [s. 520](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html) of the [Criminal Code](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html)

The Secondary ground

The Tertiary ground

Conclusion and disposition

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 4

Legal Tests 3

Legislation 2