Benjamin John Peter Dawkins

Following a judge-alone trial on May 21, 2025, the accused was found guilty of assault by choking contrary to section 267(c) of the Criminal Code and not guilty of simple assault.

At sentencing on September 9, 2025, the court imposed an absolute discharge with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, victim fine surcharge, and a 12-month peace bond.

The Crown sought 60 days incarceration plus 12 months probation, while the defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court found that while the offence involved intimate partner violence, the unique circumstances—including the accused's reduced moral culpability, first-time offender status, extensive rehabilitation efforts, and significant collateral consequences—warranted a discharge rather than incarceration.

The applicant sought a bail review under s.520 of the Criminal Code, challenging a prior detention order.

The court found new evidence demonstrating a material change in circumstances, allowing the review.

However, the applicant's updated bail plan, particularly concerning unstable housing and proximity to a prohibited person, failed to satisfy the secondary grounds for release, leading to the continued detention of the applicant for public safety.

The accused, Dwayne Nelson, applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging the denial of bail by a Justice of the Peace.

The application focused on whether there had been a material change in circumstances since the original bail hearing.

The court considered the withdrawal of certain drug charges by the federal Crown and the development of a new release plan with new sureties and more onerous conditions.

Applying the principles from R. v. St-Cloud and R. v. Antic, the court found that the proposed new sureties, combined with the tightened plan, constituted a material change in circumstances that addressed the original concerns regarding secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The bail review application was allowed, and the accused was released on a recognizance with specific conditions.

The defendant was charged with driving with a hand-held communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant admitted to holding and handling his cell phone while at a stop sign but argued he was not "driving" because his vehicle was in park mode.

The court rejected this argument, finding that stopping momentarily at a stop sign or red light constitutes "driving" under the HTA, regardless of whether the engine is in park mode.

The court applied a broad purposive interpretation of the statute consistent with its purpose of minimizing distracted driving and followed the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in York (Regional Municipality) v. Tassone.

The defendant was found guilty.