COURT FILE NO.: CR-22-10000312
DATE: 20231030
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: R. v. Riley Tebbs
BEFORE: E.M. Morgan J.
COUNSEL: Helen How, for the Respondent/Crown
Stephanie DiGuiseppe, for the Applicant/Defense
HEARD: October 27, 2023
APPLICATION UNDER S. 11(b) of the charter
I. Introduction
[1] The Applicant seeks to dismiss the criminal proceedings against him on account of delay. He submits that the delay has been so severe in this now 7 year-old case that it has violated his rights under section 11(b) of the Charter.
[2] The trial of this case is scheduled to commence on January 8, 2024 and end on February 5, 2024. Taking into account the portion of the delay time waived by the Applicant and deducting the time consumed by a plea striking motion which constitutes a discreet event and other delays attributable to the defense, the net delay since the information was laid on January 5, 2017 is 1,227 days (40 months and 27 days). Applicant’s counsel says that is nearly 11 months past the presumptive ceiling of 30 months set by the Supreme Court of Canada: R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631, at para 5. Respondent’s counsel takes minor issue with some of the counting, but concedes that the time span of the case exceeds the Jordan ceiling by numerous months and must be accounted for by certain recognized factors.
[3] On its face the delay is clearly problematic and needs to be addressed. It is well beyond what s. 11(b) of the Charter permits unless there is some further explanation.
[4] The parties both agree on the case chronology that appears as Appendix ‘A’ hereto.
[5] The record of proceedings raises two issues for consideration here: a) Is this a particularly complex case? and b) Are there otherwise exceptional circumstances?
II. Complexity
[6] Turning first to the question of complexity, in Jordan, at para 77, the Court explained that unreasonable delays can be made reasonable in the “exceptional circumstance” that the case before the Court is “particularly complex”. It is the rare case, however, that meets this test. As the Quebec Court of Appeal said in R. v. Rice, 2018 QCCA 198, at para. 87, “the ceilings already accommodate matters of some complexity, distinguishable from a normal case. A particularly complex case is even more complex.”
[7] A “particularly complex” case is one that, “because of the nature of the evidence or the nature of the issues, require an inordinate amount of trial or preparation time such that the delay is justified”: Jordan, at para 77. Thus, for example, cases with a large number of charges or pre-trial applications, or novel legal issues, will qualify. The Court also made it clear that the complexity analysis must focus on the case in its entirety rather than on certain discreet components or one or two isolated steps: Ibid., at para 65.
[8] In engaging in this analysis, the court must therefore make its determination holistically. The number of charges, the number of pre-trial applications, the length of the potential sentence, and the expected length of the trial itself, do not constitute proxies for complexity: R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, [2017] 1 SCR 659, at para 65. In R. v. Albinowski, 2017 ONSC 2260, the court found that a five-week trial did not make a case particularly complex.
[9] By contrast in R. v. Majeed, 2019 ONCA 422, a financial fraud case was held to be particularly complex where there were 11 complainant financial institutions concerning some 28 separate incidents of fraud. The investigation entailed information gathered from 150 individuals by more than 30 police officers, with 90 recorded interviews totaling 250 hours of recording and over 12,000 pages of transcript. There were 60 judicially authorized production orders issued, targeting 25 accused individuals facing a total of 31 counts of fraud. The Court of Appel opined that the trial judge correctly found the case to be particularly complex, having considered “not only the complexity of the case in terms of the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the nature of the evidence, and the number of issues, but also took into account the steps taken by the prosecution to properly manage that complexity and mitigate any delay caused by it”: Ibid., at para 4.
[10] By this standard, the present case is not particularly complex. While there are several potential pre-trial applications – e.g. an application considering accommodation for the Applicant in regard to autism, and another considering the application of sections 276 and 278 of the Criminal Code to this proceeding – neither of those involves other parties, nor are they predicted to be especially lengthy or novel for the judge hearing the application.
[11] An example of pre-trial applications that may meet the “particularly complex” test is provided by the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Perdomo Lopez, 2020 ABCA 404. There, the court concluded that the case’s complexity justified a presumptively admissible delay where there was “extensive pre-trial litigation” in both the Provincial and Superior Courts. This included “pre-trial motions consuming 23 days of court time with voluminous briefs of law, and eight substantive decisions on Charter and other procedural issues”: Ibid., at para 65. In addition, the Court observed that there was voluminous pre-trial disclosure which entailed 91 a total of undercover scenarios: Ibid., at para 72. There is nothing along these lines in the case at bar which would so justify a conclusion that the matter is particularly complex.
[12] Indeed, by any measure this is not a factually complex case. The Applicant faces charges of aggravated assault, choking, forcible confinement, and robbery regarding allegations that, following a consensual sexual encounter, he assaulted, choked and robbed the Complainant, a sex worker. The prosecution rests entirely on the testimony of the Complainant as witness. While there may be police or, possibly, expert witnesses, they are not predicted to add any elements of complexity to the trial. Although the jury trial is predicted to take four weeks, it is the complexity, and not the mere length of time, that is the issue.
[13] The present case does not fit the description of a “particularly complex” case as that phrase has been understood in the Jordan context.
III. Exceptional circumstances
[14] Turning to the question of other types of “exceptional circumstances”, the first thing to note from the chronology at Appendix A is that certain identifiable exceptional circumstances – e.g. the Applicant’s change of plea motion and the delay incurred by the Applicant’s change of counsel – have been generously accounted for in calculating the case’s net delay. For this reason, the actual procedures engaged in over the years are not the type of exceptional circumstances that the Respondent emphasizes in its submissions. Rather, the Respondent’s focus is on the exceptionally lengthy delay engendered by the COVID-19 pandemic and attendant court shutdown.
[15] To be clear, the Respondent does not allege any COVID-related delay supported by case-specific evidence. The trial starting date was set after January 29, 2022 – i.e. after the courts had re-opened and were again up and running. COVID did not have any special impact on this case that distinguishes it from all of the others that span the pandemic period.
[16] Rather, the Crown submits that the court must take notice of the general impact of COVID delays – i.e. the fact that trial scheduling has, for a considerable time, been suffering from an overall backlog of cases, without anything in particular happening in this case to make it stand out. Respondent’s counsel’s submissions draw on the idea that a discount of pandemic-related delay is done “to acknowledge the significant impediments that the COVID-19 crisis created in our system and included an acknowledgment of the ripple effects caused by the crisis”: R. v. Edwards, 2023 ONCJ 221, at para 87.
[17] As was noted in R. v. Titus, 2022 ONSC 348, at para 17, the “backlog in cases awaiting a hearing cannot in any way be attributed to a re-emerging culture of complacency that Jordan directed all justice system participants to work diligently to eliminate. The backlog is the mathematical result of the cascading systemic impact of cancelled scheduled hearing dates and deferred scheduling of future hearing dates occurring during the periods of total physical closures of court operations”. In other words, the COVID ripple effect is a form of institutional delay for which neither the Crown nor the courts themselves are responsible. The cost in time of that effect must, at least to a certain extent, simply lie where it has fallen. In the Edwards case, at para 87, the application judge concluded that this might extend the Jordan calculus by some number of days or months, but that he was “unprepared to put that number at nearly 5 months.”
[18] In the present case, the delays attributable to this are at least 7 months and possibly up to 11 months. I would, of course, be inclined to say that the pandemic-related shutdown of the court system did create an exceptional circumstance for some amount of time. As in Edwards, however, I am not prepared to extend for a delay of the magnitude encountered in the present case. An unattributed delay of this size, the substantial portion of which has taken place after the post-pandemic re-opening of the courts, is not a price that an accused person should have to pay.
[19] While it is not the Crown’s fault that the backlog has occurred, it is certainly not the Applicant’s. The extra months of waiting for trial is a societal issue. A modest extension beyond Jordan’s presumptive ceiling might be reasonable for the Applicant to bear, but nearly a year’s delay time – that is, a year beyond what the Supreme Court has said the system cannot go beyond – is a state-imposed burden that section 11(b) of the Charter guarantees will not fall on the Applicant to shoulder.
[20] Moreover, if I were to take account of the overall COVID delay in the way that counsel for the Respondent urges me to do, I would have to be confident that the pandemic bottleneck really has been so severe that this trial could not be accommodated until January 2024. From the evidence before me, I am not certain that that is the case. Any efforts to reduce the wait time and mitigate the delay in getting to trial seam to have been minimal.
[21] It would appear that, unlike in R. v. Harrison, 2023 OCJ 392, where the case was put on the back burner by everyone involved, including the defense, the present case was not left dormant. The record of correspondence shows that it was actively pursued by Applicant’s counsel, who in the spring of 2022 was making inquiries of the Crown and the court as to whether a closer trial date was available. Unfortunately, Applicant’s counsel never received a response to their inquiries.
[22] Email correspondence produced by Respondent’s counsel shows that, in fact, there was the possibility of an earlier trial date. The court administration apparently inquired in the late spring of 2022 whether the Crown would be prepared to proceed to trial in July or August of that year.
[23] For reasons of her own scheduling, counsel for the Respondent responded by asking if anything was available in September. It does not appear that her inquiry was ever answered by the court’s administrative office. Accordingly, the prospect of an earlier trial date came and went, and a trial date two years hence was left as the only option.
[24] None of these communications between the Crown office and the trial office were shared at the time with the Applicant or his counsel. Applicant’s counsel did not follow up on their initial inquiry, as they assumed that the lack of response equated with a lack of earlier trial dates. The mitigation of the delay that the Applicant deserved to have explored was prevented by institutional unresponsiveness to his situation.
IV. Conclusion
[25] Accordingly, the Applicant’s rights under s. 11(b) of the Charter were breached in a case that is not particularly complex and under circumstances that cannot be characterized as exceptional. The 7 to 11-month net delay beyond the Jordan presumptive ceiling is not a result of the case being “particularly complex”, nor is it a result of “exceptional circumstances” such as a justifiable COVID-related backlog. The Respondent cannot justify the unreasonable delay in this case.
V. Disposition
[26] An Order under s. 24(1) of the Charter staying the within proceedings is hereby granted.
Date: October 30, 2023 Morgan J.
APPENDIX A: CASE CHRONOLOGY
N = Neutral
I = Institutional
C = Crown
D = Defence
W = Waiver
EC = Exceptional Circumstance
Grey shaded rows do not affect the calculation of delay, because they occur between two scheduled dates.
Yellow highlighted rows require additional information and could affect the final calculation of delay.
Date
Defence Position on allocation of Delay since last appearance
Event
Time Since Information Sworn (days)
Net / Delay (days)
Marginal Delay since last appearance (days)
Evidentiary Reference
Jan 5 /17
Information Sworn
Application Record, Tab 2.
Jan. 5 /17
*T
N
Adjourned for bail hearing
0
0
0
Book of Transcripts, Tab 1.
Jan. 6 /17
*T
N
Bail granted; defence requested Feb. 16 return date.
1
1
1
Book of Transcripts, Tab 2.
Feb. 16 /17
*T
N
First appearance. Defence asked for disclosure in court and Crown provided four packages, not sure if it contained all disclosure; defence requested Mar. 10 return date.
43
43
42
Book of Transcripts, Tab 3.
Mar. 10 /17
*T
C
Crown provided more disclosure in court; defence requested Apr. 7 to review disclosure; Court suggested having a CPT in the interim, agent for counsel did not have instructions but indicated that may be possible. Crown suggests that delay in doing so would be at defence feet.
65
65
22
Book of Transcripts, Tab 4.
Apr. 5 / 17
Defence emails Crown indicating difficulty opening disclosure materials. Defence requests a meeting on April 7 to assess issues with Crown. Crown replies asking defence to put matter over and Crown can “look at it in the next couple of weeks.”
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 2.
Apr. 7 /17
C
Court cannot locate this recording.
The Applicant has assumed that it reflects what was discussed in the April 5 email chain above.
93
93
28
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, para. 30.
April 18 – May 3 / 17
Email exchange between Crown and defence trying to find a time to meet to review the electronic disclosure issues. Crown and defence suggest Friday may be possible. Defence notes counsel will be out of the country from May 6-18.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 2.
May 5 /17
*T
C
Issues accessing electronic disclosure, defence has been in regular communication with Crown; defence requested adjournment to discuss with Crown.
121
121
28
Book of Transcripts, Tab 6.
May 19 / 17
Crown and defence meet to review electronic disclosure issues.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 2.
Jun. 2 /17
*T
C
Issues accessing electronic disclosure, so need more time to get instructions; defence requested adjournment for instructions and to continue discussions with Crown.
149
149
28
Book of Transcripts, Tab 7.
Jun. 23 /17
N
CPT has been conducted since last appearance; defence needs more time to review voluminous disclosure with client, who has some special needs. Defence requests four weeks and says there will be another CPT in the interim.
170
177
21
Book of Transcripts, Tab 8.
Jul. 21 /17
*T
D
Defence to provide Crown with resolution materials but they’ve been delayed; defence requested Aug. 18 for this purpose. Crown provided further disclosure in court.
198
205
28
Book of Transcripts, Tab 9.
Aug 4 / 17
Defence provided resolution materials to the Crown via email
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 4.
Aug. 18 /17
D
Defence provided materials, no response from Crown because she was on vacation.
226
205
28
Book of Transcripts, Tab 10.
Sept. 15 /17
C
JPT scheduled for Oct. 23. 11(b) waived to next appearance.
254
233
28
Requires disclosure of emails by Crown; Book of Transcripts, Tab 11.
Oct. 23 /17
*T
W
Further JPT scheduled for Nov. 22. 11(b) waived to next appearance.
292
233
38
Requires disclosure of emails by Crown; Book of Transcripts, Tab 12.
Nov. 22 /17
*T
W
Prelim scheduled for Jul. 3 /18, confirmation on Apr. 20.
Defence waives delay from this date to preliminary inquiry.
322
233
30
Requires disclosure of emails and scheduling form by Crown; Book of Transcripts, Tab 13.
Apr. 20 /18
Defence request to adjourn to May 18, after Crown returns from vacation, for prelim confirmation
Book of Transcripts, Tab 14.
May 18 /18
*T
Prelim supposed to be confirmed today but defence isn’t in a position to confirm, needs to talk to Crown, who is on vacation until May 30. Defence requested Jun. 8 to talk to Crown when she returns.
Does not affect delay, as prelim set and during waiver period.
Book of Transcripts, Tab 15.
June 5, / 18
Shidlowski files application to be removed from the record.
Lindsay files application to adjourn preliminary inquiry dates.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibits 5&6.
Jun. 8 /18
W
Shidlowski removed from record, Lindsay on record and requests adjournment of prelim.
11(b) waived to the next appearance.
520
233
198
Book of Transcripts, Tab 16.
Jun. 14 /18
W
Defence requested adjournment.
526
233
6
Book of Transcripts, Tab 17.
Jun. 15 /18
D
Court cannot locate this audio.
(Due to context, the applicant has assumed this TBST happened, adj. to June 29 to give Lindsay time to review disclosure)
527
233
1
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, para. 30.
Jun. 29 /18
*T
D
Defence mis-diarized date, Court suggested return date.
541
233
14
Book of Transcripts, Tab 19.
Jul. 11 /18
D
TRANSCRIPT PENDING
*Due to context, Applicant has assumed this is a defence request to adjourn
553
233
13
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, para. 31.
Jul. 18 /18
*T
D
CPT today, joint request to return on Aug. 22 for resolution discussions.
11(b) waived to the next appearance.
560
233
7
Book of Transcripts, Tab 21.
Aug. 22 /18
W
TRANSCRIPT PENDING
(Lindsay’s memo to file says adjourned to Sept. 12 with 11(b) waiver to the next appearance)
595
233
35
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 7.
Sept. 12 /18
W
Defence request to adjourn to finalize expert report, potentially continue resolution discussions. 11(b) waived to next appearance.
616
233
21
Book of Transcripts, Tab 23.
Sept. 26 /18
D
Going over for potential plea.
11(b) waived to the next appearance.
630
233
14
Book of Transcripts, Tab 24.
Nov. 9 /18
W
Court cannot locate this audio.
It appears that a JPT was set for November 20, 2018
674
233
45
Book of Transcripts, Tab 26.
Nov. 20 /18
*T
D
JPT this morning; defence requested Dec. 5 to seek instructions.
685
233
12
Book of Transcripts, Tab 26.
Dec. 5 /18
W
Defence request for adjournment to seek instructions. 11(b) waived to the next appearance.
700
233
16
Book of Transcripts, Tab 27.
Jan. 10 /19
D
TRANSCRIPT PENDING
(Lindsay’s associate’s Memo to File says continuing JPT had to be scheduled to approve changing prelim length from 1 to 3 days. Jan. 30 earliest available date for Lindsay, he’s in trial for all other dates offered)
736
233
36
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 8.
Jan. 30 /19
D
Prelim scheduled for Oct. 21-23. Jul. 24 set for confirmation.
756
233
20
Book of Transcripts, Tab 29.
Jul. 24 /19
Prelim confirmed, adjourned to first day
Book of Transcripts, Tab 30.
Oct. 21 /19
D
Scheduled as first day of preliminary inquiry.
Guilty plea to aggravated assault, adjourn sentencing. Dates offered: Jan. 31, Feb. 18-21 (judge unavailable). Counsel return to TC and return with May 19; Crown notes judge and/or court not available for many interim dates.
1019
233
264
Book of Transcripts, Tab 31.
May 19 /20
I
Matter was scheduled for sentencing today, but impossible to go ahead with the OCJ COVID-19 directive. Counsel and Crown agree to adjourn to July 28.
1231
445
212
Book of Transcripts, Tab 32.
Jul. 28 /20
EC
Crown thought sentencing would proceed, defence thought they were setting a date for sentencing, but “in the circumstances, we couldn’t proceed in any event.” Adj. to Aug. 6 to contact TC, who will at that point be setting out of custody matters again
1301
445
71
Book of Transcripts, Tab 33.
Aug. 6 /20
EC
Crown and defence are working on getting a sentencing date in front of Botham J. Defence needed more information about client’s availability. Adj. to Aug. 11.
1310
445
9
Book of Transcripts, Tab 34.
Aug. 11 /20
D
Counsel waiting to hear back from T/C about judicial availability for sentencing.
1315
445
5
Book of Transcripts, Tab 35.
Aug. 26 /20
I
TRANSCRIPT PENDING
(The court has attempted to locate this audio recording but cannot find reference to Riley Tebbs on this date. They are in the process of making a second attempt to locate this audio.)
1330
460
15
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, para. 15.
Sept. 25 /20
U/K
Lindsay off record, RSED working towards retainer, gives notice of motion to strike plea.
1360
31
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Oct. 8 /20
EC
RSED retained and motion to strike set for Dec. 4.
1373
460
14
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Nov. 12 /20
EC
Brought forward for defence adjournment application. Motion to strike adjourned to follow IAC procedure and to seek forensic psychiatric evidence.
1408
460
36
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Nov. 25 /20
EC
Canvassed dates for motion to strike
1421
460
14
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Nov. 30 /20
EC
Jan. and Feb. dates not agreeable to counsel; motion to strike set for March 2, 4, 5, 2021.
1426
460
5
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Mar. 2 /21
EC
Motion to strike guilty plea days 1-3.
1518
460
93
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Mar. 5 /21
EC
4th day needed to complete motion, adjourned to set date.
1521
460
3
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Mar. 12 /21
EC
4th day scheduled for Mar. 22, put on the record at TBST on Mar. 12.
1528
460
7
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Mar. 22 /21
EC
Motion to strike complete, adjourned to Mar. 25
1538
460
10
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Mar. 25 /21
N
RSED not on record for prelim yet but ready to set prelim dates on same estimate as previous counsel; Crown position is JPT is required. Scheduled first available JPT – April 6.
1541
463
3
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Apr. 6 /21
JPT conducted.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Apr. 8 /21
N
RSED not on record, expects to be retained within the month. Requested 1 month adjournment for retainer.
1555
463
15
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
April 27 / 21
Preliminary inquiry dates scheduled with trial co-ordinator. All parties take the first available dates.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 27.
May 6 /21
D
Prelim dates put on the record (Sept. 27-30 /21), RSED on the record, adjourn to May 7 for publication ban application.
1583
463
29
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
May 7 /21
Matter adjourned from publication ban motion to first day of prelim.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Sept. 22 /21
JPT – Need to reschedule 4th day if necessary, because of National Day of Truth and Rec.
Sept. 27 /21
EC
First 3 days of prelim; Sept. 30 cannot be 4th day because of National Day of Truth and Rec.
1727
463
145
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Sept. 29 /21
EC
Nov. 10 set for day 4 of prelim.
1729
463
2
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Nov. 10 /21
EC
Judgment reserved after prelim day 4, ruling set for Dec. 21.
1771
463
43
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Dec. 21 /21
N
Committal given, adjourned to SCJ on Jan. 17 / 22.
1812
463
42
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Jan. 17 /22
N
JPT set for Feb. 14, family day on Feb. 21, so adjourn to Feb. 28.
1839
491
28
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Feb. 11/22
JPT Form Submitted.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 15.
Feb. 14 /22
JPT conducted
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Feb. 28 /22
N
Adjourn to put trial dates on the record and to set dates for certiorari
1867
520
29
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
March 1 / 22
Defence completes trial scheduling form and provides to Crown for Crown portion
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 16.
March 11 / 22
Trial dates scheduled
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 17.
March 13 / 22
Defence email to Crown asking Crown to look into delay in setting a three-week judge-alone trial
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 18.
Mar. 14 / 22
Crown advises she has asked Trial Coordinator about 3-week judge alone trials and will follow up once she receives a response. No follow up occurs.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 18.
Mar. 14 /22
N
Defence advised trial dates set starting Jan. 8/24; Crown said dates only targeted, not set. Adjourn to first available return date to firm up trial and certiorari dates.
1895
535
15
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
April 1 / 22
Email from Crown to defence: Thank you both for confirming the dates. I know that there had been some emails about possibly getting earlier dates and I had given my availability, but I assume that is not feasible and that s. 11(b) won’t be an issue?
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 19.
Apr. 4 /22
Aug. 29 /22
4-week jury trial started Jan. 8 /24 put on record; interim date set for Aug. 29 /22.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
April 26 / 22
Email defence to Crown (no follow up on this issue):
We did make efforts to explore earlier dates for a judge-alone trial, for information gathering purposes in the event of a hypothetical re-election. However, we never heard back from the court on this. We accepted the first available jury trial dates offered (Jan 8, 2024 and following).
In any event, we will not be re-electing at this time. We will also not be waiving s. 11(b). In light of the trial dates set, we are actively monitoring delay and considering it in conjunction with the whole of this matter’s record. We will advise promptly should there be any further developments in this area.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 19.
Aug. 29 /22
Oct. 31 /22
Adjourned for update following continuing JPT to discuss certiorari decision.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Oct. 17 /22
JPT – Certiorari decision (sexual assault discharged) does not change trial estimate
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Oct. 31 /22
Dec. 11 /23
Confirmed certiorari decision doesn’t change length of trial; trial readiness set for Dec. 11.
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
Dec. 11 /23
Scheduled for trial readiness
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 21.
January 8 / 24
I
First scheduled day of trial
2560
1201
666
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 17.
February 2/ 24
N
Projected end date of trial
2585
1227
26
Affidavit of Heather Gunter, Exhibit 17.
Total
1227 days
40 months, 27 days