Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: FS-24-00000006
Date: 2025/06/06

Parties

Between:
Stephanie Nadon (Applicant, Responding)
– and –
Glenn Sukhnandan (Respondent, Responding)
Eunice Sukhnandan (Intervenor, Moving Party)

Appearances:
K. Klein, for the Applicant
R. Leckie, for the Respondent
R. Baijnath, for the Moving Party

Heard: May 2, 2025
Released: June 6, 2025
Judge: Bellows

Introduction

[1] Eunice Sukhnandan is the moving party in this matter; she is requesting to be added as a party to the family matter to protect her claim to a financial interest in the family property. She is the mother of the respondent's husband, Glenn Sukhnandan, and the mother-in-law of the applicant's wife, Stephanie Nadon. [1]

Background

[2] Stephanie and Glenn began dating in or around October 2003. In June 2004, Glenn purchased the home at 1937 Faylee Crescent in Pickering, Ontario. Stephanie moved into the Faylee Home about a month later in July 2004. They were married on March 8, 2008.

[3] From time to time, during their years at the Faylee Home, Eunice assisted financially with some home improvements. Stephanie was never informed that the Declaration of Trust was why Eunice assisted with those improvements.

[4] The Faylee Home was their matrimonial home until its sale in 2021. The sale of this home netted $570,363.65 in proceeds.

[5] Michael Fairney was the solicitor acting for Glenn and Stephanie in the sale of the Faylee Home. There was no mention of a trust to him at the time of the sale of the Faylee Home, nor any disclosure on any real estate documents. He provided documents and an affidavit for this proceeding.

[6] Following the sale of the Faylee Home, Glenn and Stephanie moved in with Eunice and her husband (Glenn’s father) while they purchased a property in North Bay, Ontario, and planned and built their next matrimonial home there.

[7] Stephanie and Glenn began building at 39 Tupper Drive in North Bay in June 2022. However, they separated on February 28, 2023, before completing the Tupper Home. Stephanie moved to her sister’s home in North Bay, and Glenn stayed with his parents.

[8] Stephanie supervised the completion of the Tupper Home and moved into it while preparing it for sale. At some point during the home's construction, Glenn and Stephanie borrowed $50,000 from Eunice to assist with the build. It was repaid following the sale.

[9] The house was listed in June 2023 and sold on October 18, 2023. The proceeds are being held in trust.

[10] In preparation for the sale of the Tupper Home and separation, Glenn and Stephanie discussed debts to be paid from the proceeds. This discussion included the $50,000 loan from Eunice for the build.

[11] All parties agree that no trust agreement was ever registered on title to the Faylee Home. Glenn alone was on title when the house was purchased in June 2004.

Additional Information – in Dispute

[12] Eunice and Glenn both plead that Glenn signed a Declaration of Trust on June 2, 2004, which stated the following (reproduced as written):

1. My mother Eunice Sukhnandan have not contributed 50% of the purchase price of the property municipality known as 1937 Faylee Crescent in the City of Pickering.
2. I am holding 50% of title to the property known as 1937 Faylee Crescent in the City of Pickering in trust for my mother Eunice Sukhnandan and she is the beneficial owner of 50% of the said property.
3. I declare and acknowledge that I will be holding 50% of the title to the property known as 1937 Faylee Crescent in the City of Pickering in trust for my mother Eunice Sukhnandan and she is the beneficial owner of 50% of the said property.

[13] The document was dated June 2, 2003. Glenn and Eunice maintain that this was simply a typo. Stephanie points to the incorrect date as evidence of fabrication.

[14] Glenn maintains that Stephanie was aware of the Declaration of Trust. Stephanie denies this. Eunice’s evidence is that she never discussed it with Stephanie, but she should have known.

Issues on this Application

[15] The parties separated in February 2023. By June 2023, Glenn had retained counsel. When financial disclosure was produced in September 2023, it included a claim for a personal, joint debt for $211,250 to Eunice, a repayment of her 50% interest in the Faylee Home.

[16] Eunice claims this amount is $285,181.82, which represents half of the proceeds from the Faylee Home, and significantly more than half of the funds in trust following the sale of the Tupper Home. Eunice and Glenn rely on a trust agreement they say was entered into when purchasing the Faylee Home.

[17] Stephanie claims she was unaware of any such interest and vehemently denies that Eunice had any interest in the Faylee Home. Stephanie challenges the validity of the trust agreement.

[18] The main issue on this application is whether Eunice should be added as a party to the family matter involving Stephanie and Glenn.

[19] However, to determine that issue, I will have to consider the following:

1. Did Eunice have a valid trust interest in the Faylee Home?
2. If so, did that trust interest survive the sale of the Faylee Home and apply to the proceeds from the Tupper home?

[20] A corollary issue Eunice raises in this application relates to debts and assets at the time of marriage and the time of separation, as it relates to the houses. However, Eunice has no standing to make submissions on the contents of any financial statements or equalization unless she is added as a party to the proceedings. This issue is premature and will not be addressed in this decision.

Did Eunice have a valid trust interest in the Faylee Home?

[21] Eunice and Glenn rely on a trust agreement dated June 2, 2003, apparently signed before a lawyer, Oudit Rai. Glenn’s affidavit evidence states that the Agreement was signed on June 2, 2004, and “2003” is simply a typo.

[22] Mr. Rai was cross-examined and required to produce documents that remained in his file from approximately 20 years prior.

[23] He produced a reporting letter, a copy of the earlier referenced “Declaration of Trust”, his invoice/accounting, and other documents related to the purchase of the Faylee Home. All of these documents had the date hand-corrected from “day of May, 2004” to “02 day of June, 2004” except the Declaration of Trust, which was typed as “2nd day of June, 2003”.

[24] He deposed that he had never met with Eunice, that she was not his client, that she had not provided him with instructions, and that he had only met with Glenn.

Issues with the Declaration of Trust

[25] Stephanie raises concerns about the validity of the Declaration of Trust. Mr. Rai provided an affidavit and was subject to cross-examination on that affidavit. He appears to have displayed animus toward counsel and her questions. He refused to answer some questions and suggested what she ought to ask him. Despite these frustrations, the examination confirmed that he had not met with Eunice. Glenn was his client.

[26] Mr. Rai maintained that the Declaration of Trust was signed on June 2, 2004, and that the year (2003) was a typo. He provided what he had left in his file.

[27] In raising the concerns about its validity, the applicant refers the court to several anomalies:

a. The date is incorrect, and is typed as noted above as the 2nd day of June, 2003, while all other documents signed by Glenn on that day were and completed with the day, and the month was corrected from May to June.

b. The paragraph in the reporting letter that refers to a “Trust Agreement”, rather than a Declaration of Trust, is formatted differently from the rest of the document—it is left-aligned, while the other paragraphs are justified.

c. It refers to Eunice as the trust beneficiary. It also states that she “has acknowledged and agreed that she is liable for fifty (50%) per cent of the payment owing under any mortgage registered against the property”. The Declaration of Trust does not speak of any liability to Eunice – it is not an agreement but a declaration.

[28] There is no reference to Eunice or the trust in any of the other legal documents – she is not on title, nor is the trust registered on title.

[29] The language used in the document titled “Declaration of Trust” is incongruent with the language in the reporting letter titled “Trust Agreement”. The declaration simply provides a trust benefit to Eunice. At the same time, the letter states that Eunice also accepts liability for the mortgage and indemnifies Glenn against “from and against all costs, charges, expenses, and liabilities that may arise by reason of the Trustee being the registered holder of the property.”

[30] Eunice was not Mr. Rai’s client. She was not a signatory to any document provided to the court from that purchase. She was not a joint owner on title, nor was she noted as a trust beneficiary on title. It makes no sense for the reporting letter to include terms that hold Eunice liable, given the wording of the Declaration of Trust.

[31] While I cannot determine, with certainty, that the Declaration of Trust is a fabrication or fiction as the applicant urges, on a balance of probabilities, I find that it is not a reliable document.

[32] Even if I am wrong in declining to rely on the Declaration of Trust, Stephanie's evidence is consistent with Eunice’s evidence: Stephanie did not know about any such trust interest owed to Eunice. During the discussions about investing the Faylee Home proceeds into the new build, Eunice did not assert her trust interest. There was no discussion of money owed to Eunice or that her money could be reinvested in the new home.

[33] Glenn provided evidence in his affidavit and through the transcripts of his cross-examination that Stephanie discovered the Declaration of Trust shortly after moving in, and they had a “serious” discussion. According to Glenn, Stephanie was not happy about it.

[34] Glenn also stated that Eunice’s interest in the proceeds from the Faylee Home sale was the subject of a discussion between him, Stephanie, Eunice, and her husband. This is contradicted by both Stephanie and Eunice, and I reject Glenn’s evidence that Stephanie was aware of the Declaration of Trust and Eunice’s interest.

If so, did that trust interest survive the sale of the Faylee Home?

[35] My finding above makes this question largely irrelevant. However, I have also considered whether a trust interest would survive the sale of the Faylee Home when the proceeds were reinvested in the Tupper Home.

[36] The parties agree that the proceeds from the sale of the Faylee Home were used to purchase the land and build the Tupper Home. The money is, ostensibly, traceable. The real issue is whether traceability is sufficient, given that there was no right to the money asserted by Eunice at that time. Above, I found that there was no discussion with Stephanie about the funds being held in trust for Eunice, and I accept Stephanie’s evidence that she was unaware of it.

[37] At the time of the sale of the Faylee Home, Eunice’s trust claim surfaced. Although there is some evidence that Eunice, Glenn, and Stephanie spoke of how Stephanie and Glenn might invest the proceeds, there was no mention that Eunice had any financial interest in it.

[38] Eunice’s claim was discoverable at that time in 2021. Section 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B., provides that a claim is “discovered” the day on which the person with the claim first knew of the loss, or “the day on which a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have known of the matters […]”.

[39] Eunice claims an interest in 50 percent of the proceeds of the Faylee Home, not the Tupper Home. I find that this, together with the other evidence, has two significant implications:

a. She isn’t truly relying on having her share “reinvested” in the Tupper Home. If she were, she would be claiming 50 percent of the proceeds of that sale.

b. This claim is motivated by her desire to disenfranchise Stephanie as much as possible in accordance with her belief, as borne out by her evidence, that Stephanie should not receive any of the proceeds because, from her perspective, Stephanie did not contribute substantially to the Faylee Home.

[40] If Eunice believed that her interest was reinvested in the Tupper Home, she would also be required to assume the risk of that investment diminishing. One might hope their investment will grow, but there is a risk of it shrinking. Based on Eunice’s claim, she wishes to reap all the benefits of investing but expects to assume none of the risks.

[41] Neither Eunice nor Glenn made it clear that there was a continuing trust as the funds moved from the Faylee Home to the Tupper Home. They knew of at least one tool to engage such an obligation. They chose not to employ it, or any other.

[42] Section 5(2) of the Limitations Act provides that “[a] person with a claim shall be presumed to have known of the matters…unless the contrary is proved.”

[43] Although there may be some argument about when the claim was discoverable, I find that it was no later than when Glenn and Stephanie confirmed their plans to reinvest the funds into the Tupper Home. Given that the Tupper Home build began in June 2022, the limitation period of two years therefore expired in June 2024, if not earlier.

[44] So, while the money may be traceable to the Tupper Home, I find that Eunice has no claim against Stephanie, and, on the evidence before me, any claim she had against Glenn expired in 2024.

Should Eunice be added as a party to the family matter involving Stephanie and Glenn?

[45] I have reviewed the caselaw provided by counsel as it relates to adding parties to family proceedings, particularly as creditors. While the caselaw was helpful and informative, I will not reference them specifically, as I found each to be sufficiently distinguishable. I prefer to review the objectives set out by the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (the “Rules”).

[46] Rule 7(5) of the Rules allows the court the discretion to add any person who should be a party as a party.

[47] The Rules also set as the primary objective to “enable the court to deal with cases justly”: see Rule 2(2). The court, the parties, and their lawyers must all promote the primary objective, see Rule 2(4), and set out ways in which a case is dealt with justly, see Rule 2(3):

(a) ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties;
(b) saving expense and time;
(c) dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and
(d) giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases.

[48] Glenn submits that Stephanie’s position goes against the primary objective of the Rules, maintaining that it is entwined with the equalization of matrimonial property and requiring a separate application or action would be a waste of time, expenses, and judicial resources.

[49] If Eunice’s claim were rightly against Glenn and Stephanie, and the limitation period had not expired, I might well agree that adding Eunice as a party to this matter would be more expedient and a better use of judicial resources.

[50] Given my previous findings that Eunice has no claim against Stephanie, adding Eunice as a party would unreasonably delay the matter, unfairly prejudice Stephanie, and could not result in a just outcome.

[51] If the presumption regarding discoverability could be rebutted on Eunice’s trust claim against Glenn, adding her as a party to this family proceeding would unnecessarily complicate equalization, conflate issues that ought to be decided separately, and unfairly prejudice Stephanie.

Conclusion

[52] Eunice Sukhnandan shall not be a party to this matter. She has no standing in any further conferences or proceedings in this matter.

[53] This motion is dismissed with costs to the respondent, Stephanie Nadon.

[54] Stephanie was entirely successful on the motion. Therefore, she is entitled to costs. The parties shall provide their submissions concerning the issue of costs in writing, limited to three (3) typewritten pages, excluding attachments, as follows:

a. by or on behalf of Stephanie Nadon, within 14 days of the date of this decision; and
b. by or on behalf of Eunice Sukhnandan, within 14 days of the receipt of Stephanie Nadon’s submissions.

[55] Submissions received beyond these deadlines will not be considered.

Bellows

Released: June 6, 2025

[1] For ease of reference, and with all respect, I will refer to parties by their first names in this decision.