Lisa N. Gunn

AL pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference against a child (KB, aged 9-11).

The offence involved over-the-clothes touching, inviting the victim to touch his penis, and masturbating in her presence.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the nature of the offence against a child, abuse of trust, and AL's high risk of reoffence due to diagnosed pedophilia, fetishism, hypersexuality, cannabis use disorder, borderline personality disorder, and anger issues.

Mitigating factors included his early guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior record, military service with PTSD, intellectual disability, and adverse childhood experiences.

While acknowledging diminished moral blameworthiness due to his background, the court prioritized public protection and found a conditional sentence insufficient.

AL was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary followed by three years of probation, along with ancillary orders including DNA, firearms prohibition, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a no-contact order with the victim.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, assault, and choking, sought disclosure of the complainant's counselling records beyond what was initially consented to.

The applicant argued that inadvertent prior disclosure by the Crown negated the complainant's expectation of privacy and rendered the Criminal Code's s. 278 regime inapplicable.

The court rejected this argument, affirming that an accused cannot bypass the s. 278 procedure due to Crown negligence.

The court found the applicant's request for production was based on speculation and did not meet the threshold for likely relevance or necessity for full answer and defence, as required by s. 278.3(4) and established jurisprudence.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted at trial of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death, and was sentenced to six years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings regarding impairment and whether the operation constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent operator.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were rooted in adequate evidentiary foundation and entitled to deference.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the six-year term fell within the appropriate range for similar offences.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding that the trial judge properly emphasized denunciation and the harm caused by drug trafficking in the community.

The court noted that the trial judge appropriately gave considerable weight to the fact that the appellant had trafficked while on bail for a prior trafficking offense.

Although rehabilitation was not entirely disregarded, it played a secondary role in the sentencing decision.

The sentence was found to be fit, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 12 years imprisonment following his guilty plea to counselling to commit murder and criminal harassment of his estranged wife.

The appellant also challenged a non-communication order imposed under s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code that prevented him from communicating with his minor son while incarcerated.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the sentence and the non-communication order, finding the 12-year sentence was within the appropriate range given the aggravating circumstances and that the trial judge was entitled to impose the communication restriction for safety protection reasons.

The accused was charged with drinking and driving offences under sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought an application under section 11(b) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The charges were laid on January 27, 2012, with first appearance on February 7, 2012.

The matter was scheduled for trial on four separate occasions (June 7, 2012; October 31, 2012; April 17, 2013; and October 23, 2013) before finally proceeding on April 3, 2014.

The court analyzed the approximately 26-month delay and allocated it among inherent delay, defence delay, Crown delay, and institutional delay.

The court found that only the Crown delay and institutional delay could be regarded as unreasonable, and the total unreasonable delay fell within the guidelines established in R. v. Morin.

The application was dismissed.

A surviving spouse applied for dependant’s support under s.58 of the Succession Law Reform Act after receiving a limited bequest under the deceased’s will.

The deceased’s estate, valued at approximately $2.3 million including foreign assets, primarily left the residue to siblings.

The court held that the surviving spouse qualified as a dependant and that the will and beneficiary designations did not make adequate provision for her proper support, considering her age, health, inability to work, and contributions during the marriage.

Applying the statutory factors in s.62 and the moral obligations analysis from leading Supreme Court authority, the court ordered ongoing monthly support from the estate funded through a lifetime annuity.

The court also adjusted the will’s specific bequest to reflect the support order and prioritized the spouse’s support over other testamentary gifts.

The plaintiffs brought an action against the estate of their 'grandfather' figure, Gus Sorkos, seeking to enforce an oral agreement made in 1985.

Under the agreement, the plaintiffs provided unpaid labour to maintain the deceased's farm and cottage properties for over 25 years in exchange for his promise to leave them the properties in his will.

The deceased later changed his will, leaving the properties to others.

The court found the oral agreement was corroborated by third-party witnesses and a prior will.

The court held that the plaintiffs' acts of part performance took the agreement outside the Statute of Frauds and applied the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, finding it would be unconscionable to deny the plaintiffs the properties after they had detrimentally relied on the deceased's promises.

The estate was ordered to convey the properties to the plaintiffs.