Fred Bartley

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a motor vehicle collision on March 5, 2016.

The defence brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of section 10(b) rights due to police failure to provide an interpreter to explain the defendant's rights to counsel, given the defendant's limited English proficiency.

The court conducted a blended Charter voir dire and trial.

The court found that while the defendant's first language was not English, there was insufficient objective evidence that the defendant failed to understand his rights to counsel or other information provided by police at the time of detention and arrest.

The court rejected the Charter breach argument and admitted the breath sample results.

The court found the defendant was the driver of the vehicle and convicted on both counts.

The defendant brought a motion to stay charges for driving with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol, arguing that his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) had been violated.

The defendant was arrested on December 23, 2015, and the trial was scheduled for October 5, 2017, approximately 21.5 months later.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, which sets an 18-month ceiling for trial delays in the Ontario Court of Justice.

After deducting approximately 3.5 months of delay attributable solely to the defence's conduct in awaiting a toxicology report, the court found the operative delay to be 17 months, falling within the Jordan guidelines.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample after being found asleep in his vehicle on the shoulder of the 401 highway.

The Crown alleged the accused was impaired by alcohol based on observations at the roadside.

The accused testified he pulled over to take a nap due to fatigue and made good faith efforts to provide a breath sample but was unable to do so.

The court found three Charter breaches: loss of rough notes (section 7), failure to advise of reason for detention (section 10(a)), and placement in a cell without considering less restrictive alternatives (section 9).

Under section 24(2), the evidence was admitted.

The court acquitted on impaired driving due to reasonable doubt but convicted on refusing to provide a breath sample, finding the accused intentionally failed to blow into the Intoxilyzer despite multiple opportunities.

The accused pleaded guilty to ten property and violent offences committed between February 8 and March 13, 2016, including theft of a motor vehicle, five robberies armed with a knife, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and administering a noxious substance.

The offences formed a crime spree in west-end Toronto.

The accused has an extensive criminal record with 21 prior sentencing events and 18.5 years of incarceration.

The court considered the accused's Aboriginal heritage (West Moberly First Nation), previously undisclosed due to fear of racism, along with systemic factors including childhood trauma, family violence, substance abuse, mental illness (multiple personality disorder and schizophrenia), and lack of support upon release from custody.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day in a reformatory facility plus three years probation, with credit for 27 months and one week of time served, resulting in an effective sentence of approximately four years and three months.

The defendant brought a second application under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to stay charges of impaired driving and "over 80" due to unreasonable delay.

The first application was dismissed in August 2016 when the anticipated trial completion was under 18 months.

By the time of the second application in February 2017, the total delay had exceeded 22 months.

The court found that the Crown failed to disclose critical evidence (an audio dispatch recording) despite repeated requests over many months, and that this disclosure failure was the primary cause of delay beyond the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown adduced no evidence of exceptional circumstances to justify the excess delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused brought a Section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

Charged on April 14, 2015, with impaired driving and "over 80," the trial was set for September 26-27, 2016, representing approximately 17 months of delay.

The application was heard on July 13, 2016, shortly after the Supreme Court of Canada released its landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which established an 18-month ceiling for delay in Ontario Court of Justice cases.

The court found that while the delay fell slightly below the presumptively reasonable threshold, the accused failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and the delay did not markedly exceed what was reasonably required.

The application was dismissed and the trial dates were upheld.

The offender, a 53-year-old man with a lengthy criminal record specializing in diamond theft through switching, pleaded guilty to theft of a 1.70 carat diamond and two counts of breaching a probation order that prohibited attendance at jewellery stores.

The Crown sought three to four years imprisonment; defence counsel sought 18 months.

The court imposed a sentence of four years on the theft and 18 months on the breach of probation counts, to be served consecutively to each other but concurrent with an existing sentence.

The decision addresses the application of sentencing principles for Aboriginal offenders under Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and the principles established in R. v. Gladue and R. v. Ipeelee.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and brought a Charter application under sections 7, 11(b), and 24(1) seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The trial commenced approximately 18 months after the charge date.

The court analyzed the delay using the Morin framework, considering the overall length of delay, waiver periods, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

After deducting waived time and characterizing various periods as inherent time requirements, institutional delay, or neutral time, the court found approximately 6 months and 14 days of institutional delay.

The court concluded this fell well below the Morin guideline of 8 to 10 months and that societal interests in a trial on the merits outweighed the moderate prejudice suffered.

The application was dismissed.