Jennifer Carrie Gleitman

The appellant appealed a decision of the summary conviction appeal court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was alive to the frailties of the identification evidence and that the combination of identification and confirmatory evidence made the verdict reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence relating to a prolonged period of domestic violence, including a stabbing incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge provided adequate reasons, properly applied the W.(D.) principle, and correctly assessed credibility based on objective evidence.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, upholding the five-year sentence as warranted for serious domestic violence.

The appellant sought to appeal his convictions to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right, relying on a dissent in the court below.

The Supreme Court quashed the appeal, finding that the dissent relied upon could not be construed as a dissent on a question of law alone.

As leave to appeal was not sought, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appellants were convicted of various weapons offences and crimes of violence related to the collection of drug debts.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the segregation of evidence, the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for unsavoury witnesses, and the position of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

However, the sentence appeals for three of the appellants were allowed, as the trial judge failed to adequately consider the principle of rehabilitation and mitigating factors, resulting in reduced sentences.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment when he attended the trial date with newly retained counsel, forcing him to proceed unrepresented during the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the trial judge might have made further inquiries before refusing the adjournment, the fairness of the trial was not compromised.

The trial judge granted a lengthy adjournment after the Crown's case, allowing the appellant to retain counsel who was provided with transcripts and disclosure, and who subsequently recalled a Crown witness and presented the defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment when he appeared on the trial date with newly retained counsel, forcing him to proceed unrepresented during the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial's fairness was not compromised.

The trial judge had granted a lengthy adjournment after the Crown's case, allowing the appellant to retain counsel who then recalled a Crown witness, called defence evidence, and made submissions.

The overall conduct of the proceedings overcame any perceived unfairness from the initial denial of the adjournment.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for possession of and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

They argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing their Charter application to exclude evidence obtained through wiretaps and search warrants, claiming the affidavit supporting the authorization contained misstatements and failed to establish investigative necessity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the errors were minor and made in good faith, and that investigative necessity was established given the broad objectives of the investigation.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for two robberies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instruction that evidence on each count could be considered on the other counts on the issue of identity due to striking similarity.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The trial judge had imposed a sentence of seven years in addition to three years of pre-trial custody.

Given the appellant's background and that this was his first jail term, the sentence was found to be manifestly excessive.

The sentence was reduced to five years concurrent on each count.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder and robbery following a home invasion where a 72-year-old victim was severely beaten and left bound.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting, and by omitting the D.W. instruction from written materials provided to the jury.

One appellant also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the jury instructions were adequate in context, the verdicts were reasonable, and the 13-year sentence was fit given the viciousness of the crime and the intent to kill.

The appellants were convicted of kidnapping and extortion after a retrial where they were self-represented.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing their request for an adjournment to retain counsel.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly balanced the appellants' right to counsel against the need to control the trial process, given the history of delays and the appellants' lack of diligence.

The court also found that the trial judge provided adequate assistance to the self-represented appellants and made no reversible errors regarding evidentiary rulings or sentencing.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the refusal to grant an adjournment created an appearance of unfairness.

The appellant, a former Crown Attorney suffering from bipolar affective disorder, pleaded guilty to fraud and breach of trust for misappropriating funds from a charity and a client, and for improperly negotiating plea bargains to secure restitution for that client.

The sentencing judge imposed a total of 24 months' incarceration, finding that the medical evidence did not support a causal link between the appellant's mental illness and his criminal behaviour.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge misconstrued the psychiatric evidence regarding the inadequacy of the appellant's lithium levels and his uncontrolled hypomanic state.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was varied to a blended sentence of 12 months' incarceration followed by a 12-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed a 3-year sentence for extortion and threatening, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to the totality principle.

The appellant committed the offences while in custody for previous offences against the same complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 3-year sentence reflected the totality principle, as the offences would have merited a longer sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record had he not already been serving a substantial sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving causing death after driving his vehicle off a dock as a prank, resulting in the drowning of a passenger and a dog.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's admission of prior discreditable conduct, finding it relevant to the dangerous driving charge.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's statements to police or his credibility.

The sentence of two years less a day and a five-year driving prohibition was upheld, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking, as well as his sentence imposed in absentia.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence from a police officer regarding drug trafficking and the roles of persons in a three-person transaction.

The Court of Appeal held that while the officer was allowed too much latitude, the core of his testimony was admissible and the trial judge was aware of its limitations.

The court also rejected arguments that the verdict was unreasonable and that evidence from one count could not be considered for another.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit and the sparse reasons were due to the appellant having absconded.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal considered the gravity of the offences, the appellant's high degree of moral blameworthiness, his failure to address a long-standing alcohol problem, his failure to comply with court orders, and his criminal record.

The Court concluded that while the global sentence was substantial, it was not manifestly excessive.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal against sentence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against the respondents due to a 33-month delay, which breached their s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the delay was unacceptable and reflected a culture that failed to prioritize timely trial dates.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred in using evidence of prior trafficking and that the Crown's cross-examination was oppressive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the prior trafficking evidence was relevant to intention and the improper cross-examination did not render the trial unfair.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a vicious assault.

At trial, the Crown introduced telephone records under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act to rebut the appellant's alibi that he was with his former wife at the time of the offence.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider whether the records were made in the usual and ordinary course of business and their reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the records were properly admitted and reliable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 3-year sentence for the vicious attack was not manifestly unreasonable.

The appellants, a mother and son, were convicted of first-degree murder in the death of the mother's husband.

The son admitted to killing the deceased but claimed self-defence, defence of his mother, or provocation, citing a history of severe domestic abuse by the deceased.

The Crown's theory was that the appellants conspired to kill the deceased for insurance money.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding self-defence, party liability, the use of co-accused statements, the standard of proof for reasonable doubt, and the need for a Vetrovec warning for unsavoury Crown witnesses.

The son also argued the Crown's cross-examination was abusive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and concluding that the cross-examination, while aggressive, did not compromise trial fairness.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a jury trial.

He argued that the trial judge erred by failing to leave the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent with the jury, failing to charge the jury sufficiently on consent, giving an improper charge on reasonable doubt, and that the jury's verdicts of guilty on sexual assault and not guilty on break and enter were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief in consent, no error in the jury instructions, and no inconsistency in the verdicts given the different elements of the offences.