Oliver Keith Douglas Fitzgerald

The accused were charged with multiple offences arising from a violent home invasion where masked intruders assaulted the occupants and demanded money while armed with firearms.

The intruders fled in a stolen vehicle, leading to a police pursuit and their subsequent arrest in a wooded area.

The court relied on circumstantial evidence, including DNA on discarded gloves, flight from police, and the accused's presence in the getaway vehicle, to find both accused guilty as co-principals or aiders to robbery, break and enter, disguise with intent, and various firearms offences.

The appellant, B.V., appealed his conviction for assault and intermittent jail sentence.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's alleged error in placing the burden on the defence to establish a motive to fabricate, the finding that the force used was not de minimis, and the rejection of the s. 43 Criminal Code defence of corrective force.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the de minimis doctrine did not apply given the context of inter-familial aggression and psychological harm, and that the force was not for corrective purposes but motivated by anger.

The court also found that any error regarding the burden of proof for motive to fabricate was harmless and did not affect the outcome.

Krystle Oag pleaded guilty to 37 offences, including 30 counts of break and enter, committed over 15 months.

The offences involved targeting residences of individuals attending funerals, preying on their emotional vulnerability.

Stolen items included firearms, some unrecovered.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 5.5 to 6 years, while the defence requested a time-served disposition or a conditional sentence, citing addiction and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court found the offences to be of extremely high gravity with high moral blameworthiness, aggravated by the targeting of vulnerable victims and the theft of firearms.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea and a limited criminal record.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years, reduced to five and a half years (66 months) due to the particularly harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 1,101 days.

A conditional sentence was deemed inappropriate given the seriousness of the crimes.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to review a judicial interim release order granted to the accused, who faced serious drug trafficking and firearms charges.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace misapprehended the accused's criminal record, failed to consider the surety's inability to supervise, and overemphasized the release plan on the tertiary ground.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the St. Cloud framework and found no error of law, concluding the Justice of the Peace properly weighed the strict house arrest and electronic monitoring conditions against the statutory factors.

The Crown's application was dismissed.

The accused sought to re-elect his mode of trial from provincial court to superior court after his originally scheduled provincial court trial was adjourned on the first day due to counsel's withdrawal.

The central issue was whether the "day first appointed for the trial" under s. 561(2) of the Criminal Code had passed, thereby extinguishing the accused's statutory right to re-elect.

The court held that despite no substantive trial activity occurring on the scheduled date, the day constituted the "day first appointed for the trial" because the trial had become an established reality with both parties ready to proceed.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding sufficient grounds for the roadside test, accepting the breathalyzer results despite an unreliable breath technician, and finding the delay caused by a forced consultation with duty counsel was reasonable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the first two grounds but found the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider whether the police acted reasonably in requiring the appellant to consult with duty counsel after she had waived her right to counsel.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Jevon White, appealed his conviction for breaching bail and probation orders, where the sole issue at trial was identity.

The appeal court found that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge erred in her analysis of the identification evidence.

Specifically, the trial judge's assessment focused too heavily on the witness's prior relationship with the accused (recognition evidence) rather than critically evaluating the circumstances of the actual observation during the incident.

Furthermore, there was no analysis of the reliability of the in-dock identification, which, standing alone, has negligible probative value.

The court emphasized that recognition evidence is a form of identification evidence subject to the same frailties and risks, requiring the same level of critical assessment.

Consequently, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with assault, mischief, and assaulting a peace officer following a dispute with a roommate over smoking marijuana in their student house.

The police responded with a significant tactical presence and arrested the accused, who was already restrained by his brother due to mental health concerns.

The court dismissed all charges, finding no evidence of a threat to constitute assault, that the minor writing on a door and mirror did not constitute mischief, and that the police's disproportionate use of force and failure to advise the accused of the reasons for his arrest negated the charge of assaulting a peace officer.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but abandoned the sections 8 and 9 arguments before trial.

The court found no breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel, rejecting arguments that police "funnelled" the accused to duty counsel or that the telephone consultation lacked privacy.

On the trial proper, the accused testified he consumed two double vodka drinks in the 10 minutes before leaving the restaurant, raising a bolus drinking defence.

The court rejected this evidence as incredible and unreliable, finding it inconsistent with the bartender's testimony and contrary to common sense.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicology evidence and the common sense inference that people do not normally consume large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under Section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that on December 31, 2017, the accused failed to provide a suitable breath sample into an approved screening device after multiple attempts.

The defence argued the accused attempted to provide a sample and lacked the requisite mens rea.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately and intentionally refused or failed to provide a sample.

The court acquitted the accused, finding reasonable doubt regarding her understanding of the demand and her intention to comply, particularly given language barriers and deficient police notes.

The defendant brought an application to quash a replacement information for alleged non-compliance with section 504 of the Criminal Code, specifically challenging the sufficiency of information provided to the intake Justice of the Peace and the failure to verbally administer an oath when laying the information.

The defendant was originally charged with one count of "Over 80" but the Crown sought replacement charges of Impaired Causing Bodily Harm and Exceed Causing Bodily Harm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the presumption of regularity applied and that the defendant failed to establish an evidentiary attack on the validity of the information on a balance of probabilities.

The accused was charged with two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm and two counts of over 80 causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown and defence presented an agreed statement of facts.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath samples on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of Sections 8, 9, and 10.

The court found that while the arresting officer failed to make a formal breath demand (breaching Section 9), the evidence was admissible under the Grant analysis.

The court convicted on both counts of over 80 causing bodily harm but acquitted on the impaired causing bodily harm counts, finding insufficient evidence of impairment beyond the BAC reading.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and care or control while blood-alcohol content exceeded 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The accused was found sleeping in the driver's seat of his vehicle after it had drifted onto a curb and struck a hydro box.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing BAC of 100 and 90.

The court acquitted on both counts, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that impairment was caused by alcohol rather than exhaustion, and that the breath test evidence was inadmissible due to a serious Charter violation of the accused's right to counsel of choice.