Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-23-148 Date: 2025-10-27 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King – and – Peter Krelove

Counsel:

• Abby Agich, for the Crown
• Ben Dawkins, for the Accused

Heard: September 9, 2025

Reasons for Decision - Sentencing

Cullin J.

Introduction

[1] On May 21, 2025, following a judge-alone trial, Peter Krelove was found guilty of one count of assault by choking ("the offence") pursuant to s. 267(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 ("the Criminal Code"), and not guilty of one count of assault pursuant to s. 266 of the Criminal Code.

[2] On September 9, 2025, Mr. Krelove appeared before me for sentencing. On that date, I rendered a brief oral decision regarding sentence, with written reasons to follow. These are those written reasons.

The Offence

[3] The offence arose in the context of an argument between Mr. Krelove and his then common-law spouse, Sara Presley (who I will collectively refer to as "the parties"). It occurred on May 17, 2020, the Victoria Day weekend, while the parties were at a family cottage with their infant son and Ms. Presley's family.

[4] The argument giving rise to the offence was initiated by Ms. Presley in the parties' bedroom. She was upset because she believed that Mr. Krelove had left the family gathering to watch pornography on his cellphone, which he denied.

[5] Mr. Krelove awoke to being struck by Ms. Presley. She was over top of him, striking him on his upper body, showing him a pornographic picture and texts, and loudly whispering, "You'll never change. You're a pervert. What is wrong with you." Except for a brief intermission to retrieve a cellphone which had fallen beside the bed, this onslaught continued for several minutes.

[6] The altercation ultimately ended with Mr. Krelove on top of Ms. Presley, with his hands on her throat, choking her until she almost blacked out. At trial, Mr. Krelove argued that he had acted in self-defence. This defence was rejected, with a finding that Mr. Krelove's act of choking Ms. Presley was not a reasonable, necessary, or proportional response to the threat confronting him. In the circumstances, a finding of guilt was entered.

Sentencing Positions

The Crown

[7] The Crown submitted that an appropriate sentence for Mr. Krelove would be a term of incarceration for 60 days, followed by a term of probation for 12 months. The Crown also requested ancillary orders, requiring Mr. Krelove to provide a DNA sample, and subjecting him to a weapons prohibition for a period of 10 years. The Crown did not file a Victim Impact Statement.

[8] In response to the defence request for an absolute discharge, the Crown argued that this was not a matter for which a discharge would be appropriate. While they acknowledged that the case involved "difficult facts", and that a discharge would be in Mr. Krelove's best interests, they submitted that denunciation and deterrence were key considerations in sentencing offences involving Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), that they would not be adequately addressed by a discharge, and that a discharge would not be in the public interest.

The Defence

[9] The defence submitted that an appropriate sentence for Mr. Krelove would be an absolute discharge and indicated that Mr. Krelove was prepared to voluntarily submit to a peace bond. They took no issue with the requested ancillary orders, or with the imposition of a victim fine surcharge.

[10] The defence acknowledged that the act committed by Mr. Krelove was an aggravating factor in sentencing but argued that his moral culpability was low having regard to the circumstances of the offence. They argued that the jeopardy to Mr. Krelove secondary to the outstanding charges, the trial, and the finding of guilt was denunciatory. They also argued that Mr. Krelove had high rehabilitative potential.

[11] The defence submitted that Mr. Krelove would sustain significant collateral consequences if a conviction were entered, and he were sentenced to a period of incarceration. It was contended that he would lose his employment, he would be required to leave Timmins to seek the financial support of his extended family, and he would no longer be able to financially support or share parenting of his son.

The Law

[12] Sentencing is an individualized process that requires the Court to have regard to the circumstances of the specific offence and the attributes of the specific offender: R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 SCR 206, at paras. 43-45.

[13] Section 718 of the Criminal Code identifies principles and objectives which the Court must apply when imposing a sentence for a criminal offence. They include: the denunciation of unlawful conduct; the deterrence of the offender and other potential future offenders; the separation of offenders from society; the rehabilitation of offenders; the provision of reparations for harm done to victims; and, the acknowledgment of the harm done to victims. Where a victim is vulnerable, pursuant to s. 718.04 of the Criminal Code the objectives of denunciation and deterrence are to be given primary consideration.

[14] In arriving at an appropriate sentence, the Court must consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender. Pursuant to s. 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, the fact that an offender abused their intimate partner in committing an offence is deemed to be an aggravating circumstance that may warrant an increased sentence. Pursuant to s. 718.201 of the Criminal Code, additional consideration is to be given to the increased vulnerability of female victims of IPV.

[15] Sentencing is a process of balancing these principles, objectives, and circumstances. While conducting that process, the Court must be mindful that proportionality and parity are guiding principles that must be reconciled: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 SCR 1089, at para. 53.

[16] The principle of proportionality in sentencing considers the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: s. 718.1, Criminal Code. Consideration of the gravity of the offence recognizes the victim and speaks to the objective of denunciation. Consideration of moral blameworthiness recognizes the offender and ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate in the circumstances: R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 SCR 433, at para. 37.

[17] The collateral consequences of a sentence may be considered as personal circumstances of the offender. They are not necessarily mitigating or aggravating factors, but they are relevant in considering the principles of parity and individualization, and the objective of assisting in the rehabilitation of the offender. The weight to be given to collateral consequences must consider the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. There is not, however, a rigid formula to be applied in considering collateral consequences: R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, [2013] 1 SCR 739, at paras. 11-12; R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, [2018] 2 SCR 496, at paras. 46-49.

[18] The sentences proposed by counsel, imprisonment and discharge, are at opposite ends of the sentencing spectrum.

[19] The imposition of a term of imprisonment is a punishment of last resort. Section 718.2(d) of the Criminal Code directs that an offender should not be deprived of their liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances. Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code directs that all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, which are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders.

[20] Serious incidents of IPV warrant sentences that reflect the principles of denunciation and deterrence. Absent exceptional circumstances, non-custodial sentences will not be proportionate in cases of IPV involving choking, particularly choking to the point of unconsciousness: R. v. Granger, 2011 ONCA 537, at para. 5; R. v. Martin, 2021 ONSC 6964, at para. 50.

[21] The Court's authority to direct a discharge is provided in s. 730 of the Criminal Code. Where a discharge is granted, the offender is deemed not to have been convicted of the offence: s. 730(3), Criminal Code.

[22] A discharge is available where an offence is not punishable by imprisonment for fourteen years or for life or does not require the imposition of a minimum sentence. The court may direct that the offender be discharged, either absolutely or conditionally. Prior to granting a discharge, the Court must first be satisfied that such an order is not contrary to the public interest and is in the best interests of the offender.

[23] In Regina v. Sanchez-Pino, Arnup J.A. described the test to be applied in granting a discharge as follows:

…The granting of some form of discharge must be "in the best interests of the accused". I take this to mean that deterrence of the offender himself is not a relevant consideration, in the circumstances, except to the extent required by conditions in a probation order. Nor is his rehabilitation through correctional or treatment centres, except to the same extent. Normally he will be a person of good character, or at least of such character that the entry of a conviction against him may have significant repercussions. It must not be "contrary to the public interest" to grant some form of discharge. One element thereby brought in will be the necessity or otherwise of a sentence which will be a deterrent to others who may be minded to commit a like offence -- a standard part of the criteria for sentencing.

Obviously the section is not confined to…any class of offences except to the extent I have noted. On the other hand, it is only common sense that the more serious the offence, the less likely it will appear that an absolute discharge, or even a conditional one, is "not contrary to public interest". In some cases, the trivial nature of the offence will be an important consideration; in others, unusual circumstances peculiar to the offender in question may lead to an order that would not be made in the case of another offender.

[24] The imposition of a discharge in cases involving violence, particularly IPV, is the exception and not the norm. In R. v. Wood, at para. 4, the Court of Appeal noted that, "[i]n cases of violence resulting in injury the requirement of general deterrence to the public militates, in almost every case, against the grant of a conditional discharge, notwithstanding considerations personal to the accused."

[25] A review of the case law provides some insight into the circumstances which may support a discharge in the presence of IPV. In R. v. Khanna, at paras. 7-8, the Court of Appeal, in granting a sentence appeal and substituting an order for an absolute discharge, reasoned as follows:

This was a minor assault which occurred in the context of a most unhappy marriage. The appellant and complainant developed an intense dislike for each other and their respective families shortly after this arranged marriage was made. Both resorted to physical violence on occasion. Apart from each other, the complainant and the appellant are both valuable members of the community. Together they are trouble for each other.

Given the present circumstances of the appellant and complainant and the jury's verdict, we think an absolute discharge is an appropriate disposition.

[26] Likewise, in R. v. Carson, at paras. 35-39, the Court of Appeal upheld an absolute discharge in a case involving IPV with the following reasoning:

The trial judge also made serious adverse findings concerning the complainant's credibility. In acquitting the appellant of the forcible entry and forcible confinement charges, the trial judge rejected the complainant's evidence concerning many of the key events in question. In addition, and significantly, the trial judge rejected the complainant's claim that she was assaulted by the appellant in the hallway of her home, in the kitchen and in the bedroom. Indeed, in connection with the altercation in the bedroom, the trial judge held that the complainant was the aggressor.

The trial judge also held that on a number of prior occasions when the appellant was assaulted by the complainant, he did not retaliate but, rather, walked away. On this occasion, the trial judge found that the complainant was intoxicated and was behaving somewhat irrationally…

The trial judge correctly observed that there is a societal interest in seeking to deter domestic violence and to protect the victims of domestic violence. In this case, however, the trial judge also found that the appellant was a victim of domestic violence.

The sentencing judge rejected certain of the Crown's submissions concerning sentence on the basis that they would have an unnecessarily harsh impact on the appellant's prospects to continue his employment as a police officer. This is a legitimate factor, among others, to be taken into account at a sentence hearing. Neither the appellant's personal interest nor the societal interest would be served by the imposition of a sentence, not otherwise warranted, that would preclude the appellant's continued employment as a police officer.

When the unique circumstances of this case are considered, we do not agree that a sentence of incarceration was warranted. The trial judge's reasons do not suggest that there is a need for specific deterrence and the entry of a conviction against the appellant on the charges at issue on this appeal may have significant negative repercussions for him…

[27] What is clear from the case law is that the circumstances that will justify a discharge in cases involving IPV are, invariably, fact-specific.

Circumstances of the Offender and the Offence

[28] In determining an appropriate sentence, I must consider both the offence and the offender. Information regarding Mr. Krelove was provided in a defence evidence brief, which included confirmation of counselling and therapeutic programs attended by Mr. Krelove, confirmation from his union about the consequences to his employment of a criminal conviction, and numerous letters of support. No pre-sentence report was filed.

Biographical Information

[29] Peter Krelove was born on January 14, 1985. He was 35 years of age at the time of the offence. He is presently 40 years of age.

[30] Mr. Krelove was born and raised in Barrie, Ontario. He comes from a large family of six siblings; he is the second youngest child and the youngest boy. The letters of support filed on his behalf reveal that his family is close and loving, and that he has their unconditional support.

[31] The relationship between Mr. Krelove and Ms. Presley commenced in or about 2016 and ended in or about May 2020. They met in 2013 when they were both working as probation officers in Moosonee, Ontario. Shortly after their relationship began, they transferred together to Thunder Bay. In early 2020, they transferred together to Timmins where Ms. Presley's family resided. Although now separated, they both continue to reside in Timmins.

[32] Mr. Krelove's relationship with Ms. Presley produced one child, Clark, who is approximately 6 years of age. The letters filed on Mr. Krelove's behalf disclose that, following the offence, there were periods of time when Mr. Krelove's parenting time with Clark was limited. It is my understanding that Mr. Krelove and Ms. Presley presently share parenting time with Clark.

[33] The letters of support filed on Mr. Krelove's behalf spanned a broad base of connections – family, friends, co-workers, and community members. They uniformly described Mr. Krelove as a kind, compassionate, patient, and empathetic person whom they respect and rely upon as a source of assistance and comfort.

[34] Both prior to and following the offence, Mr. Krelove demonstrated a strong pro-social lifestyle. His letters of support describe an individual who enjoys playing team sports, who has participated in local theater, and who volunteers in the community. Since moving to Timmins, he has been a regular volunteer at the local food bank, where his involvement is described as reflecting, "a sustained commitment to public service, empathy for those in need, and an ability to manage adversity with professionalism and grace".

Education and Employment

[35] Mr. Krelove completed a college program in police studies, followed by a certificate program in research analysis. He completed both programs at Georgian College in Barrie.

[36] Upon entering the workforce, Mr. Krelove was initially employed in marketing in Toronto. He eventually secured a contract position as a probation officer in Barrie and has continued a career in this field since 2013. Throughout that time, Mr. Krelove has worked as a probation officer in Barrie, Moosonee, Thunder Bay, and Timmins.

[37] Mr. Krelove has been suspended with pay from his employment since being charged.

Prior Criminal Involvement

[38] This matter is Mr. Krelove's first involvement with the criminal justice system.

Aggravating Circumstances

[39] It is undisputed that the fact that this offence involved IPV is an aggravating circumstance. The fact Ms. Presley is a female victim of that IPV must also be given special consideration.

[40] The Crown argues that the involvement of IPV in Mr. Krelove's offence is a significant consideration in determining an appropriate sentence. IPV is endemic and requires condemnation by the Court, even in cases involving first-time offenders with good rehabilitation prospects.

[41] The Crown argues that, in weighing this aggravating circumstance, the following should be considered:

a. As spouses, Mr. Krelove and Ms. Presley were in a position of trust with one another. Ms. Presley was particularly vulnerable as a female victim of IPV.

b. Mr. Krelove was a probation officer. As an individual in a position of public trust with knowledge of the consequences of his actions, he had a higher degree of responsibility than other individuals in the same circumstances.

c. Mr. Krelove had an opportunity to remove himself from the situation and elected instead to remain until it escalated to the assault.

d. Choking is a potentially lethal activity that amplifies the gravity of the offence. Mr. Krelove's conduct was in the "mid-range" of the spectrum of such conduct.

[42] While the defence acknowledges that IPV is an aggravating circumstance, they submit that the offence must be considered having regard to the totality of the circumstances. They argue that Mr. Krelove's conduct was not an act of domination against a vulnerable victim, but rather it was a response to an unprovoked assault.

[43] The defence argues that, in weighing this aggravating circumstance, the following should be considered:

a. Mr. Krelove was not the aggressor. He did not initiate the altercation with Ms. Presley.

b. Mr. Krelove believed that he was defending himself. This belief was not only informed by the presenting circumstances, but by prior similar incidents initiated by Ms. Presley.

c. While Mr. Krelove did choke Ms. Presley, his conduct was on the "lower end" of the spectrum of such conduct. The incident was brief, and he did not choke her to the point of unconsciousness.

Mitigating Circumstances

[44] In addition to considering aggravating circumstances of the offence or the offender, I must also consider any relevant mitigating circumstances. In Mr. Krelove's case, the mitigating circumstances include the following:

a. Mr. Krelove appears before the Court as a first-time offender having no prior involvement with the criminal justice system.

b. The letters filed in support of Mr. Krelove were unanimous in observing that the offence was completely out of character for him.

c. Stressors related to the parties' deteriorating relationship, their move to Timmins, their shared living arrangements with Ms. Presley's family, Mr. Krelove's isolation from his family, and the pandemic, all appear to have played a role in the offence.

d. There have been no further physical confrontations between Mr. Krelove and Ms. Presley since the offence. He has been fully compliant with his release conditions.

e. Mr. Krelove has undertaken extensive self-initiated counselling since the offence, both before and after being charged.

f. While Mr. Krelove did, at trial, attempt to distance himself from the letters that he wrote to Ms. Presley and her family following the offence, at the time they were written they appeared to be genuine expressions of remorse and an acknowledgment of the wrongfulness of his actions.

g. Mr. Krelove has the benefit of strong support from his extended family.

Collateral Consequences

[45] Mr. Krelove has been suspended from his employment since he was charged on March 23, 2023. His evidence brief includes correspondence from an OPSEU union representative which indicates that an employee of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services who is convicted of a criminal offence would, more likely than not, be terminated from their employment.

[46] Mr. Krelove is not from Timmins. He moved here shortly prior to the offence, to be closer to Ms. Presley's family. While Mr. Krelove volunteers in the community and appears to have developed some social connections, he has no extended family in Timmins, other than his young son. In their letters of support, his family have reasonably expressed concerns about Mr. Krelove's ability to remain in Timmins, and contribute to his son's care, if he loses his employment.

[47] For sentencing purposes, I am satisfied on the evidentiary record and accept that Mr. Krelove will suffer the following collateral consequences in the event of a conviction:

a. If Mr. Krelove is convicted of a criminal offence, he will lose his employment as a probation officer.

b. If Mr. Krelove loses his employment as a probation officer, he will sustain a financial hardship. I am prepared to take judicial notice of the fact that a criminal record will be a barrier to his employability, particularly in his chosen field of corrections and social services.

c. If Mr. Krelove loses his employment and is unable to secure adequate replacement employment in Timmins, it will be financially untenable for him to remain in Timmins. He will be required to return to Barrie where he has family support.

d. If Mr. Krelove loses his employment and is unable to secure adequate replacement employment, it will have an adverse impact on his ability to financially contribute to his son's care and upkeep.

e. If Mr. Krelove is required to move from Timmins, it will have an adverse impact on his parental relationship with his son.

[48] Another collateral consequence of this offence that cannot be overlooked is the impact of the offence on Mr. Krelove's family. It was undisputed at trial that, in the aftermath of the offence, the parties separated. After leaving the cottage on the morning after the incident, Mr. Krelove dropped Ms. Presley and their son at her parents' residence and drove to his parents' home in Barrie. They never resumed cohabitation.

Discussion

Availability of a Discharge

[49] It is undisputed that a discharge is an available sentence for Mr. Krelove, and that a discharge would be in his best interests. What is in dispute is whether a discharge would meet the primary objectives of denunciation and deterrence, and whether it would be in the public interest.

Denunciation and Deterrence

[50] The objectives of denunciation and deterrence are challenging issues to balance in determining an appropriate sentence for Mr. Krelove. Both the Crown and the defence acknowledge that this case presents with difficult facts.

[51] As I noted both in my trial decision and in my brief oral reasons, this was an unfortunate incident that was a product of an extremely unhealthy relationship in which mutual acts of aggression had become normalized. While it was ultimately Mr. Krelove who was charged with offences, either of these parties could have found themselves before the Court facing criminal charges for any of the other altercations that preceded this incident.

[52] It appears that the move to Timmins at the beginning of 2020 did not assist this ill-fated union. At trial, both parties confirmed that they were living in the basement at the residence of Ms. Presley's parents while trying to care for an infant. Because of the pandemic, they had limited interactions outside of Ms. Presley's immediate family.

[53] The impact of these arrangements on Mr. Krelove was reflected in the letter of support submitted by his parents: "At the time of the May 2020 events that gave rise to Peter's charge, Peter was going through a period of significant stress. He, Clark and Sara had just relocated to Timmins, where he had no family or support network, and he was feeling isolated. Shortly after, the COVID pandemic began, which added to those challenges."

[54] It was against this backdrop that the offence occurred.

[55] The offence itself was a highly charged incident. Mr. Krelove was sleeping when Ms. Presley initiated a physical confrontation with him. Immediately before the offence, Ms. Presley was either standing over or sitting on Mr. Krelove and striking him. It was the second time in the span of a month that she had initiated an altercation with him while he was in bed.

[56] At trial, I accepted that Mr. Krelove's subjective purpose in grabbing Ms. Presley was to defend himself. In doing so, he used more force than was reasonable. The force that he used, choking, was ill-advised and dangerous. He injured Ms. Presley, and he frightened her and the members of her family who attended to assist her.

[57] While neither Mr. Krelove's subjective belief nor the surrounding circumstances excuse his conduct, in my view, they do speak to his moral culpability, his risk of future offences, and his prospects of rehabilitation.

[58] I agree with the submission of defence counsel that Mr. Krelove's actions were not ones of domination, but rather were intended to disrupt Ms. Presley's unprovoked assault. Mr. Krelove's actions were brief, and I do not believe that they were intended to injure Ms. Presley. In my view, this reduces Mr. Krelove's moral culpability.

[59] While it is important in sentencing Mr. Krelove to denounce his offence as an act of IPV, a proportional sentence must reflect this reduced moral culpability.

[60] It is my view that Mr. Krelove's experience as an offender in the criminal justice system has served as an explicit denunciation of his conduct. For over two years, he has been suspended from his employment, he has been subject to protective release conditions, and he has had restrictions on his ability to access his son. His family has been fractured. He has had to wonder and wait for a decision to be made about his future. When he returns to work after his lengthy absence, he will have to face the humiliation that other members of the justice system in which he works will be aware of intimate details of his life.

[61] In my view, Mr. Krelove's experience will also act as a deterrent to himself and to other similar offenders. I do not believe that we will ever see Mr. Krelove before the Court again facing criminal charges. His finding of guilt and the prospect of losing everything highlighted to him and will serve as a warning to other similar offenders, that there are consequences of not retreating from conflict in highly charged spousal interactions. His experience demonstrates that everyone, regardless of their position or profession, will be held to account for their actions.

[62] I find that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the consequences that Mr. Krelove has experienced as an offender in the criminal justice system serve the primary objectives of denunciation and deterrence. I do not find that this is a case which requires incarceration to serve those objectives.

The Public Interest

[63] Granting a discharge requires that I be satisfied that such an order would not be contrary to the public interest. In my view, a discharge would not be contrary to the public interest as it would support Mr. Krelove's rehabilitation, it would mitigate the impact of collateral consequences on his family and the community, and it would reflect a just, proportional sentence.

[64] Rehabilitation is intended to ensure that offenders move beyond their offence to become successful, contributing members of society. It is an objective in which there is a significant public interest; successful, contributing members enhance, rather than encumber, society.

[65] Likewise, there is a public interest in ensuring that the punishment of offences is fit and appropriate. This requires consideration of the circumstances of both the offence and the offender. Punishment that is either too lenient or too harsh undermines the confidence of the public in the justice system.

[66] Both Mr. Krelove and Ms. Presley have suffered in the aftermath of this life-altering event. Their family was fractured by the incident. Each of them now has less time to spend with their son as they share parenting of him. I do not believe that it is in the public interest that they also suffer the consequences that would accompany the loss of Mr. Krelove's employment.

[67] The loss of Mr. Krelove's employment would render him unable to contribute to the financial and emotional support of his son. The undisputed evidence before me indicates that Clark has been diagnosed with autism. Both now and in the future, Clark will require his father's financial support as well as his consistent presence and emotional support. If Mr. Krelove is unable to provide this, it will be a detriment to Clark. It will be a detriment to Ms. Presley and to the community who will be required to fill the resulting gap. It will also do nothing to support Mr. Krelove's rehabilitation.

[68] In my view the community is also better served by having Mr. Krelove return to his employment. Prior to this incident, Mr. Krelove was an admirably pro-social individual who made significant contributions and served vulnerable communities in his work as a probation officer. I find that it is in the public interest to give him the opportunity to return to that work, with the insight that he has gained from the hard lessons that he has learned.

[69] Finally, it is my view that it is in the public interest to ensure that Mr. Krelove's sentence reflects the unique and difficult facts of this case. I find that a reasonably informed member of the public would view the sentence requested by the Crown to be too harsh in its consequences and not proportional to Mr. Krelove's offence. While there are many IPV cases which call out for a period of incarceration, this is not one of those cases. On the unique and difficult facts of this case, a sentence which would result in the loss of Mr. Krelove's employment and would compromise his ability to support his autistic child would undermine the public's confidence in the criminal justice system.

Appropriate Sentence

[70] In the unique circumstances of this case, and for the reasons I have given, I find that a discharge is an appropriate sentence for Mr. Krelove. As between an absolute or conditional discharge, I find that an absolute discharge is appropriate.

[71] Through his self-initiated counselling and treatment programs, Mr. Krelove has demonstrated that he does not require the supervision of the Court to support his rehabilitation. He is aware of the programs that are available and has demonstrated that he is willing and able to access them.

[72] Mr. Krelove, through his counsel, submitted that he would voluntarily enter into a 12-month common-law peace bond limiting his contact with Ms. Presley to their employment and parenting. I considered whether, if such a term were ordered, it should instead be included in a conditional discharge.

[73] In my view, Mr. Krelove does not require the supervision of a probation order to manage his conduct as it pertains to Ms. Presley. He has been released on his own undertaking since March 23, 2023, without incident.

[74] With that said, I find that there is no drawback to accepting Mr. Krelove's invitation to issue a peace bond order. There is always a risk, however minor, that tensions may be stoked between Mr. Krelove and Ms. Presley and a breach of the peace could occur in the aftermath of the trial. A peace bond would act as a deterrent to yielding to those tensions. Such an order may also give Ms. Presley peace of mind.

[75] Mr. Krelove will therefore be granted an absolute discharge but will be subject to protective conditions in a peace bond for a period of twelve months.

[76] The following ancillary orders are mandatory following a finding of guilt for assault by choking, and will be issued accordingly:

a. An order requiring Mr. Krelove to submit a DNA sample to the national database. Assault by choking is a primary designated offence pursuant to s. 487.04(a)(ix) of the Criminal Code.

b. A weapons prohibition order pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code.

[77] Neither the Crown nor the defence took a position with respect to the victim fine surcharge. In my view there is no reason to dispense with the requirement to pay a victim fine surcharge. Mr. Krelove will be ordered to pay it within 60 days.

Disposition - Summary

[78] For these reasons, I am imposing the following sentence on Mr. Krelove:

1. Pursuant to s. 730 of the Criminal Code, it is ordered that Mr. Krelove is discharged absolutely.

2. Mr. Krelove shall attend and provide a sample of his DNA for the national database. This order is made pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code, following his finding of guilt and discharge for the primary designated offence of assault by choking pursuant to s. 267(c) of the Criminal Code.

3. Mr. Krelove shall be subject to a weapons prohibition for a period of 10 years from the date of this order, pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code.

4. Mr. Krelove shall pay a Victim Fine Surcharge of $200 within 60 days of the date of this order.

5. Mr. Krelove shall be subject to a Peace Bond for a period of twelve (12) months on the following terms:

   a. He shall promise to pay the amount of $2,500 in the event that he fails to comply with the order;

   b. He shall keep the peace and be of good behaviour;

   c. He shall not contact or communicate in any way, either directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic, or other means with Sara Presley except:

   i. Pursuant to a family court order made after today's date, or for the purpose of conducting or defending family court proceedings;

   ii. In the presence of or through legal counsel;

   iii. For the purpose of attending family mediation with an accredited family mediator or professional mediator service provider;

   iv. For the purpose of making contact arrangements (or through a mutually agreed upon third party), for, or having contact with, his child, Clark Krelove; or,

   v. For the purpose of employment.

Cullin J.

Released: October 27, 2025