Hillson Tse

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on historical intrafamilial sexual offence allegations, the court acquitted on four counts involving one complainant but convicted on two counts involving a second complainant.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and credibility principles for historical sexual assault cases, the court found the second complainant credible and rejected the accused's evidence that the sexual activity only began when the complainant was an adult.

The court held that the accused, a significantly older great-uncle who spent time alone with the complainant and was entrusted with his care, stood in a position of trust under s. 153 of the Criminal Code.

It further held that the accused abused that position of trust so as to vitiate apparent consent under s. 273.1(2)(c), supporting a conviction for sexual assault.

The acquittals on the remaining historical counts followed from exculpatory defence evidence that left the court with a reasonable doubt.

The accused, charged with historical sexual offences against his son, brought a Mills application for the production of the complainant's counselling records.

The Crown brought a Seaboyer application to adduce evidence of sexual acts involving the complainant and his sister in the accused's presence.

The court dismissed the Mills application, finding the counselling records lacked detail and were not likely relevant.

The court granted the Seaboyer application, ruling that the sexual acts in the accused's presence constituted the subject matter of the charge and were not presumptively excluded under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, sexual exploitation, threatening bodily harm, common assault, and assault with a weapon against his stepdaughter over a six-year period.

The court found the offender was in a position of trust and that the aggravating factors, including the prolonged nature of the abuse and threats of violence, outweighed the mitigating factor of having no prior record.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the sexual interference charge was stayed.

The court imposed a global penitentiary sentence of 8 years, emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA order and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of sexual interference, sexual assault, and threatening bodily harm against his younger sister.

The offences occurred over several years, beginning when the victim was nine years old, and escalated to include digital penetration and forced fellatio.

The sentencing judge applied the framework for determining disputed facts on sentence following a jury's general verdict.

After weighing the aggravating factors, including the victim's young age and the protracted nature of the abuse, against the offender's intellectual disability and mental health issues, the court imposed a total sentence of 36 months' imprisonment.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, sexual exploitation, threatening bodily harm, common assault, and assault with a weapon arising from prolonged abuse of a child in his care.

The court held that delayed disclosure and imperfect recall of dates and peripheral details were not credibility markers of fabrication, particularly in historic child sexual abuse cases.

Relying on the complainant's internally consistent evidence, corroborative eyewitness evidence for one incident, and rejecting the accused's evasive and implausible testimony, the court found the Crown proved all counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

Convictions were entered on all six counts.

R.D. sought a stay of sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and uttering threats charges due to alleged unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from arrest to the end of trial was 30 months and six days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The court found that delay attributable to the defence, including failure to promptly complete a Legal Aid application and late filing of a third-party records application, brought the total delay below the 30-month ceiling.

Consequently, the onus shifted to the defence to prove unreasonable delay, which it failed to do, as its conduct was not consistently aimed at expediting proceedings, and the delay was not a marked departure from reasonable time requirements given local court considerations.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, sought a bail review after being denied bail by a Justice of the Peace.

The applicant proposed a house arrest plan with his aunt and father as sureties.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the proposed release plan unworkable due to the sureties' financial limitations, the applicant's lack of employment prospects, and the fact that one of the firearms was found on the proposed surety's property.