Ivana Denisov

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing Romario Watts and Lamar Bartley following their convictions for multiple armed robberies and related offences.

Watts was found guilty of six armed robberies, six counts of masking, one attempted armed robbery, and possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

Bartley was found guilty of one armed robbery, one count of masking, and several motor vehicle offences related to fleeing police.

The court applied sentencing principles including denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and totality, emphasizing the seriousness of firearm offences.

Aggravating factors for Watts included the number of robberies, use of a loaded firearm, and planning.

Mitigating factors for Watts were his age and lack of criminal record.

For Bartley, mitigating factors included his role (not armed) and surrender, while aggravating factors included the dangerous flight from police.

The court also considered pre-trial custody credits and potential immigration consequences for Bartley.

Watts received a global sentence of 12 years, and Bartley received a global sentence of 5 years and 3 months.

The applicant, Elijah Jacques-Taylor, sought a stay of serious firearms charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn (November 18, 2021) to the anticipated trial date (October 2-4, 2023) was 22 months and 2 weeks.

The court deducted one month for defence counsel's unavailability and three months for the ongoing impact of the COVID-19 backlog, resulting in a net delay of 18 months and 2 weeks.

This period exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice established in R. v. Jordan.

As the Crown conceded there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, the court concluded that a stay of proceedings was the necessary remedy.

The defendant, Anoop Kumar Ubbu, was charged with one count of sexual assault.

The trial focused on whether the complainant, JY, consented to sexual activity and whether the defendant had an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court found JY to be a credible witness who did not consent to any sexual activity with the defendant or other individuals.

The defendant's claim of honest but mistaken belief in consent was rejected due to his failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and inconsistencies in his testimony.

The court found the defendant guilty of sexual assault.

Krsna Singh was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample.

Police responded to a Crimestoppers tip about an impaired driver, located the vehicle at Singh's residence, and made an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, which Singh refused.

Singh challenged the lawfulness of his detention and the ASD demand, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 9 (arbitrary detention), 10(a) (right to be informed of reasons for detention), and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found no Charter violations, distinguishing the case from R. v. McColman by noting the police had reasonable grounds to suspect impaired driving based on the specific tip.

The court also found the police acted within their ancillary powers and that Singh was promptly informed of his detention reasons and that his right to counsel was not violated, as he was released as soon as practicable.

Consequently, the court found Singh guilty of the offence.

The defendant, Daniel Reza, was convicted of six offences including assault, assault with a weapon, multiple sexual assaults (some involving penetration while the victim was asleep or incapacitated by marijuana), and threatening to kill the victim's father.

The offences occurred within a domestic relationship.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the domestic context, repeated manipulation, the victim's vulnerability (asleep), use of an object, and lasting impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's youth, lack of criminal record, and mental health/addiction issues.

The Crown sought a six-year custodial sentence, while the defence proposed two years.

The court imposed a global custodial sentence of 4.5 years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and issued ancillary orders including a no-contact order, DNA order, SOIRA order, and s. 109 order.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with bail conditions requiring him to reside at a specified address in Kleinburg and remain within that residence at all times unless in the presence of his surety or attending court on a specific matter in Scarborough.

Police attended the residence to conduct a bail compliance check and were informed by the surety and his wife that the accused was not present.

The accused did not present himself during the half-hour visit.

The defence conceded the Crown proved the bail conditions and identification but argued the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not in the residence.

The court found the Crown proved guilt based on circumstantial evidence and the only reasonable inference was that the accused was in breach of his recognizance.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a minor collision at a gas station and subsequent erratic driving on Highway 404.

A civilian witness observed the accused stumble when exiting his vehicle at the gas station and subsequently followed the vehicle on the highway, observing consistent swerving and lane violations.

Police officers observed similar driving deficiencies and noted physical signs of impairment including red eyes, slurred speech, unsteadiness, and an odour of alcohol.

The accused testified he consumed only two or three light beers over eight hours and attributed his driving errors to distraction from a following vehicle with flashing lights.

The court found the accused's testimony not credible and convicted him based on the consistent observations of the civilian witness and two police officers, corroborated by in-car video evidence.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of methamphetamine, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The court considered the offender's lengthy criminal record, substance abuse disorder, and ADHD diagnosis, alongside his guilty plea and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court imposed a total sentence of 35.5 months, granting standard pre-sentence credit at 1.5:1 and enhanced credit at 2:1 for days spent in lockdown due to harsh conditions, leaving 4 months to serve followed by 2 years of probation.

The offender pleaded guilty to impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm.

He drove his vehicle into oncoming traffic, causing a head-on collision with a 79-year-old victim who suffered catastrophic injuries including a shattered hip and femur, broken ribs, fractured shoulder and neck, and a brain injury.

The offender's blood alcohol concentration was approximately twice the legal limit.

The offender was a first-time offender with strong character references and demonstrated genuine remorse.

The Crown sought 18 months custody, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court imposed 14 months custody, finding that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount sentencing objectives despite significant mitigating factors.

The defendant brought a motion for mistrial based on a reasonable apprehension of bias after observing the trial judge reading from a document marked "Confidential Draft" during final argument.

The defendant argued that the presence of such a document indicated the judge had predetermined the outcome and that the judge's refusal to disclose the document's contents constituted bias.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that trial judges have no obligation to disclose their notes or preliminary rulings to counsel, and that preparing draft reasons prior to or during submissions does not constitute bias provided the judge remains receptive to counsel's arguments.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop on November 26, 2016.

The Crown called two police officers and filed an expert toxicologist report.

The defence raised multiple Charter violations relating to the roadside breath sample procedure and the right to counsel.

The court found two Charter violations under section 10(b) but admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge but acquitted of the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a motor vehicle accident on Highway 400.

A police constable administered an approved screening device (ASD) test which the accused failed, leading to arrest and subsequent breathalyzer tests showing a blood alcohol content well over the legal limit.

The accused challenged the validity of the ASD test on Charter grounds, arguing that the device had not been properly calibrated within the required 15-day interval and that the officer lacked objective grounds for reliance on the test result.

The court found a section 8 Charter violation, excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, and acquitted the accused.

Rehan Riaz, facing multiple charges including impaired driving and driving disqualified, sought a bail review after being denied bail.

The application was based on a material change in circumstances, including new sureties and efforts to secure addiction counselling, and arguments regarding the length of pre-trial custody potentially exceeding a fit sentence.

The court found that the new supervision plan was not a material change but accepted that the potential length of pre-trial incarceration, possibly exceeding a likely sentence, constituted a material change.

The court granted judicial interim release with specific conditions, including residing with his sister, supervision, and prohibitions on alcohol, non-prescriptive drugs, and driving.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a roadside stop on May 25, 2016.

The defendant alleged several Charter breaches and sought to exclude breath test results.

The principal issue was the extent to which police must attempt to facilitate contact with counsel of choice before offering duty counsel as an alternative.

The court found no breach of the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter, as the defendant had expressed willingness to speak to duty counsel if his preferred counsel could not be reached, and the officer made reasonable efforts to contact the preferred counsel before offering the alternative.

The breath test results were admitted into evidence, and the defendant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The accused was charged with refusing to comply with a lawful breath demand contrary to the Criminal Code.

Following a citizen complaint of impaired driving, police located the accused in the driver's seat of a vehicle with the engine running.

After failing an Approved Screening Device test, the accused was arrested and taken to the station where he was demanded to provide breath samples on an Approved Instrument.

The accused refused to comply.

The trial addressed multiple Charter issues including care or control, reasonable grounds for the demand, timing of the demand, the validity of the refusal, potential reasonable excuse based on mistrust of police, and alleged breaches of sections 10(a), 10(b), 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The court found the Crown proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and rejected all Charter defences.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The trial was scheduled for two days in November 2016, but the second day could not be completed due to court unavailability.

A Crown witness failed to appear on the adjourned date in January 2017, resulting in a further adjournment to February 2017.

The total delay from information to trial completion was 529 days.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was 482 days, falling below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice cases.

The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate the case took markedly longer than it should have and dismissed the application.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit after police found him outside his vehicle in an intoxicated state following a collision with a parked car.

The Crown conceded it could not prove the offence of operating over 80 due to lack of evidence establishing the time of the accident.

The Crown alternatively sought a conviction for the included offence of having care and control of a motor vehicle over 80.

The court dismissed the charge, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual care and control of the vehicle.

The evidence was equally consistent with the defendant remaining at the scene to comply with his statutory duty under the Highway Traffic Act.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a sample of breath into an approved screening device (ASD) pursuant to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that a police officer made a lawful demand for a breath sample at a RIDE spot check, which the accused refused.

The defence argued that no proper demand was made and that the accused was not advised of the consequences of refusal before arrest.

The court found that the officer did make a proper demand, the accused unequivocally refused to comply, and that there is no legal requirement for an officer to advise a driver of consequences before making a demand.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a RIDE spot check.

The impaired charge was dismissed due to lack of evidence of impairment.

On the Over 80 charge, the defence raised multiple Charter breaches including timing of breath samples, failure to videotape, lost evidence, lack of reasonable grounds, and denial of right to counsel.

The court rejected all Charter breach arguments and found the Crown proved the accused operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

Conviction entered.

The Crown brought an application under section 123(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act seeking access to youth records of the accused for use in two separate Superior Court prosecutions (one involving four counts of attempted murder and one count of aggravated assault, and another involving a charge of first degree murder), as well as for transmission to the Parole Board of Canada.

The accused had previously been convicted of first degree murder and was serving a life sentence with parole ineligibility for twenty-five years.

The court dismissed the Crown's application as premature, finding that while the Crown had a valid and substantial interest in the records, access was not necessary in the interests of the proper administration of justice at that time.