Paul Joseph Mongenais

The Applicants (grandparents) brought a motion to enforce an interim contact order for their two grandchildren, alleging the Respondent mother had failed to comply with the previous order.

The court denied the Respondent's adjournment request, deeming it a delay tactic contrary to the children's best interests.

The court found the Respondent was actively preventing contact and influencing the children against their grandparents.

The motion for enforcement was granted, with the court ordering a new, detailed contact schedule, involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer, and a police enforcement clause as a last resort.

Costs were awarded to the Applicants.

The appellant mother sought costs against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) for a second appeal to the Superior Court of Justice, which became moot after the CAS withdrew its protection application in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The case involved conflicting interim orders between the two courts and concerns about the CAS's conduct in investigation and presentation of its case, including failing to meet with the mother and withholding relevant information from the OCJ.

The court found the CAS acted unfairly and unreasonably, justifying a costs award, despite the general exception for government agencies in child protection cases.

This decision addresses a motion for costs brought by the mother against the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) in a child protection proceeding.

The mother sought full recovery costs of $12,577, alleging the CAS acted unfairly and unreasonably, including late service of materials, mistaken pleadings, and untimely conduct.

The CAS argued against costs, citing its statutory obligations and the specific subrule for child protection cases.

The court reviewed principles for awarding costs against child protection agencies, emphasizing that while not immune, they should not be penalized for carrying out their mandate unless their conduct is patently unfair and indefensible.

The court found the CAS acted reasonably and thoroughly, dismissing the mother's claim for costs.

The applicant mother and respondent father brought cross-motions for temporary orders concerning parenting time and procedural matters for their child.

The mother sought increased unsupervised access and disclosure, while the father sought continued supervised access and various conditions, including drug testing.

The court found the mother had made significant progress in overcoming substance abuse and granted her unsupervised parenting time, including extended periods, while denying most of the father's requests for continued supervision and future conditions.

The court emphasized the need to move towards normalization of parenting time and criticized the prolonged litigation.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's dismissal of her application for retroactive spousal support covering a four and a half year period from June 30, 2010 to December 31, 2014.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by not accounting for time spent in mediation when considering delay, by failing to address compensatory support, and by not providing reasons for departing from the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the exercise of discretion regarding retroactive support, which carries no presumptive right.

This appeal concerns a child relocation motion where the mother sought to move her five-year-old son from Cochrane, Ontario to Thunder Bay.

The parties had joint and shared custody following their separation in November 2015.

The motion judge dismissed the mother's relocation motion, finding that the child would lose meaningful contact with his father and that the mother's financial difficulties were self-imposed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to recognize the mother as the primary caregiver and by making a palpable and overriding error in concluding that the mother's financial difficulties were self-imposed.

The court found a valid and compelling parenting-based reason for the move, as it was necessary to enable the primary caregiver to remain financially viable while providing care for the child.

On a motion to change following a review clause in a divorce order, the payor spouse sought termination or reduction of spousal support, while the recipient sought increased support under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The court determined the matter should proceed as a review rather than a variation, meaning no material change in circumstances was required.

After considering the Divorce Act factors, the parties’ long marriage, the recipient’s mental health conditions affecting employability, and the payor’s pension and employment income, the court increased spousal support.

Applying the SSAG without child support formula, the court set support at the midpoint of the guideline range and ordered indefinite duration due to the length of the marriage and the “rule of 65”.