Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-22-91107290 Date: 20240814 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty The King – and – Romario Watts and Lamar Bartley, Defendants

Counsel: Ivana Denisov, for the Crown Larry Leibovits and Alice Chuang, for the Defendant, Romario Watts Kannan K’annan S’ree Jr., for the Defendant, Lamar Bartley

Heard: June 25, 2024

Reasons for Sentence

Charney J.:

[1] On April 9, 2024, Romario Watts was found guilty of six counts of armed robbery and six counts of having his face masked with intent to commit an offence. These robberies were committed over a two month period from the middle of November 2020 to the beginning of January 2021.

[2] Mr. Watts was also found guilty of one count of attempted armed robbery and one count of possession of a loaded restricted firearm without a licence or registration.

[3] The jury also found Lamar Bartley guilty of one count of armed robbery and one count of having his face masked with intent to commit an offence.

[4] Mr. Bartley was also found guilty of: a. One count of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle; b. One count of failure to stop after an accident; c. One count of failure to stop a motor vehicle while being pursued by the police.

Facts Relating to the Offences

[5] The six convenience store robberies committed by Mr. Watts and the victims who were robbed were as follows:

1. Ayden Georges – Georges’ Convenience, November 17, 2020
2. Maikel Saadalla – PetroCan, November 29, 2020
3. Eileen Huang and Cui Fang – Waterford Convenience, December 18, 2020
4. Sujith Cumarasany – Esso Gas Station, December 19, 2020
5. Roshni Patel – Lucky’s Convenience, January 7, 2021
6. Abdul Matin Popalzai – Mac’s Convenience, January 7, 2021

[6] Each victim testified that a masked person entered the store, pointed a gun at them and demanded all the money from the cash register. After being given the money, the person or persons left the store.

[7] Mr. Watts was the armed robber in each of the six robberies.

[8] Mr. Bartley accompanied Mr. Watts at the fourth robbery at the Esso Gas Station on December 19, 2020. In that case, Mr. Watts ordered the store clerk at gun point to lay on the floor and to not get up until after the assailants left the store. The store clerk complied with that direction. Mr. Bartley did not have a gun, but he actively participated in the robbery by stealing lottery tickets while Mr. Watts held the gun. Mr. Bartley was found guilty of aiding Mr. Watts in the armed robbery.

[9] In each case, the robber or robbers were masked.

[10] Mr. Watts was also found guilty of attempted robbery at a seventh convenience store on January 29, 2021. Although he walked to the convenience store, he did not go in, possibly because there were one or two individuals standing outside of the store as he observed it from across the street. He was arrested when he returned to his car, and the police found a loaded handgun with an extended magazine in the front waistband of his pants. Based on the video evidence of the other robberies, this appears to be the same handgun that was used at each of the six armed robberies.

[11] The police also found the distinctive clothing that Mr. Watts wore during the other robberies in a backpack on the back seat of his car.

[12] Mr. Bartley was also found guilty of failure to stop a motor vehicle while being pursued by the police and two related motor vehicle offences. These offences occurred when the police located Mr. Bartley on January 29, 2021, and tried to arrest him.

[13] On January 29, 2021, police officers in the Criminal Investigation Unit were tasked with locating the black Dodge Journey that was known to be driven by Mr. Bartley and to arrest Mr. Bartley.

[14] The police located the Dodge Journey and followed it. As the Dodge Journey drove down Neilson Road, it was boxed in by three police vehicles: one in front, one on the driver’s side, and one behind. All were unmarked police cars. There was also a fourth police vehicle on the scene. The police vehicles activated their sirens and emergency lights. The Dodge Journey appeared to be stopped, but seconds later the police heard a loud banging, and the Dodge Journey hit the police cars that had boxed it in, drove over the curb on the passenger side, drove around the police car in the front, and continued on to Hwy 401. The police followed it to Hwy 401 but could not see the Dodge Journey and did not pursue it. The police cars were damaged by the impact.

[15] Mr. Bartley later turned himself in at the police station.

Position of the Parties

[16] The Crown takes the position that the appropriate sentence for Mr. Watts is 14 years, comprised of: a. 7 years concurrent for each of the six armed robberies, b. 1 year concurrent for wearing the disguise during the robbery, c. 5 years consecutive for the attempted armed robbery, d. 2 years for possession of the loaded restricted firearm.

[17] The Crown takes the position that the appropriate sentence for Mr. Bartley is 6 years comprised of: a. 5.5 years for the armed robbery, b. 6 months for the flight from the police.

[18] The Defence takes the position that Mr. Watts should receive a global sentence of 10-12 years, less pre-sentence and Downes credit.

[19] Mr. Bartley’s lawyer takes the position that Mr. Bartley should receive a total sentence of 5 years: the 5 year minimum for armed robbery and 6 months concurrent for the failure to stop a motor vehicle when pursued by the police.

Appropriate Sentence

[20] Section 344(1) of the Criminal Code provides:

344 (1) Every person who commits robbery is guilty of an indictable offence and liable (a) if a restricted firearm or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the offence or if any firearm is used in the commission of the offence and the offence is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of i. in the case of a first offence, five years, and ii. in the case of a second or subsequent offence, seven years;

[21] The minimum sentence established by s. 344(1) was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of R. v. Hilbach, 2023 SCC 3. In upholding the minimum sentence, the Court discussed the seriousness of this offence, at paras. 53-54:

To start, even when committed without a firearm, robbery is a serious offence based on the requisite actus reus of the use or threat of violence or force in stealing or attempting to steal property. Adding a firearm to the equation simply increases the gravity of the offence. Further, mere possession of the firearm is not sufficient for conviction. The offender must use the firearm in the commission of the offence. As this Court wrote in R. v. Felawka, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 199, when a firearm is used to threaten or intimidate, it “presents the ultimate threat of death to those in its presence” (p. 211). Prohibited firearms are among the most potent tools in the commission of crime. For example, sawed-off rifles are capable of deadly force, while being easier to conceal, transport, and maneuver in close quarters, like convenience stores.

The harmful consequences of using a restricted or prohibited firearm in a robbery are readily identified. There is the risk of death or life-altering physical injury for victims and bystanders if the weapon is discharged. Even if the weapon is not fired, exposure to this threat carries the risk of profound psychological harm. It can be expected that store clerks who are victims of offences like the one perpetrated by Mr. Hilbach will suffer psychological harm … Beyond the immediate threats to victims, there are wider risks to the community. Wielding a firearm in a store can reasonably provoke force in response, either by police responding to the robbery in progress or bystanders who attempt to intervene. The risk of escalating violence is, as a result, acute.

[22] The Supreme Court further stated, at para. 57:

There is some breadth to the offence. At the high end of the spectrum, s. 344(1)(a) captures, for example, offenders who organize elaborate, coordinated robberies on large institutions using automatic weaponry and cause serious injuries or death. On the low end of the spectrum, the section captures individuals like Mr. Hilbach, conducting unsophisticated hits on gas stations using unloaded prohibited firearms. This range in gravity and levels of culpability are appropriately reflected in differing sentencing outcomes above the minimum. However, the thread that connects each case is the intent to both steal and to benefit from the deep terror that comes with the threat of a firearm at a proximate range. In each case, the offender uses a firearm to induce fear for their victim in service of their own benefit. While the individual circumstances of the accused and the motivations for their conduct vary, these two elements remain constant. It is this specificity of conduct that Justice Proulx referred to in Lapierre, which aggravates the offence and subjects offenders to this minimum (p. 344).

[23] In the present case, the testimony of the store clerks who were robbed at gunpoint and the victim impact statement filed demonstrate the harmful consequences identified by the Supreme Court’s decision. Each of the victims were terrified and feared for their lives during the robbery.

[24] The first victim, Ayden Georges, provided a victim impact statement which described the trauma and fear he experienced during the robbery, and how these have impaired his sense of security. He sometimes struggles to go to work because the trust that he once had in strangers that he encounters in the store has been shattered. The sense of safety that he once had has been shaken.

Principles of Sentencing

[25] The objectives of sentencing are codified in s. 718 of the Code. They are: the protection of society and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the denunciation of unlawful conduct; deterrence, both general and specific; the separation of the offender from society where necessary; rehabilitation; reparation for harm done to the victims or the community; and, promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done.

[26] Section 718.1 provides that the fundamental principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Section 718.2 provides that a sentence should be increased or decreased to account for any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It also requires that a sentence be similar to those imposed on similar offenders in similar circumstances.

[27] In reaching a fair and fit sentence, I must also consider the principles of totality and parity.

[28] It is well-recognized that for offenders convicted of possession of a loaded firearm, the primary focus of sentencing will be on denunciation and deterrence. “Handguns are an all too prevalent menace in the Greater Toronto Area. First and foremost, the sentences imposed for firearms offences must further the sentencing goals of denunciation, deterrence and protection of the public.”: R. v. Brown, 2010 ONCA 745, at para. 14. That does not mean that rehabilitation can be ignored, nor does it mean that proportionality in sentencing is no longer an applicable principle. Sentencing is a highly individualized process and particular circumstances relating to blameworthiness, prospects for rehabilitation and the like must always be taken into account. However, where loaded firearms are involved, the degree of danger to our community mandates an emphasis on deterrence and denunciation.

[29] There are a multitude of cases describing the gravity of gun crimes and the particular danger posed by loaded handguns in public places. In R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, the Court of Appeal stated, at para. 68:

Gun crimes involving the possession of loaded, concealed firearms in public places pose a real and immediate danger to the public, especially anyone who interacts with the gun holder. When the person with the gun is confronted by the police, who are engaged in the lawful execution of their duties, the risk increases dramatically. It increases yet again when the gun holder flees, and still again when the gun holder discards the weapon in a public place. A person who carries a concealed, loaded handgun in public undermines the community’s sense of safety and security. Carrying a concealed, loaded handgun in a public place in Canada is antithetical to the Canadian concept of a free and ordered society.

[30] The Court also stated, at para. 71:

Apart from the specific provisions in the Criminal Code, Canadian courts have long recognized that the gravity of certain kinds of offences requires sentences emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence. Gun crimes involving the unlawful possession of loaded handguns in public places fall squarely within that category.

[31] The totality principle is particularly applicable to this case given the number of charges against Mr. Watts.

[32] Section 718.2 (c) of the Criminal Code provides as follows:

718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;

[33] Chief Justice Lamer, speaking for the court in R. v. M.(C.A.), 1996 SCC 230, described the totality principle at para. 42:

In the context of consecutive sentences, this general principle of proportionality expresses itself through the more particular form of the “totality principle”. The totality principle, in short, requires a sentencing judge who orders an offender to serve consecutive sentences for multiple offences to ensure that the cumulative sentence rendered does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender. As D. A. Thomas describes the principle in Principles of Sentencing (2nd ed. 1979), at p. 56:

The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing consecutive sentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate sentence is “just and appropriate”.

[34] If Mr. Watts were sentenced consecutively for each of the six armed robberies committed, his sentence would be a minimum of 40 years (a minimum of 5 years for the first offence and a minimum of seven years for each subsequent offence). This would clearly be disproportionate. As a result of the totality principle, many of the sentences for individual counts in this case will run concurrently rather than consecutively.

Circumstances of the Offenders

[35] Mr. Watts was 25 years old when he committed these offences. He has no criminal record. Mr. Watts declined to participate in a pre-sentence report, so little information about him is available.

[36] Mr. Bartley is 37 years old. He was born in Jamaica and immigrated to Canada when he was 18 years old. He is a permanent resident of Canada. He has a grade 12 education and graduated from secondary school in Jamaica. He has been married for approximately 4.5 years, and has two children (aged 4 and 5) with his wife. They also parent three children from previous relationships: Mr. Bartley’s 11 year old son and his wife’s 17 year old son and 21 year old daughter.

[37] Mr. Bartley and his spouse own and operate a home-based catering business, but are also supported though social assistance. Mr. Bartley has had difficulty maintaining steady employment, and has worked for a tree company, and as a forklift operator and welder. By all accounts Mr. Bartley is a loving husband and father. He does not have a substance abuse problem.

[38] Mr. Bartley’s criminal record includes offences for obstruction and failing to comply with recognizance in January, 2011, failure to comply with recognizance and possession of a Schedule II substance in March 2011, failure to comply with recognizance in January 2012, failure to comply with recognizance in October 2012 and assault causing bodily harm in July 2017. His longest prison term so far has been 75 days intermittent for the assault. He has been on probation in the past and has demonstrated satisfactory compliance with reporting conditions. This will be his first penitentiary sentence.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

[39] The mitigating factors for Mr. Watts are his age – he was only 25 when the offences were committed – and his lack of criminal record.

[40] No one was physically harmed in any of the robberies committed, which I would consider to be the absence of an aggravating factor, not a mitigating factor.

[41] The primary mitigating factor for Mr. Bartley is his role in the event. Although he actively participated in the Esso Gas Station armed robbery, he was not the person with a gun. Nevertheless, he did play a key role in that robbery.

[42] Another mitigating factor for Mr. Bartley was his decision to surrender to the authorities after his escape from the police.

[43] The aggravating factors with respect to Mr. Watts is that he committed six armed robberies within a period of two months. He was armed with a loaded restricted handgun with a prohibited extended magazine in each of these robberies. The gun was pointed at each of the victims as he demanded all the money in the cash register. He was wearing a mask and other clothing to hide his identity. The robberies were not opportunistic, they were the result of significant planning, including where to park the car so that it was not visible on CCTV and wearing a disguise to hide his features.

Sentencing Ranges

[44] The range of sentences for multiple armed robberies appears to be in the 7 – 15 year range. The higher double digit range applies in cases where the aggravating factors include the use of a real loaded gun, prior criminal record, and where the victims were physically harmed or the gun was fired during the robbery. The greater the number of armed robberies, the higher the sentence, especially where one or more of these aggravating factors is present. See for example: R. v. Dilleon, 2008 ONCA 401, at para. 40; R. v. Codner, 2013 ONCA 138; R. v. Davies, 2017 ONCA 467; R. v. Henry, 2019 ONCA 229; R. v. Johnson, 2016 ONCA 935; R. v. Lira, 2021 ONSC 8294, at paras. 99 - 115; R. v. Osman, 2016 ONCA 64; R. v. Shuman, 2021 ONCA 638.

[45] The range of sentences for first offenders for possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm is 3 – 5 years. In R. v. Stewart, 2022 ONSC 6997, at para. 74, Copeland J. (as she then was) outlined the range of sentence for first offenders who possess firearms:

The range of sentence for a first offence of firearm possession offences is sometimes stated as three to five years. However, stating the range in this manner excludes an established range of sentences as low as upper reformatory (including conditional sentences) for young first offenders, where other criminality such as drug dealing or making threats using the firearm is not proven. It also includes a higher range above three years which typically is applied where there is evidence that a firearm was possessed in connection with some other criminality such as drug trafficking. In general, sentences above three years involve some other criminality such as drug trafficking connected to the firearm possession: R. v. Marshall, 2015 ONCA 692, 340 O.A.C. 201, at paras. 47-48; R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817, at para. 38; R. v. Beharry, 2022 ONSC 4370, at para. 31.

[46] In R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Court of Appeal that firearm offences fall along a spectrum, with regulatory infractions at one end and guns used for criminal purposes at the other. Cases falling near the “true crime” end of the spectrum warrant sentences of three years or more. Writing for the majority in Nur, Chief Justice McLachlin explained, at para. 82:

Section 95(1) casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct. Most cases within the range may well merit a sentence of three years or more, but conduct at the far end of the range may not. At one end of the range, as Doherty J.A. observed, “stands the outlaw who carries a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm in public places as a tool of his or her criminal trade. . . . [T]his person is engaged in truly criminal conduct and poses a real and immediate danger to the public”: para. 51. At this end of the range — indeed for the vast majority of offences — a three-year sentence may be appropriate. A little further along the spectrum stands the person whose conduct is less serious and poses less danger; for these offenders three years’ imprisonment may be disproportionate, but not grossly so. At the far end of the range, stands the licensed and responsible gun owner who stores his unloaded firearm safely with ammunition nearby, but makes a mistake as to where it can be stored. For this offender, a three-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the sentence the conduct would otherwise merit under the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code.

[47] There is no question that Mr. Watts stands at the “true crime” end of the spectrum and his sentence for possession must reflect this. He used a loaded restricted firearm at each of the six robberies he committed and had the loaded firearm in his possession when he was arrested after the attempted seventh robbery. Subject to the totality principle, a consecutive sentence of 3 to 5 years for possession is appropriate in this case.

[48] I also wish to address the question of whether Mr. Watts’ conviction for the attempted robbery should run consecutive to or concurrent with the convictions for armed robbery. In my view, the attempted robbery should be a concurrent sentence. In the scheme of Mr. Watts’ criminal activities, the attempted robbery was his least serious offence. He did not go into the store that was targeted before he, for whatever reason, changed his mind and returned to his car where he was arrested. In this circumstance, I will not add additional jail time to his sentence for this particular offence.

Application of Kienapple

[49] The Kienapple principle (R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729) bars multiple convictions for two or more offences arising out of the same criminal act or transaction in circumstances where the essential elements of the offences are meant to cover the same wrong. In order for the Kienapple principle to apply, there must be both a factual and legal nexus between the charges.

[50] In the present case, the Crown acknowledges that the Kienapple principle applies to Mr. Bartley’s three motor vehicle offences, and that only the most serious of these - failure to stop a motor vehicle while being pursued by the police contrary to s. 320.17 of the Criminal Code – should proceed. The other two motor vehicle offences are stayed.

[51] The maximum penalty for a violation of s. 320.17 of the Code is 10 years in prison.

[52] This was a distinct offence, and was performed in a particularly dangerous manner. It is fortunate that no police officers were injured. As such, it demands a consecutive sentence.

Pre-trial Credit

[53] As of today’s date, Mr. Bartley has been in custody for 114 days, and is entitled to Summers credit of 172 days at 1.5:1.

[54] Mr. Watts has been in custody for 144 days, and is entitled to Summers credit of 216 days at 1.5:1.

[55] Mr. Bartley and Mr. Watts were both under house arrest for nearly three years pending their trial. As the Crown points out, however, the long duration of their house arrest was the result of their several adjournment requests.

[56] They were arrested for breach of bail conditions at the end of the trial because they broke the no-contact order by meeting in the washroom of the courthouse. Although a breach of bail conditions may disqualify a person from Downes credit (R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817, at para. 31), I agree with the defence that this breach, coming at the end of the trial, had no impact on the proceedings and should not, by itself, disentitle the defendants to Downes credit.

[57] In R. v. Downes, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that time spent under stringent bail conditions must be taken into account as a relevant mitigating circumstance on sentence. While the amount of credit to be given for time spent on bail is within the discretion of the sentencing judge, a number of factors must be considered in the assessment. The Court did not adopt a rigid formula because there can be a wide variation in bail conditions.

[58] When an offender seeks credit for stringent bail conditions, the focus of the inquiry is on the impact of the conditions on the offender and whether they were punitive enough to be akin to punishment: R. v. Joseph, 2020 ONCA 733, at paras. 107 – 108; R. v. Schlaepfer, 2022 ONCA 566, at paras. 13, 20 – 21. The amount of credit to give is within the sentencing judge’s discretion.

[59] There is no mathematical way to calculate Downes “credit”, which is properly understood as a mitigating factor on sentence because stringent bail conditions are punitive and thus akin to custody. In assessing the appropriate weight of the mitigation to be given, factors to be considered include the amount of time spent on the bail conditions, the stringency of the conditions, their impact on the offender’s liberty and the ability of the offender to carry on normal relationships, employment and activity: Joseph, at para. 108; R. v. Place, 2020 ONCA 546, at para. 2.

[60] A credit for any such time is not automatic and the cases recognize the reality that bail is not jail: R. v. Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597, at paras. 36 and 37. That said, in cases where a person suffers a significant restriction of liberty due to onerous bail conditions, some credit is appropriate. Again, the courts have been clear that there is no rigid or mathematical formula fixed for making this determination.

[61] In R. v. Panday (2007), 2007 ONCA 598, the majority of Court of Appeal held that Downes credit cannot be deducted to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence. As explained by McPherson J.A. for the majority, at para. 27,

The reality is that when a person is convicted of an offence that carries a minimum sentence, the sentencing judge does not engage in the usual balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors to arrive at an appropriate sentence. Indeed, the statutory minimum sentence specifically excludes such a balancing up to the point of the minimum sentence.

[62] The Defence argues that Mr. Watts should receive 1 year Downes credit and Mr. Bartley should receive 11 months Downes credit.

[63] In considering whether a Downes credit is appropriate, I must consider the specific impact that the restrictive bail conditions had on Mr. Watts and Mr. Bartley. In this regard I have no evidence from either of the defendants. While the house arrest continued for a long period of time, I am not satisfied, on the basis of the little evidence I have, that the house arrest unduly interfered with either their employment opportunities or relationships with family members.

[64] In addition, Mr. Bartley spent more than 24 days in lockdowns of more than 6 hours, and 115 days in less than six hour lockdown. He was also triple bunked for 7 days.

[65] “Duncan” credit is given on account of particularly difficult and punitive presentence custody conditions. The Duncan credit should not be calculated as an enhancement of the Summers credit but must be assessed independently. Like Downes credit, “Duncan” credit is not a deduction from the otherwise appropriate sentence, but is one of the factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence (R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, at paras. 50-52).

[66] The Defence argues that Mr. Bartley should receive 10.4 months for Duncan credit.

[67] The Defence argues that Mr. Watts should receive 284 days Duncan credit.

[68] The Crown takes the position that its proposed sentence take into account Duncan/Downes mitigation of approximately 6 months for each of the defendants.

Immigration Consequences

[69] The sentence imposed in this case may have immigration consequences for Mr. Bartley, who is a permanent resident of Canada.

[70] The Supreme Court of Canada has held that although “not, strictly speaking, aggravating or mitigating factors” a court can consider collateral consequences such as a defendant’s immigration status as a personal circumstance in imposing a fit sentence: R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, at para. 11. The Court stated, at paras. 14 – 16:

The general rule continues to be that a sentence must be fit having regard to the particular crime and the particular offender. In other words, a sentencing judge may exercise his or her discretion to take collateral immigration consequences into account, provided that the sentence that is ultimately imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

The flexibility of our sentencing process should not be misused by imposing inappropriate and artificial sentences in order to avoid collateral consequences which may flow from a statutory scheme or from other legislation, thus circumventing Parliament’s will.

These consequences must not be allowed to dominate the exercise or skew the process either in favour of or against deportation. Moreover, it must not lead to a separate sentencing scheme with a de facto if not a de jure special range of sentencing options where deportation is a risk.

[71] See also R. v. B.M., 2023 ONCA 224, at para. 33:

Disproportionate sentences cannot be imposed to avoid collateral immigration consequences which flow from other legislation …While these considerations may be taken into account, they cannot be applied in such a way as to result in the imposition of a sentence that is otherwise wholly inappropriate in the circumstances: Pham, at para. 15.

[72] In the present case, none of the potential immigration consequences can be realistically avoided: R. v. Arora, 2024 ONSC 713, at para. 56.

Conclusion

[73] Mr. Watts, please rise:

[74] Given the circumstances and considerations discussed above, I conclude that a global sentence of 12 years is the appropriate sentence, taking into account the totality principle and the other factors discussed above. The sentence is comprised of: a. 9 years concurrent for each of the six armed robberies, b. 5 years for the attempted robbery, concurrent with the armed robberies. c. 1 year concurrent for having your face masked during the robberies. d. 3 years consecutive for possession of a loaded restricted firearm without a licence or registration.

[75] From that sentence 216 days (7 months and 1 week) will be deducted for Summers credit, leaving 4,164 days remaining (4,380 days minus 216 days = 4,164).

[76] This sentence takes into account the Duncan credit for difficult pre-sentence custody conditions.

[77] In addition, 3 ancillary orders are granted: a mandatory lifetime s. 109 order prohibiting weapons; a DNA order; and forfeiture of seized property.

[78] Mr. Bartley, please rise:

[79] Given the circumstances and considerations discussed above, I conclude that a global sentence of 5 years and 3 months is the appropriate sentence. The sentence is comprised of: a. 5 years for armed robbery. b. 6 months concurrent for having your face masked during the robbery. c. 3 months consecutive for failure to stop a motor vehicle while being pursued by the police. This three month sentence takes into account the Duncan credit for difficult pre-sentence custody conditions.

[80] From that sentence 172 days – basically 6 months -will be deducted for Summers credit, leaving 57 months – 4 years, 9 months - remaining.

[81] In addition, 3 ancillary orders are granted: a mandatory lifetime s. 109 order prohibiting weapons; a DNA order; and forfeiture of seized property.

[82] The Crown has also requested an 18 month driving prohibition following the term of Mr. Bartley’s imprisonment. It is my hope that Mr. Bartley will be able to find employment and return to his responsibilities as a father to his young children when his prison term ends. Either would be made more difficult if Mr. Bartley is under a driving prohibition after his release, and I decline to order a driving prohibition.

Justice R.E. Charney

Released: August 14, 2024