Jennifer Carrie Gleitman

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on self-defence.

The trial judge failed to adequately explain the elements of self-defence under section 34(1) of the Criminal Code, including the definition of provocation, and failed to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the accumulation of errors undermined the correctness of the verdict and that the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction, arguing his statements to the police were involuntary.

The trial judge found that an officer had assaulted the appellant in an elevator prior to the interview but ruled the subsequent statements voluntary because they were not temporally connected to the assault.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the test for voluntariness, as the assault undermined the officers' credibility and the temporal connection was not broken.

The statements were ruled involuntary and inadmissible.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and three-year sentence for four arson-related charges.

He argued that his section 8 Charter rights were violated when police obtained fire marshal samples without a warrant, that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence would not have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter even if a breach occurred, the trial judge's comments did not reverse the burden of proof, and there was no miscarriage of justice resulting from trial counsel's performance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his treatment of alibi evidence and by admitting hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by stating he was 'not satisfied' the alibi witnesses were reliable, without considering if their evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence regarding cell phone records through a police officer without meeting the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial for both appellants, declining to apply the curative proviso.