Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-20-00000026 Date: 2025-10-20 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Tambeau Construction Ltd., Plaintiff – and – Stuart Hopper, Skobah Investments (2019) Inc., and Hopper Buick GMC, Defendants

And Between: Stuart Hopper, Skobah Investments (2019) Inc., and Hopper Buick GMC, Plaintiffs by Counterclaim – and – Tambeau Construction Ltd., Defendant by Counterclaim

Counsel:

• T. Trottier, for the Plaintiff
• B. Jackson, for the Defendants
• B. Jackson, for the Plaintiffs by Crossclaim
• T. Trottier, for the Defendants by Crossclaim

Heard: May 20, 2025

Before: Bellows, J.

Reasons for Judgment

Evidence

Background – Facts Not in Dispute

[1] Tambeau Construction Ltd. ("Tambeau") completed work on the defendant's business and personal properties in 2019. Tambeau claims that the defendants have failed to pay their invoices in full and seeks an order against them for the outstanding balances. Tambeau asks that the matter be heard as a summary judgment motion.

[2] Stuart Hopper and his two business entities, Skobah Investments (2019) Inc. ("Skobah"), and Hopper Buick GMC (the "dealership"), agree that the matter should be heard as a summary judgment motion, including the crossclaim brought against Tambeau for incomplete work, defective work, and unfair practices. Hopper seeks dismissal of the plaintiff's claim and seeks a judgment against Tambeau on the crossclaim.

[3] In July 2019, Tambeau was hired by Stuart Hopper to do work on two properties: Hopper Buick GMC and his residential property. Stuart Hopper assigned the dealership's general manager to assist him with the exchange of project documentation, financing, and payment for both projects.

[4] The work at the dealership was the subject of a fixed price contract with a quote of $112,292.32, provided on July 19, 2019. The project was substantially complete as of November 22, 2019, and was invoiced under budget for $94,779.59 in November, later revised to $98,739.83 in December.

[5] Hopper paid a total of $65,412.56 directly to two subcontractors, but paid nothing to or through Tambeau, leaving an outstanding balance of $33,327.73 based on the revised invoice.

[6] The renovations at the Hopper residence were completed on a time-and-materials basis, commencing around the same time as the dealership. Routine invoices were issued for the residence.

[7] Five invoices were issued for work as provided in Tambeau's evidence. The first two were paid in full. They are as follows:

• Invoice 2188 for $19,691.24 was issued on August 28, 2019. It was paid, in full, by cheque from Hopper Buick GMC on September 5, 2019.

• Invoice 2203 for $30,122.81 was issued on October 9, 2019. It was paid, in full, by cheque from Skobah on October 24, 2019.

• Invoice 2217 for $54,848.51 was issued on November 22, 2019. It was paid, in part, by a cheque for $36,000.00 from Skobah on December 19, 2019.

• Invoice 2222 for $19,280.23 was issued on December 19, 2019. No payment was made.

• Invoice 2224 for $5,614.63 was issued on January 16, 2020. No payment was made.

[8] The outstanding balance of these five accounts issued by Tambeau to Hopper is $43,743.37.

[9] Stuart Hopper did not receive a quote for the work done on the residence. There was a request made for a quote from the dealership's general manager on August 1, 2019; however, work commenced without a quote based on drawings provided by Hopper's architect.

[10] Lucien Delean ("Delean") was an architect working for Hopper on both projects. Delean was responsible for preparing drawings, detailing the scope of the work, reviewing and approving drawings from subtrades, and choosing materials and finishes for both projects. He was examined in discovery but passed away before the motion.

[11] As late as November 22, 2019, Delean provided Tambeau with direction on selections for the renovations. On November 25, 2019, Tambeau was advised by the general manager of the dealership not to complete any further work on the residence.

Position of the Parties

Tambeau's Position

[12] Tambeau had valid agreements for work done at each location. The work at the dealership was completed, and the outstanding invoice should be paid according to the fixed price agreement of July 19, 2019. Any complaints of deficiencies were not made known to Tambeau until after the work was invoiced.

[13] Tambeau was working under the direction of Stuart Hopper, but most of his renovation direction came through Delean, who acted as agent for Hopper.

[14] There were two complaints about the work at the dealership. First, the fireplace was off-centre; however, the fireplace was built in accordance with Delean's drawings. Second, the tile replaced on the floor did not match; however, Delean selected it and testified during examinations that it was fine and could not be matched perfectly due to the age of the original tile.

[15] Tambeau was not permitted to assess those complaints and/or remediate where appropriate.

[16] This project came in under budget. Tambeau claims the entire balance owing on the invoice: $33,327.73.

[17] Tambeau had a time and materials agreement for the Hopper residence. That work resulted in five invoices. Hopper directed Tambeau to make the invoices appear to be work for the dealership. The three payments for these invoices were made either by the Hopper Buick GMC or Skobah.

[18] Tambeau was not privy to the nature of the title to the Hopper residence. That is, it may have been owned personally by Stuart Hopper or by one of his businesses. Tambeau maintains that Skobah is a proper party to the action because Stuart Hopper is the sole owner and director of the company, and that Skobah made payments towards the residence project invoices.

[19] Tambeau asks the court to find that the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30 ("CPA"), does not apply to the residence due to the actions of Stuart Hopper and his businesses in handling the renovation project.

[20] In the alternative, if the court finds that the CPA does apply, Hopper has failed to establish that Tambeau engaged in unfair business practices and, therefore, is not afforded the right to terminate the agreement without payment for invoices issued for time and materials to the time of termination.

[21] The scope of the work at the residence was regularly expanded. There was no timeline or completion date discussed. Moreover, the most recent selection of materials was provided on November 20, 2019, just five days before Tambeau was terminated.

[22] Tambeau was not permitted to complete the work or remedy any alleged deficiencies. As of November 25, 2019, he was not to return to the property.

[23] Tambeau notes that the work on the residence was never completed, even as late as February and March 2025, when Hopper's expert witness walked through to assess it. They submit that this ought to counter any claim of loss of use or enjoyment made by Hopper. There is no photo evidence before the court that captures the condition of the residence from any time before February/March 2025. Moreover, Tambeau's expert witness, Ron Foster, was not able to make their own observations of the residence.

[24] Tambeau submits that the entire balance of the outstanding invoices for the residence should be paid according to their time and materials agreement, amounting to $43,743.37.

[25] Tambeau also seeks costs and interest.

Hopper's Position

[26] Stuart Hopper argues that Skobah is not a proper party because it was not involved in any contract, whether for the dealership or the residential renovations. Skobah, a corporation owned by Stuart Hopper, owns the land where the dealership is situated.

[27] Hopper has filed a counterclaim against Tambeau. Hopper maintains that the deficiencies in Tambeau's work at the dealership merit a reduction in the final invoiced amount. Hopper had the tile work on the dealership remedied by Gilles Hebert in 2023.

[28] With respect to the residence, Hopper raises issues of delay, leaving the residence in disarray just before the Christmas holidays, unfair business practices, being charged for remedial work on the bulkhead, unreliable billing practices, unfair business practices, and loss of use and enjoyment of his residence. He relies on the CPA to set aside any obligation to pay the outstanding residence invoices.

[29] Hopper relies on the size of the residence (approximately 1200 square feet) and the nature of the work (primarily aesthetic) to establish that the project was taking too long to complete. Both projects commenced in August 2019, and he discharged Tambeau on November 25, 2025. He acknowledged that the changes to the scope of the work and selections were being made as late as November 20, 2019. Hopper states that he communicated concerns to Delean and believes Delean wrote to Tambeau on at least two occasions to inquire about progress.

[30] Hopper's counterclaim for loss of use and enjoyment of his residence rests on the submission that his residence was left in a state of disarray for the holidays. He acknowledges that it is difficult to assign a specific amount to this and asks the court to consider $2,500.00. It is acknowledged that the renovations remain incomplete at the residence.

[31] Hopper's counterclaim seeks to reduce Tambeau's invoices for the residence project for several reasons related to billing practices:

• In questioning, Ronald Tambeau admitted to billing for remedial work done on the bulkhead – this ought not to have been billed.

• Invoice details were vague, and there was no way to distinguish what work was reflected on the invoice, such as being billed for remedial work, until a detailed accounting was requested. Hopper maintains that this vagueness ought to result in a reduction.

• Tambeau did not seek quotes from different subcontractors, and there may have been savings if he had. He acknowledges that it is impossible to put a number on this claim.

[32] Hopper acknowledges that the renovations in the house were not completed or remedied (at least not between November 2019 and February/March 2025 when Gilles Hebert inspected it). However, he maintains that this does not form a basis for Tambeau's claim that wear and tear would have significantly impacted the 2025 assessment of Tambeau's work in 2019. Hopper refers to unfinished work, examples of ill-fitting trim, and a damaged door to support his position. Appropriately, he acknowledges that wear and tear may apply to the refinished hardwood floors.

[33] In the end, Hopper's position is that the deficiencies in the work at the dealership should offset the contract amount owed. Additionally, the completion and remedial work required at the residence, along with the loss of use and enjoyment and unfair billing practices, should significantly reduce the amount due on the residence project.

[34] Based on the affidavit of Gilles Hebert, Hopper brings a counterclaim for $2,039.58 for replacement of the tiles at the dealership, and $52,348.38 to cover costs to remediate and/or complete work at the residence. He also seeks $2,500.00 for loss of use and enjoyment of his residence.

Issues and Analysis

Preliminary Issues

Is this matter appropriate for summary judgment disposition?

[35] Although Hopper was initially opposed to summary judgment disposition in their materials, both parties agree that the matter is appropriate for summary judgment disposition.

[36] Rule 20.04(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, states that the court shall grant summary judgment where the parties agree to have all, or part, of the claim determined by summary judgment and the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to grant summary judgment.

[37] There is no genuine issue requiring a trial. Based on the evidence before the court, I can reach a fair and just determination of the merits of the claim and counterclaim. I can make the necessary findings of fact and apply the law to those facts. Proceeding as a summary judgment motion is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result: see Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, at para. 4.

Is Skobah a proper party to this matter?

[38] Stuart Hopper is the sole owner of Skobah Investments (2019) Inc., and Skobah, in turn, is the owner of the dealership property.

[39] Tambeau relies solely on the fact that Skobah paid two invoices issued against the work completed on the residence project as a basis for liability. No invoice was issued to Skobah, and there is no evidence that Skobah was a party to either contract.

[40] The defendant, Stuart Hopper, can direct whatever corporate entity he wishes to pay the invoice, but this does not create liability for that corporate entity.

[41] The claim against Skobah Investments (2019), Inc. is dismissed.

The Dealership Project

The Contract, the Architect, and the Counterclaim

[42] Most of the facts in relation to the dealership project are undisputed by the parties. There was a valid fixed price agreement entered into by the parties on July 19, 2019. The initial meeting took place at the dealership. Delean provided drawings for the renovations, and Tambeau completed the work with the help of various subcontractors as required.

[43] There is no dispute that the final invoice was less than the amount quoted. The first invoice issued upon completion was for $94,779.59. Despite being close to $20,000.00 less than the quote, Hopper disputed the invoice and requested particulars. Upon reviewing their accounts, a revised invoice was issued for $98,739.83. Hopper paid $65,412.56 directly to a subcontractor for the millwork. He paid nothing to Tambeau.

[44] Tambeau's claim is for the balance owing of $33,327.73. The only defences raised against this claim are:

• There were two final invoices issued, and they should not be required to pay the higher amount.

• There ought to be an offset of the amount owing due to the fireplace being off-centre, and the tile not being matched well enough to the existing tile.

[45] In reviewing the evidence, I find that Delean was acting as an agent for Hopper, that Tambeau installed the fireplace according to the drawings provided by Delean, and that the tile was chosen and later justified by Delean as sufficient. Hopper cannot retroactively revoke Delean's agency because he is dissatisfied with the final product. Tambeau did not subcontract Delean. I find that Tambeau has made out their claim for the dealership work, and in making that finding, I dismiss the counterclaim brought by Hopper for remediation of the tile work completed in 2023.

[46] The question that remains is what invoice amount prevails. Although Tambeau was not able to explain the difference between the two invoices issued, the latter invoice was issued at the request made by Hopper and was accompanied by receipts and subtrade invoices. On a balance of probabilities, I find that Tambeau correctly invoiced for the labour, subtrade, and disbursements incurred, as well as for appropriate management and profit margins.

[47] As such, Tambeau is entitled to damages of $33,327.73 for the dealership project.

The Residence Project

[48] The claim and counterclaim relating to the residence project are more complex than the fixed price agreement for the dealership. The issues to be addressed are as follows:

• Was there a valid agreement?

• Does the CPA apply to the residence project?

• Claim vs Counterclaim – the nitty-gritty.

Was there a valid agreement for the residence project?

[49] There is no dispute between the parties that Tambeau was engaged to complete renovations at the Hopper residence.

[50] The dispute arises in the execution of that verbal contract. Tambeau argues that it was a "time and materials" contract, also known as a contract for future performance, and that no formal quote was required. Furthermore, the scope of the project continuously changed and expanded throughout the renovation period.

[51] Stuart Hopper disagrees; however, the evidence before the court indicates that the parties discussed the project, it commenced, and several invoices were, in fact, paid. Hopper's only request following the first invoice was that it be made to look like work was being completed at the dealership.

[52] Although s. 30(1) of the CPA requires that contracts for individuals acting for a personal purpose are to be in writing, it does not negate the fact that this agreement was in place between the parties.

Does the Consumer Protection Act apply?

[53] The interplay between the two projects serves to complicate an otherwise relatively straightforward question. The CPA defines a consumer as an individual acting for personal, family, or household purposes, as opposed to acting for business purposes.

[54] Upon reviewing the evidence, it is evident that many facts not in dispute are significant to this issue:

• The meeting between Ronald Tambeau and Stuart Hopper occurred at the dealership – Hopper's place of business.

• Delean was hired directly by Hopper to provide drawings for both projects concurrently and was the primary point of contact for both.

• The first invoice for the residence was sent to Stuart Hopper on August 28, 2019, for his review, and he replied that "[…] it should look like you did the work at [H]oppers…I will assist with that…".

• At the direction of Stuart Hopper, though the projects were noted to be separated, both projects were managed by the general manager of the dealership and overseen by Hopper's architect, Delean.

• All invoices were to be directed to and were paid by the general manager at the dealership.

[55] These are not the actions of a personal transaction that were intended to be afforded the protections of the CPA. Stuart Hopper was a sophisticated businessman directing billing practices that could be reasonably inferred to benefit his business(es) and himself. The only payments made to Tambeau were for the residence project, and they were all made by Stuart Hopper's corporate entities, as coordinated by the dealership's general manager.

[56] Hopper negotiated the project at his place of business, requested that the project be invoiced to appear as if it had been done at the dealership, and paid three such invoices from corporate accounts. He now asks the court to treat him like an individual under the CPA to shield him from liability. This argument must fail.

[57] The CPA was not designed to protect consumers who behave the way Stuart Hopper did. Section 93(2) exists for precisely this sort of situation. It grants the court discretion to consider the equities of enforcing or setting aside consumer contracts.

[58] I have reviewed sections 93(1) and (2) of the CPA and find that even if the residential contract was illegal, as contracts with consumers are required to be in writing, it is still enforceable under section 93(2) as it would be inequitable to find otherwise.

[59] In making that finding, I have reviewed the factors set out in the caselaw and have considered the following:

• The serious consequences of invalidating the contract, the social utility of those consequences, and the class of persons for whom the prohibition was enacted.

• Whether the contract was bargained for at arm's length, and whether the consumer was unfairly taken advantage of; whether it was wholly or substantially complete, the degree of benefit derived by the customer; and whether it would be inherently wrong or contrary to public policy to enforce the contract.

[60] Following the factors outlined in Grainger v. Flaska ("Grainger"), I make the following findings regarding these relevant factors in this case:

Consequences of invalidating the contract: Were the court to find that the contract is invalid, the consequences would be serious, not only for Tambeau, but for all unsuspecting contractors, particularly those running small businesses.

The protected class of persons: The CPA is designed to protect customers from unscrupulous service providers who try to take advantage of them. Hopper and Tambeau do not fit this picture – Stuart Hopper is a savvy businessman who had engaged Tambeau for significant renovations at his business, had an architect working on both projects, and a business manager at the dealership running point on the financing and payments. He had prior business dealings with Tambeau and many of the subcontractors hired to complete the residence project. He is neither a naïve nor an unsophisticated consumer.

Whether the contract was negotiated at arm's length: Although they had prior dealings, the negotiations were at arm's length – the parties were acting independently and in their own best interests. Tambeau has been one of Hopper's customers, and he has also completed prior jobs for him.

Whether Tambeau took unfair advantage of Stuart Hopper: Hopper negotiated at his place of business for both contracts. He sought Tambeau for both projects and benefited from an architect who assisted in overseeing the projects and acted as his agent for various decisions. Hopper complains that Tambeau spent too many hours carrying out the work, but provided no reliable evidence upon which to make such a finding.

Whether the contract was wholly or substantially completed: The bulk of the work on the residence was completed (Hopper's expert estimated that it was 70% complete); however, the scope of the project and the material selections were still being made. Based on all the evidence, the work was substantially complete, and only the completed work was invoiced. Through Delean, Hopper provided additional instructions for selections or remediation on November 13, 2019, but did not allow time to complete or address the items mentioned. They were notified that they were not to return on November 25, 2019.

Degree of benefit derived by the consumer: Although some renovations were not complete, or might have required remediation, Hopper made the decision to not permit Tambeau to return. He then did not have any work completed for more than five years. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the condition of many items in the house resulted from incomplete work, deficient work, or wear and tear between 2019 and 2025. While the customer did not benefit from a fully completed and defect-free renovation, it was of his own doing. Had Tambeau been allowed back in, deficiencies may have been fixed without difficulty. It was the defendant's choice to lock him out, and he is stuck with the consequences of that decision. Moreover, a review of invoices from December 2019 and January 2020 disclose that the bulk of the invoiced amounts were from sub-trades that Tambeau would have been responsible for paying. Hopper received the benefit of those subtrades (such as Rochefort) to the detriment of Tambeau.

Public policy: It would not be contrary to public policy to enforce the contract. Stuart Hopper is a sophisticated consumer attempting to exploit consumer protection legislation and taking advantage of contractors, while reaping the benefits of running residential renovations through his business.

[61] Having considered all these factors, I find that it would be inequitable for the court to relieve Stuart Hopper of his contractual obligation to pay Tambeau because the contract is not in writing.

[62] Moreover, I reject the claims that Tambeau engaged in unfair business practices in hiring subcontractors, as it is based on years of experience working with them. Considering that the dealership project involved many of the same subcontractors and the final invoice was lower than the estimate, I find that, on balance of probabilities, not seeking quotes from several subcontractors is neither negligent nor unfair.

[63] Finally, in his CPA submissions, Hopper claims that the hourly rate was grossly inflated and that labourers ought to have been about half the cost. However, Tambeau was supplying unionized, skilled labourers. I accept Foster's evidence that $85.00 per hour was a reasonable cost for skilled labour. I reject Delean's anecdotal evidence that the hourly rate for labourers was too high. I also reject Hebert's evidence that the labour cost could have reasonably been reduced to $45.00 per hour. He provides no evidence of the hourly rate for the labourer he quotes, nor for his own work. Again, there is no evidence that this labour cost was any different from that of the dealership project, which was a written, accepted quote that was completed under budget.

[64] As such, I must next consider the extent to which Tambeau has established the claim, and whether any damages are owing as a result of the counterclaim by Hopper.

Claim vs. Counterclaim – the nitty-gritty

[65] Tambeau issued periodic invoices accounting for time and materials. The first two were paid in full without question. Hopper paid $36,000.00 toward the third; however, he has never paid anything further to Tambeau for the residence project. Tambeau's claim is for the outstanding balance of $43,743.37.

[66] Hopper brought a counterclaim on several grounds, many of which have been referenced in the above assessment regarding the CPA. In general, the claim relates to incomplete or deficient work and negligence in project management, particularly in time management and in failing to obtain competitive quotes from subcontractors. As dealt with above, he also claims unfair business practices and seeks relief under the CPA.

[67] Although I will not review their opinions in great detail in this decision, I have reviewed the affidavits and exhibits in this matter, including those of Ron Foster and Gilles Hebert.

[68] The initial claim by Tambeau is relatively straightforward – there was a valid time-and-materials contract that the CPA did not invalidate. On a balance of probabilities, I find that Tambeau has satisfied its onus and made out its claim. Invoices have been issued and substantiated by timesheets, receipts, and accounts from subcontractors. There is a balance for work owed to Tambeau of $43,743.37.

[69] As I embark on an assessment of damages claimed by Hopper in the counterclaim, I have reviewed and adopted the approach of the Court of Appeal in Martin v. Goldfarb (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 161, which was recently cited at para. 24 in Westmount-Keele Limited v. Nicholas C. Tibollo Professional Corporation, 2025 ONCA 401:

[I]t is a well-established principle that where damages in a particular case are by their inherent nature difficult to assess, the court must do the best it can in the circumstances. That is not to say, however, that a litigant is relieved of his or her duty to prove the facts upon which the damages are estimated. The distinction drawn in the various authorities, as I see it, is that where the assessment is difficult because of the nature of the damage proved, the difficulty of assessment is no ground for refusing substantial damages even to the point of resorting to guesswork. However, where the absence of evidence makes it impossible to assess damages, the litigant is entitled to nominal damages at best. [Emphasis added.]

[70] When assessing damages with less than perfect evidence, I am tasked to do my best to assess based on the evidence I do have, and may, in fact, assign damages even when the quantum is not clearly set out. However, where evidence is absent, damages will be nominal at best.

[71] There are two broad categories within the counterclaim: work that was incomplete, and work that was deficient. Hopper bears the onus to prove their claim on a balance of probability standard. As it relates to the first category, Hopper must prove that Tambeau invoiced Hopper for services that were not provided – this is to be distinguished from things that were not yet completed and not invoiced for.

[72] While there is evidence that the renovations were not complete, there is no evidence that Tambeau invoiced for work they did not do or charges they did not incur from subcontractors. One example to highlight the distinction is the mantle that was prepared and provided by Dowdall. The mantle installation was not completed before Hopper stopped the renovations, but the subcontractor did make the mantle, deliver the mantle, and attempt the installation. These services were rendered, though the job was unfinished, and Tambeau was not permitted to complete it.

[73] The second broad category of the counterclaim is for deficient work. I have the benefit of reviewing reports prepared by both experts. I start this analysis by accepting the position stated in Foster's report that it can be difficult to tell the difference between work that is incomplete and work that is deficient. At times, something that is incomplete can appear deficient. For example, imperfections in drywall or exposed nail holes in real wood trim may result from tasks that are not yet completed.

[74] Similarly, I accept Foster's caution about some of Hebert's findings, given that the residence was first assessed in February 2025, more than five years after the renovations ceased. Numerous factors over five years can impact the state of a home that has been lived in and used during that time, including wear and tear and items left unfinished during use.

[75] Hopper had a duty to mitigate his damages. The report prepared by Hebert did not consider any attempt to fix or reuse materials where possible, and includes work outside the original scope. Although there is a dispute between the parties about whether the fireplace was to be replaced, on a balance of probabilities, I find that the scope of work included fireplace doors, not the replacement of the entire fireplace. This is evidenced by the product ordered and invoiced for, as well as the November 13, 2019 note from Delean to Tambeau, which references only aesthetic remediation and Hopper's overall position that the renovations were purely aesthetic. Hebert's report also does not accord with Delean's November 13, 2019 correspondence to Tambeau: Hebert prefers the more expensive option of powder coating the radiators, whereas Delean's instructions on Hopper's behalf are to paint the living room radiators to match the wall.

[76] I return to the Court's decision in Grainger, which held that a contractor who has not breached their contract should be given an opportunity to repair deficiencies before the court will require them to pay for another contractor to carry out the repairs: Grainger, at paras. 45 and 53.

[77] Unfortunately, Hebert's report does not distinguish between deficient and incomplete work; essentially, he considers all items noted to be defective or subpar. I disagree. I find that considering unfilled nail holes as deficient rather than incomplete is a misclassification. I agree with the breakdown of work made by Foster. In reviewing the findings in Foster's report of those items that are deficient or otherwise may require remedial work that was within the scope of Tambeau's contract, Hopper ought to be awarded $5,700.00. This amount generally reflects a calculation of remedial work reduced by 25% to account for wear and tear and/or corrections that Tambeau could have made, had they been permitted to complete the job (painting, drywall, trim, etc.) and includes HST.

[78] As for the completion costs claimed for closet organizers and so on, Hopper has not met his onus. I find that the incomplete items were either not yet invoiced or have been provided, but the labour is not yet complete. Tambeau has been responsible for the subcontractor accounts for those items which have been made and delivered.

[79] There is, however, evidence to satisfy me on a balance of probabilities that Tambeau invoiced for some remedial work, which would have resulted in some double billing and that ought to be accounted for. Here, I must rely on the Court of Appeal's guidance in Martin v. Goldfarb and award a nominal amount. I find in favour of Hopper for $750.00.

[80] Hopper's claim for loss of use and enjoyment remains for $2,500.00. This claim is based on his home being left unfinished, especially with the Christmas holidays fast approaching. However, there is no evidence of loss of use and enjoyment. Though perhaps inconvenient at times, Hopper continued to reside in and use his home from 2019 to the date of this motion in May 2025. He was left without a sink in his bathroom and had to purchase and install one because he terminated Tambeau before it was complete. The counterclaim for loss of use and enjoyment is dismissed.

[81] As such, Hopper shall be awarded a total of $6,450.00 in damages. This award shall be offset against the damages owing to Tambeau.

Conclusion

[82] All claims against Skobah Investments (2019) Inc. are dismissed.

[83] Tambeau's claim for the dealership project succeeds in full against Stuart Hopper and Hopper Buick GMC. Tambeau is awarded $33,327.73.

[84] Tambeau's claim for the residence project succeeds in full against Stuart Hopper. Tambeau is awarded $43,743.37.

[85] Hopper's counterclaim for the dealership project is dismissed.

[86] Hopper's counterclaim for the residence project succeeds, in part. Hopper is awarded $6,450.00 to be offset against the damages due to Tambeau.

[87] Hopper's counterclaim for loss of use and enjoyment is dismissed.

[88] Tambeau is entitled to pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on the balance owing at the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43 rates.

Costs

[89] Tambeau is entitled to costs on this summary judgment motion, to be offset to a degree by costs to Hopper for partial success on their counterclaim. To that end, Tambeau may provide cost submissions to a maximum of two pages (excluding attachments) within 15 days of today's date, and Hopper may provide reply submissions to a maximum of two pages (excluding attachments) within 15 days of receiving Tambeau's materials. Finally, Tambeau may provide one further page of reply submissions in relation to the costs requested by Hopper, within 10 days of receiving Hopper's materials. No submissions will be considered beyond these deadlines.

Bellows, J.

Released: October 20, 2025

Footnotes

[1] I will refer to the defendants collectively as "Hopper", and where specificity is required, I will refer to each by their full name/business name.

[2] See Tambeau Construction Ltd v. Hopper et al., CV-20-026 (Exhibit J, Ronald Tambeau's Affidavit).

[3] See GTA Restoration Group Inc. v. Baillie, 2020 ONSC 5190, at paras. 65-66; Grainger v. Flaska, 2013 ONSC 4863, at paras. 79-82; and Connect Electric Inc. v. Pullen and Greensides, 2013 ONSC 1837, at paras. 59-60.