ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: 2025 07 17
COURT FILE No.: Toronto 4810 998 24 48102871
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
CHARMARE CRAWFORD
Before Justice Peter N. Fraser
Heard on March 28, 2025, May 2, 2025, June 12, 2025, July 3, 2025, July 10, 2025
Reasons for Sentence released on July 17, 2025
Scott Arnold — counsel for the Crown
Stephanie Brown — counsel for the accused Charmare Crawford
Facts and Guilty Plea
1On March 28, 2025, Charmare Crawford pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery with a firearm, contrary to s. 344(1) of the Criminal Code, and two counts of wearing a disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence, contrary to s. 351(2). He also admitted facts making out two more robberies with a firearm and the possession of 29.53 grams of powder cocaine, 8.88 grams of crack cocaine and 22.82 grams of fentanyl, pursuant to s. 725(1)(b.1) of the Code.
2The Crown’s position on sentence was 6 years in jail. The defence initially sought the mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years. After I expressed my concerns that both proposed sentences were below the acceptable range, counsel jointly asked to withdraw the facts relating to the drug offences from my consideration. Defence counsel then joined the Crown in recommending a sentence of 6 years on the robberies. On July 10, 2025, I agreed to forego consideration of the drug offences and sentenced Mr. Crawford to 7 years in jail for the robbery charges, with reasons to follow. These are the reasons.
3Mr. Crawford was arraigned on two counts of robbery and two counts of wearing a disguise with intent on March 28, 2025. He pleaded guilty and the following facts were admitted with respect to those four charges.
4On December 12, 2023, Mr. Crawford attended an Ultramar gas station at 909 Wilson Avenue in Toronto, wearing a blue mask and black gloves. He asked the clerk, Balaketheeswaran Sivasubramanim, for cigarettes. When the clerk turned around, Mr. Crawford came around the counter and produced a handgun. He demanded that Mr. Sivasubramanim open the till, pushed him to the ground, and struck him on the head with the butt of the handgun causing a minor injury. He took a quantity of coins, totalling $100.
5On January 8, 2024, Mr. Crawford attended a Shell Canada gas station at 920 Albion Road wearing a blue mask and black gloves. He asked the store clerk, Yash Patel, for cigarettes and then came around the counter with a handgun demanding cash from the till. He stole $475 and fled in a Nissan Rogue. He was followed by a police surveillance unit and arrested. He was found in possession of the $475 in stolen money from the Shell Canada gas station.
6Additional facts were admitted pursuant to s. 725(1)(b.1) of the Code with the consent of both parties. They relate to two more charges of robbery with a firearm that were contained in the same information as the other two robberies, and to three charges of possession of a schedule 1 substance for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 5(3) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, which were contained in a separate information. These additional facts are set out below.
7On December 25, 2023, Mr. Crawford attended a Circle K convenience store at 2428 Islington Avenue in Toronto wearing a blue mask and black gloves. He asked for cigarettes and, when the clerk turned around, he moved around the counter and produced a handgun. He demanded the clerk open the till and took a quantity of cash totaling $95.
8On December 28, 2023, Mr. Crawford attended the Albion Variety Store at 361 Albion Road in Toronto wearing a blue mask and black gloves. He again asked the clerk for cigarettes and came around the counter brandishing a handgun. He demanded the till be opened and made off with about $300 in cash. Mr. Crawford admitted that the handgun used in all four robberies was an operative firearm.
9On January 8, 2024, police executed a search warrant at Mr. Crawford’s residence and located 29.53 grams of powder cocaine, 8.88 grams of crack cocaine, and 22.82 grams of fentanyl. Mr. Crawford admitted to possessing these drugs.
10The matter was adjourned in order for the parties to prepare materials and submissions on sentence.
The Sentencing Hearing
11The sentencing hearing began on May 2, 2025. The Crown sought a global sentence of 6 years in jail, less time spent in pre-sentence custody. The defence invited me to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years, less time served, principally on the basis of the guilty plea, some particularly harsh conditions spent in pre-sentence custody, and in light of the impact of race and culture as envisioned in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680.
12Mr. Crawford’s criminal record was filed as an exhibit on sentence. The record contains 5 findings of guilt under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and 9 adult convictions. There are six prior sentences involving a custodial component, including a conviction for possession of a schedule 1 substance for the purpose of trafficking in 2020 and a penitentiary sentence for aggravated assault in 2022.
13The defence filed records from the Toronto East Detention Centre, where Mr. Crawford has been held since his arrest. The records documented almost 200 days spent under lockdowns of various lengths, almost all of which were attributed to staff shortages. The defence filed two reports prepared for the federal Department of Justice entitled, Canadian black justice system report — Think 2wice, and Black People in Criminal Courts in Canada: An Exploration Using the Relative Rate Index. The defence also filed a report of the Ontario Human Rights Commission entitled, Report on conditions of confinement at Toronto South Detention Centre.
14Mr. Crawford swore an affidavit, setting out some of the circumstances of his life and upbringing. The affidavit also detailed the impact of the lockdowns on Mr. Crawford personally and provided further details about the harsh conditions in the jail. He was not cross-examined on his affidavit and the Crown did not otherwise dispute the assertions contained in it. In addition, the defence filed three letters of support for Mr. Crawford.
15After hearing the submissions of counsel, I expressed my concern that the sentences proposed by both the Crown and defence were well below the appropriate range of sentence and failed to give effect to the aggravating factors in this case. I noted that Mr. Crawford admitted facts making out two additional robberies with a firearm, making four robberies in total. He struck the victim of the first robbery, Balaketheeswaran Sivasubramanim, with the handgun. Mr. Crawford had his face masked. He had a significant criminal record with 9 adult convictions, including a sentence of 3 years and 3 months for an aggravated assault in which he stabbed a man seven times: R. v. Crawford, 2022 ONSC 2280. He was on parole for this offence when he committed the robberies before this Court. He was subject to a weapons prohibition. And he admitted to possessing significant amounts of illegal drugs, including fentanyl, which were themselves capable of attracting a significant penitentiary sentence.
16In view of the aggravating factors here, I advised counsel I had difficulty understanding how a sentence of five years, or even six, could properly be imposed in this case and that I was considering whether to exceed the Crown’s position on sentence.
17In R. v. Blake-Samuels, 2021 ONCA 77 at paras. 29-33, the Court of Appeal confirmed that a sentencing judge retains discretion to exceed the Crown’s position on sentence. However, if a judge is considering exercising this discretion, fundamental fairness requires that the parties be permitted to make additional submissions and the accused be made aware of their increased penal jeopardy. Further, the sentencing judge must provide clear and cogent reasons for imposing a sentence which exceeds the Crown's position: see, also, R. v. Bagheri, 2022 ONCA 357 at para. 16.
18In R. v. Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37, the Supreme Court endorsed this methodology, and affirmed the distinction between a judge who departs from a joint submission and a judge who exceeds the Crown’s position in the context of a contested sentencing hearing.
19The test for departing from a joint submission was set out in R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43. The Supreme Court held that judges are bound to accept a joint submission, unless it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest. The Court remarked that such submissions are not sacrosanct, and observed that s. 606(6)(1.1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code provides that judges are not required to accept them. Nonetheless, the Court went on to articulate an extremely high test for departing from the joint submissions of counsel, as evidenced by these remarks, at paragraph 31 of the decision:
Rejection denotes a submission so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons, aware of all the relevant circumstances, including the importance of promoting certainty in resolution discussions, to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down. This is an undeniably high threshold…
20In R. v. Nahanee, supra at para. 4, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the public interest test set out in Anthony-Cook should apply where judges exceed the Crown’s position in a contested sentencing hearing:
[T]he public interest test adopted by this Court in Anthony-Cook does not, and should not, apply to contested sentencing hearings following a guilty plea, regardless of the amount of prior negotiation between the parties culminating in the plea. In such cases, however, if the sentencing judge is of a mind to impose a harsher sentence, in any respect, than what the Crown has proposed, they should notify the parties and give them an opportunity to make further submissions…
21I followed this procedure in the present case. The matter was adjourned to give the parties the opportunity to make further submissions and provide additional evidence or authority to support their positions. I also asked counsel for caselaw concerning the range of sentence that would normally apply to the drug offences.
22In addition, I expressed concern about the conditions of Mr. Crawford’s pre-trial detention at that time. I asked counsel for further assistance in interpreting the institutional records, in order to better understand how many days Mr. Crawford had spent in lockdown and for how long. Given how long this problem has existed in Ontario, I invited the Crown to lead evidence to explain the state of affairs at the Toronto South Detention Centre, or the province's remand facilities more generally.
The Sentencing Hearing Continued
23On June 12, 2025, the proceedings resumed and both counsel made further submissions in support of their respective sentencing positions. The Crown explained its sentencing position, in part, on the basis that the complainants were scared and did not want to testify at a trial. I would not expect those feelings to be particularly uncommon amongst victims of violent gun crime. There is no suggestion any of the victims were recanting their statements to police or were otherwise unavailable. This factor weighs somewhat minimally in my analysis of the fit sentence.
24The Crown also provided a chart, summarizing a series of sentencing decisions involving fentanyl. Based on those cases, the Crown expressed the view that the amount of drugs possessed by Mr. Crawford would, at minimum, have attracted a sentence of 5 years had they been the subject of a stand-alone sentencing proceeding. My review of the authorities suggests the sentence would be at least that much and would most probably be higher.
25Defence counsel filed a second affidavit from Mr. Crawford, detailing additional lockdowns and continuing harsh conditions in the jail. Counsel further argued that the drug offences should be treated in a categorically different and considerably more lenient way under s. 725(1)(b.1) than if the accused had been arraigned and pleaded guilty to those charges.
The Application of Section 725(1)(b.1) of the Criminal Code
26Having considered the further submissions of counsel and upon review of the additional materials provided, I continued to be concerned that the positions of both the Crown and defence were far below what the principles of sentencing required. I found the evidence of the drug offences to be particularly troubling in the circumstances of this case.
27There is appellate authority setting the range of sentence for an ounce or less of cocaine between 6 months and 2 years, less a day: R. v. Woolcock, [2002] O.J. No. 4927 (C.A.); R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817 at paras. 47-48. Had the accused entered guilty pleas to the cocaine charges, the quantity in this case would place this matter at the top of the Woolcock range or above it.
28While the sentencing ranges for fentanyl are still being developed, the caselaw supports a mid-single digit penitentiary term for the quantity possessed by Mr. Crawford. See, for example, R. v. Campbell, 2022 ONCA 666, affirmed, 2024 SCC 24; R. v. Moore, 2025 ONCA 47; R. v. Disher, 2020 ONCA 710; R. v. Loor, 2017 ONCA 696; R. v. Margerison, 2022 ONCA 211; R. v. Llanos, 2025 ONSC 3986; R. v. Jenkins, 2018 ONSC 5078; R. v. Moore, 2017 ONCJ 801; R. v. Cinelli, 2018 ONSC 4983. [1]
29The drug charges would normally be the subject of consecutive sentences, subject to attenuation in accordance with the principle of totality. The comments of Code J. in R. v. Graham, supra, at para. 43 are instructive on this point:
The conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking requires a separate consecutive sentence. It is an entirely separate offence, based on separate public policy interests, and it requires separate punishment. I agree with the reasons of Campbell J. in R. v. Mark [2018] O.J. No. 270 at para 27 (S.C.J.) in this regard. Also see R. v. Crevier, supra at paras 128-9 where Rouleau J.A. agreed with the trial judge in imposing "a consecutive sentence for the cocaine conviction because it constituted a different legally-protected interest from the gun offences".
30On July 3, 2025, the proceedings resumed and I expressed concern about the propriety of dealing with the drug offences via s. 725(1)(b.1) of the Code in the particular circumstances of this case. I read out the following endorsement, which was later provided to counsel in writing:
[1] On March 28, 2025, Charmare Crawford pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery with a firearm, contrary to s. 344(1) of the Criminal Code, and two counts of wearing a disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence, contrary to s. 351(2). He also admitted facts, pursuant to s. 725(1)(b.1), making out two more robberies with a firearm and the possession of 29.53 grams of powder cocaine, 8.88 grams of crack cocaine and 22.82 grams of fentanyl.
[2] The Crown seeks a global sentence of 6 years in jail. The defence invites me to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years. After hearing the submissions of counsel, I expressed my concern that the sentences proposed by both the Crown and defence were below the appropriate range of sentence and failed to give effect to the aggravating factors in this case. The matter was adjourned to give the parties the opportunity to make further submissions and provide additional evidence or authority to support their positions: R. v. Blake-Samuels, 2021 ONCA 77 at paras. 29-30; R. v. Bagheri, 2022 ONCA 357 at para. 16.
[3] One of my principal concerns was the effect the drug charges would have on the sentence. I asked counsel for caselaw setting out the range of sentence for those offences. And I have sought the assistance of counsel in respect of how those drug charges should affect the sentence, when admitted by way of s. 725(1)(b.1).
[4] Having heard from counsel, and having considered this matter at length, I consider the use of this section to be problematic in the circumstances of this case. I view this to be an unorthodox proceeding and a challenging sentencing issue.
[5] I have reached the point where I am forced to consider whether I should decline to admit the facts relating to Mr. Crawford’s possession of illegal drugs. The drug offences are pleaded in a three-count information that is before me, but on which the accused has not pleaded guilty. This information alleges that Mr. Crawford possessed cocaine, crack cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
[6] Section 725(1)(b.1) of the Criminal Code provides as follows:
in determining the sentence, a court shall consider any outstanding charges against the offender, unless the court is of the opinion that a separate prosecution for one or more of the other offences is necessary in the public interest, subject to the following conditions:
(i) the Attorney General and the offender consent,
(ii) the court has jurisdiction to try each charge,
(iii) each charge has been described in open court,
(iv) the offender has agreed with the facts asserted in the description of each charge, and
(v) the offender has acknowledged having committed the offence described in each charge.
[7] The conditions in subsections (i) through (v) are met here. However, the section clearly affords the judge discretion to decline to consider the additional facts where a separate prosecution for the drug offences is necessary in the public interest. I would make the following observations in this regard.
[8] First, the drug charges are very serious. The illegal drugs in question, most particularly the fentanyl, are extremely dangerous substances that pose a risk of widespread harm and death to the community. My review of the authorities provided by counsel suggests that, if the accused had been arraigned on the drug charges, the resulting sentence could well have been double what would otherwise have been appropriate for the robbery charges alone, subject to considerations for totality.
[9] Second, the drug charges are unrelated factually to the robbery charges. The drugs were found in the accused’s residence pursuant to a search warrant after his arrest.
[10] Third, there is little clarity in the jurisprudence as to how facts admitted pursuant to s. 725(1)(b.1) should be handled in the sentencing process. There are compelling reasons to use the range of sentence for the additional offences as guidance, and increase the sentence for the charge the accused pleaded guilty to accordingly, subject again to concerns for totality. This approach would give effect to well established sentencing principles, many of which have been dictated to the courts by Parliament. There are important similarities between the offender who pleads guilty to an offence and one who admits the offence under s. 725(1)(b.1). The moral culpability of the accused is the same. The seriousness of the criminal conduct is the same. The harm to the community is the same. And the procedural protections are essentially identical.
[11] There are some differences too. For example, the accused who admits facts under s. 725(1)(b.1) obtains the benefit of fewer entries on his criminal record. And the range of sentencing options would be limited to those sanctions made available by the charges the accused actually pleaded guilty to. On its face, it is difficult to see why these distinctions would lead to a markedly different sentencing outcome. There may well be some qualitative difference between offences read in under s. 725(1)(b.1) and offences an accused pleads guilty to, but I have been provided no authority for that.
[12] Counsel for Mr. Crawford submitted that s. 725(1)(b.1) represents a kind of middle ground, where an accused should be sentenced in a considerably more lenient fashion than if he was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge, but I do not read the cases provided to stand for that proposition. The Crown has not proposed a clear methodology for the consideration of these facts. [2]
[13] It is implicit in the positions taken by the Crown and the defence that neither counsel is of the view the drug charges should meaningfully affect the length of sentence I impose on the robbery charges. I consider the dissonance between their proposed treatment of s. 725(1)(b.1) and my own observations as set out above to weigh against admitting the facts of the drug charges in this case.
[14] In short, I question whether the drug charges can be appropriately dealt with as aggravating factors in the particular circumstances of this case. The facts underlying these drug charges are so serious in their own right, and the potential harm to the community so great, there is a real potential for these additional offences to skew the sentencing process and interfere with the Court’s ability to affix a proportionate sentence for the robberies.
[15] I have not been presented with a clear methodology through which to give effect to the drug offences pursuant to s. 725(1)(b.1).
[16] I am inviting counsel to make submissions as to whether I should exercise my discretion to decline to receive the facts of the drug charges. If I do, Mr. Crawford would potentially be subject to a separate prosecution for those charges. If the Crown was inclined to prosecute him on that information, that might give rise to an application to strike the plea before me, as the accused clearly anticipated all these charges being dealt with together.
[17] If it comes to pass that I do decline to admit the facts of the drug charges, the defence would be entitled to know what the Crown intends to do with the CDSA information before proceeding with the sentencing in this matter.
[18] I will adjourn the case to permit counsel to consider their positions. It may be they are able to jointly propose a solution to this problem. Either way, I will receive submissions on whether to decline to admit the drug charges on a future date.
31The matter was adjourned for counsel to consider their positions in light of this endorsement.
32I would add that counsel did not seek to withdraw the facts pertaining to the two additional robberies from consideration in this case, nor did I raise that as an issue. In my view, those facts are properly receivable under s. 725(1)(b.1) in the circumstances of this case, and they can be rationally addressed as aggravating factors on sentence. The additional robbery offences are factually similar to the offences Mr. Crawford pleaded guilty to and they occurred in and around the same time period. All four robberies occurred within the span of four weeks leading up to Mr. Crawford’s arrest on January 8, 2024. These offences can properly be viewed as part of a related course of conduct or “spree.” Multiple offences that fit into this kind of pattern are often dealt with by way of concurrent sentences, though in general the sentences ought to be increased to account for the aggravating factor of multiple delicts: R. v. Johnson, supra at para. 43; R. v. Kozussek, 2013 MBCA 52 at paras. 8-10; R. v. Lagimodiere, 2008 MBCA 137 at para. 26; R. v. McEwan, 2018 ONCJ 541 at paras. 25-27; R. v. Watts, 2024 ONSC 4501 at para. 44.
Modified Positions of the Parties
33When the proceedings continued on July 12, 2025, the Crown and defence jointly withdrew their request for me to consider the CDSA offences pursuant to s. 725(1)(b.1) of the Code. I accepted this request and declined to consider the drug offences in connection with this sentencing. In so doing, it fell to the Crown to deal with the drug charges separate and apart from this proceeding in whatever manner it saw fit. Defence counsel was satisfied that no prejudice would befall the accused, as no further prosecution of those charges was anticipated. [3]
34At that point counsel for Mr. Crawford changed course and joined the Crown in seeking a sentence of six years on the remaining Criminal Code matters before me. Counsel candidly acknowledged this was not akin to a joint submission at first instance, which could only be departed from according to the “public interest test” set out by the Supreme Court in R. v. Anthony-Cook, supra. The accused did not plead guilty in exchange for a joint submission and, instead, went in open and sought a lesser sentence: R. v. Omoragbon, 2025 ONCA 481.
35I proceeded to sentence Mr. Crawford on July 12, 2025 for the four charges he pleaded guilty to, taking into account the two additional robberies that were properly admitted pursuant to s. 725(1)(b.1) of the Code.
Principles of Sentencing
36Sentencing is a highly individualized process: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para. 58. The judge must give effect to a number of different and often competing sentencing objectives. Section 718 of the Criminal Code directs that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and, more specifically, to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. According to s. 718.1, the fundamental principle of sentencing is proportionality. The sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Parity of sentence is a corollary to proportionality. It requires that similar sentences be imposed upon similar offences committed in similar circumstances: R. v. Lacasse, supra, at para. 2.
37Where sentences are imposed for multiple offences, the Court must consider the principle of totality. Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the Court must ensure the combined sentence is not unduly long or harsh and that the global sentence does not exceed the offender's overall culpability: R. v. C.A.M., 1996 SCC 230, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500.
38Crimes involving firearms represent a grave danger to our society: R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 at paras. 1, 6. The primary principles of sentencing in these cases are denunciation and deterrence: R. v. Morris, supra, at para. 71. Illegal handguns are particularly dangerous given how easily they can be concealed and transported into public places where innocent people are imperiled: R. v. Hilbach, 2023 SCC 3 at para. 53. The only purpose for these weapons is to intimidate, injure and kill.
39Illegal firearms have been correctly described at all levels of court as a scourge on our society and the City of Toronto in particular: R. v. Danvers, 2005 ONCA 30044 at paras. 77-78; R. v. Thavakularatnam, 2018 ONSC 2380 at para. 21. In R. v. Lacasse, supra, at para. 89, the Supreme Court recognized the frequency of a type of offence in a particular region is a relevant factor on sentence.
40The Courts must demonstrate in clear terms that our society will not tolerate the use of firearms in our streets and communities. Exemplary sentences are required to deter those who would engage in this kind of conduct and to protect the lives of law-abiding people: R. v. Doucette, 2015 ONCA 583 at paras. 59-60; R. v. Danvers, supra, at paras. 77-78; R. v. Jones, 2012 ONCA 609 at para. 12.
41The use of a restricted or prohibited firearm in a robbery poses grave risk to public safety. The risk of violence and psychological trauma from any robbery involving a firearm is acute: R. v. Hilbach, supra, at paras. 6 & 71. I consider that clerks of convenience stores and gas stations are vulnerable members of our communities, who often work alone or late at night, have cash on hand, and are all too often the victims of robberies: R. v. Lewis, 2009 ONCA 792 at para. 3; R. v. Asif, 2020 ONSC 1403 at para. 40.
42I consider the need to separate Mr. Crawford from society in order to protect the public and the need to promote in him a sense of responsibility for the harm he has done. I consider the principle of restraint, which is codified in s. 718.2(d) and (e) of the Code. I also consider the principle of rehabilitation. While this sentencing principle occupies a less prominent position in the circumstances of this case, I must consider Mr. Crawford’s potential to change and become a contributing member of society.
Impact of Race and Culture
43In R. v. Morris, supra, the Ontario Court of Appeal brought the implications of race and social context to the forefront of the sentencing process. That decision requires sentencing judges to consider background factors, and specifically the impacts of systemic racism, which may have contributed to the offender being before the court. Mr. Crawford is a black man who grew up in a low-income housing complex in the Markham and Eglinton area of Toronto. At paragraph 1 of the Morris decision, the Court of Appeal held as follows:
It is beyond doubt that anti-Black racism, including both overt and systemic anti-Black racism, has been, and continues to be, a reality in Canadian society, and in particular in the Greater Toronto Area. That reality is reflected in many social institutions, most notably the criminal justice system. It is equally clear that anti-Black racism can have a profound and insidious impact on those who must endure it on a daily basis.
44In this case, the evidence touching on social context is somewhat limited. Counsel for Mr. Crawford expressly declined to seek an Impact of Race and Cultural Assessment (IRCA) report, which have begun to appear in courts in the wake of Morris. Counsel also declined to seek a pre-sentence report, but did supply the Court with information regarding Mr. Crawford’s background and upbringing.
45Mr. Crawford swore an affidavit in which he provided evidence of economic disadvantage, negative peer influences, and some general reference to his own experiences with systemic racism. These are some of the same kinds of personal circumstances the Court of Appeal was considering in Morris and that would potentially appear in an IRCA report. Mr. Crawford was raised by his mother, as his father was not involved in his life. He described his family as being very poor and living in social housing units that were in serious states of disrepair. He described being exposed to violence and to the drug trade in the building he grew up in. This information was confirmed in part by the letters of support written by his sister, Charlene Crawford, and a family friend named Deidre Jeffers. Later in life, Mr. Crawford described struggling to find work and resorting to selling drugs to make money. He did find steady work beginning in 2019 in commercial construction, where he worked until he was incarcerated in 2022 for a previous offence. Regarding his experiences with systemic racism, he wrote the following:
Starting around age 14, I would be stopped and searched by police when they were either in the area of my apartment or in the building itself. I remember being asked for ID and knowing other people who were beat up by the police. I grew distrustful of the police and felt angry and as though I was being targeted unfairly by the police based on my race and where I lived.
46I am further aided in this inquiry by the report tendered in the Morris case, entitled, Expert Report on Crime, Criminal Justice and the Experience of Black Canadians in Toronto, Ontario. As the Court of Appeal observed, “The report bears reading and re-reading by those called upon to prosecute, defend and sentence Black offenders, particularly young Black offenders.” With the assistance of this report, and the case-specific information before me, it is not hard to draw a line between Mr. Crawford’s challenging background and his criminal history.
47As to how that experience informs the sentence, I consider the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Morris, and more specifically these remarks at paragraph 18 of the decision:
-- social context evidence relating to the offender's life experiences may be used where relevant to mitigate the offender's degree of responsibility for the offence and/or to assist in the blending of the principles and objectives of sentencing to achieve a sentence which best serves the purposes of sentencing as described in s. 718;
-- the gravity or seriousness of an offence is determined by its normative wrongfulness and the harm posed or caused by that conduct in the circumstances in which the conduct occurred. Accordingly, unlike when assessing the offender's degree of personal responsibility, an offender's experience with anti-Black racism does not impact on the seriousness or gravity of the offence;
48In accordance with these remarks, the social context evidence does not affect my view of the seriousness of the offences. I am, however, prepared to accept that Mr. Crawford’s experiences with community violence, economic disadvantage, and systemic racism bear on his level of moral responsibility for these offences.
Aggravating Factors
49First, Mr. Crawford has a criminal record, containing 9 convictions as an adult and 5 findings of guilt under the Youth Criminal Justice Act. The youth entries are dated and have a negligible impact on the sentence I impose here. The adult convictions, however, are significant. There are six prior sentences involving a custodial component. On January 3, 2020, Mr. Crawford was sentenced to 225 days of time served for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and 30 days of time served for possession of a schedule I substance for the purpose of trafficking. On May 10, 2022, he received a sentence of 3 years and 3 months for an aggravated assault in which he stabbed a man seven times. This matter is the subject of a reported decision: see R. v. Crawford, supra.
50Second, Mr. Crawford was on parole for the aggravated assault conviction when he committed the robberies before this Court. He was granted early release on November 23, 2023 and committed the first of four robberies less than 3 weeks later on December 12, 2023. The warrant expiry date was September 4, 2024. This is a statutory aggravating factor, according to s. 718.2(a)(vi) of the Code.
51Third, the accused struck the victim, Rob Balaketheeswaran, with the handgun during the course of the robbery on December 12, 2023. This factor is tempered somewhat by the fact the injury was described as being minor.
52Fourth, Mr. Crawford was subject to a weapons prohibition. He did not plead guilty to this offence, but his criminal record establishes that he was prohibited from possessing any firearms under section 109 of the Code at the time he committed these offences.
53Fifth, Mr. Crawford had his face masked when he committed the robberies. I have chosen to treat these facts as aggravating factors on sentence regarding the robbery charges, and to impose concurrent sentences on the two counts of this offence the accused pleaded guilty to.
54Sixth, Mr. Crawford has admitted to multiple robberies with a firearm. Each one of these robberies is a serious crime, involving a separate victim, and constituting a separate affront to the community. I have chosen to treat the fact there were two robberies Mr. Crawford pleaded guilty to as an aggravating factor and to impose concurrent sentences on both in order to give effect to the principle of totality: R. v. Johnson, supra, at para. 43; R. v. Kozussek, supra, at paras. 8-10; R. v. Lagimodiere, supra, at para. 26; R. v. McEwan, supra, at paras. 25-27; R. v. Watts, supra, at para. 44. I treat the two uncharged robberies that were admitted pursuant to s. 725(1)(b.1) as further aggravating factors on sentence, but I consider them part of the same course of conduct or spree, which spanned four weeks leading up to the accused’s arrest.
Mitigating Factors
55I consider the following mitigating factors on sentence. First, Mr. Crawford pleaded guilty. He has accepted responsibility for these offences. He has spared the Court the time and expense of conducting a trial and he has spared the victims from having to testify. I accept that the plea is a genuine expression of remorse, as evidenced by his allocution before the court and through letters of support filed on his behalf.
56Second, as set out above, I find the evidence of race and social context goes some distance toward explaining Mr. Crawford’s conduct and mitigates his moral culpability to some extent.
57Third, Mr. Crawford has the support of family members and friends in the community and some prosocial history of work in the community. These are favourable indicators with respect to his long-term rehabilitative potential.
58Fourth, Mr. Crawford has deposed that he was motivated by economic pressure and committed the offenses at a time when he was dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder, and was consuming alcohol on a daily basis. These features are not well delineated in the evidence. There is no formal diagnosis before me from a medical professional regarding the PTSD or any substance abuse disorder. I am prepared to treat these circumstances as mitigating to a point, but the extent to which I can find they had a direct bearing on the commission of the offences or lessened the accused’s moral culpability is limited on this record.
59Fifth, Mr. Crawford has spent time under particularly harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody. I return to this point later in these reasons.
Contextual Factors
60Counsel for Mr. Crawford submits the robberies were unsophisticated, the value of the stolen money was low, and the firearm was not discharged. I do not consider these factors to be mitigating in law. These are relevant considerations, but I view each of these circumstances as representing the absence of an aggravating factor. In other words, these are areas in which the crimes could have been worse.
61Defence counsel also points out there is no evidence before the court that the firearm was loaded. I consider this again as the absence of an aggravating factor. And I would observe this point was addressed by the Supreme Court in R. v. Hilbach, supra, at para. 55, in the following terms:
The use of an unloaded prohibited firearm does not substantially reduce the offence's gravity. The presence of a firearm, even an unloaded one"in and of itself creates a highly volatile and dangerous situation.”
Moreover, an unloaded firearm is used for the same reason as a loaded firearm: to instill "the ultimate threat of death to those in its presence." [Citations omitted.]
Impact of the Offences
62The victims were afforded the opportunity to provide victim impact statements, but declined to do so. That being said, the circumstances of these robberies are objectively terrifying. And I would note the Supreme Court opined in R. v. Hilbach, supra, at para. 54 that,
“It can be expected that store clerks who are victims of offences like the one perpetrated by Mr. Hilbach will suffer psychological harm.”
The Range of Sentence
63The maximum sentence for the offence of robbery is life in prison. Where a restricted or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the offence, there is a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years. This mandatory minimum has been found to be constitutional: R. v. Hilbach, supra. The maximum sentence for having one’s face masked with intent to commit an indictable offence is 10 years where the Crown proceeds by indictment.
64Since proportionality is the fundamental principle of sentencing, I am guided by sentences handed down in other cases.
65In R. v. Watts, supra at para. 44, Charney J. surveyed several recent cases and identified the range of sentence for multiple armed robberies as 7-15 years in jail:
The range of sentences for multiple armed robberies appears to be in the 7 - 15 year range. The higher double digit range applies in cases where the aggravating factors include the use of a real loaded gun, prior criminal record, and where the victims were physically harmed or the gun was fired during the robbery. The greater the number of armed robberies, the higher the sentence, especially where one or more of these aggravating factors is present. See for example: R. v. Dilleon, 2008 ONCJ 401, at para. 40; R. v. Codner, 2013 ONCA 138; R. v. Davies, 2017 ONCA 467; R. v. Henry, 2019 ONCA 229; R. v. Johnson, 2016 ONCA 935; R. v. Lira, 2021 ONSC 8294, at paras. 99 - 115; R. v. Osman, 2016 ONCA 64; R. v. Shuman, 2021 ONCA 638.
66In R. v. Clarke, 2024 ONSC 436 at para. 27, Schrek J. described the range of sentence in the following terms:
Robbery with a firearm is an exceptionally serious crime which usually results in a significant penitentiary sentence in the high single digits: R. v. Sithravel, 2023 ONCA 748; R. v. Treleaven, 2019 ONCA 593, varying 2018 ONSC 1707; R. v. Kreko, 2016 ONCA 367, 131 O.R. (3d) 694; R. v. Hayes, 2016 ONCA 47; R. v. Wolynec, 2015 ONCA 656, 330 C.C.C. (3d) 541; R. v. Taylor (2006), 214 O.A.C. 27 (C.A.); R. v. Asif, 2020 ONSC 1403; R. v. Pink, 2020 ONSC 814; R. v. Charley, 2019 ONSC 6490; R. v. Taylor, [2017] O.J. No. 139 (S.C.J.); R. v. S.A., 2011 ONSC 4165.
67I have considered the cases provided to me by the defence, which are distinguishable from the present case in significant ways. For example, In R. v. McIntyre, 2016 ONSC 7498, the accused was just over 18 when he committed a single robbery and had no criminal record. In R. v. Gokool-Clark, 2024 ONSC 5927, the accused was convicted of robbery and possession of a firearm, but the gun was not used in the commission of the robbery. The case of R. v. Auld, 2024 ONSC 689 did not involve a firearm at all. And in R. v. Tchintcharashvili, 2025 ONCJ 204, the accused received a sentence below the mandatory minimum of 5 years. Respectfully, I do not believe the sentence imposed in that case was available in law.
68Sentencing ranges are instructive but they are not hard and fast rules. They are summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para. 36; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, at para. 44. There will be situations that call for a sentence outside the existing range.
Exceeding the Crown’s Position on Sentence
69Even with the drug offences removed from my consideration, I consider the six-year sentence now jointly proposed by the Crown and defence to be below the acceptable range. In my view, that sentence fails to take into account the number of robberies, or to give effect to the serious aggravating factors in this case.
70I do not approach the recommended sentence in the same way I would a joint submission at first instance: R. v. Omoragbon, supra. A departure from the parties’ recommendation in this scenario is not governed by the “public interest test” set out by the Supreme Court in R. v. Anthony-Cook, supra. Instead, I continue to be guided by the caselaw concerning exceeding the Crown’s position in the context of a contested sentencing hearing: R. v. Nahanee, supra; R. v. Blake-Samuels, supra; R. v. Bagheri, supra.
71The mandatory minimum sentence for one robbery with a prohibited or restricted firearm is 5 years. A minimum sentence is an inflationary floor, applicable to the so-called “best” offender whose conduct is caught by the provisions, and from which all other sentences are to be scaled up: R. v. Morrissey, 2000 SCC 39 at paras. 75-76; R. v. Hilbach, supra, at para. 57. And, according to s. 718.2(a), “a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender.”
72The “best” offender in respect of the offence of robbery with a firearm might notionally be compared to the reasonable hypothetical scenarios considered by the Supreme Court in R. v. Hilbach, supra, at paras. 85-90, in the course of deciding whether the 5 year minimum sentence could amount to cruel and unusual punishment under s. 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These hypotheticals represent some of the least serious iterations of the offence of robbery with a firearm that could reasonably be expected to occur. As an example, these included the following, at para. 85:
[A] 21-year-old Indigenous man, suffers from alcoholism and fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, is extremely intoxicated and face down in a snowbank when a good Samaritan stops to help him. He grabs the woman, reaches into his waistband, flashes a BB gun, and snatches her purse. The BB gun is operable and capable of taking an eyeball out, but it is unloaded.
73The Supreme Court also referred to two scenarios drawn from reported decisions involving youthful offenders who committed convenience store robberies. One was an 18-year-old Indigenous woman, who pled guilty as a party to the robbery where the principal used an imitation firearm. The other was an 18-year-old youthful offender who used a BB gun in the commission of a robbery and pled guilty. None of these scenarios were found to render the mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutional.
74These are useful points of reference, as they highlight just how far away from the bottom of the range Mr. Crawford is. In my view, the circumstances of this case would make a sentence of either 5 or 6 years unfit.
The Fit Sentence
75I have carefully considered the applicable sentencing principles. I have weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors and evaluated them according to the guiding principle of proportionality. I find that a just sentence in this case would be a global sentence of 7.5 years in jail. A clear message must be sent that criminals who arm themselves with illegal firearms and use them in public will face severe consequences.
76This sentence is subject to reduction for time spent in pre-sentence custody. Mr. Crawford has served 309 days in pre-sentence custody, which is not otherwise attributable to the sentence he was serving for the aggravated assault conviction. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, I award him credit at the rate of 1.5 to 1 and will reduce his sentence by 464 days.
77The sentence will be further mitigated, over and above the Summers credit, on account of particularly harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody, pursuant to R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754.
Harsh Conditions in Pre-Sentence Custody
78The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons. [4]
79What happens inside our prisons matters. The conditions inside our penal institutions reflect upon our society at large. They demonstrate, for better or worse, our collective commitment to the most fundamental of human rights. Our prisons are a statement, rendered in concrete and steel, of the dignity we afford to every person, no matter how marginalized, misguided, or lost.
80In this case, the defence seeks credit for the harsh conditions Mr. Crawford has endured at the Toronto South Detention Centre (TSDC) where he has been held since his arrest. Counsel filed records from the institution detailing extensive lockdowns. Based on these records and the evidence of Mr. Crawford, I conclude he was held in lockdown for most or all of the day on 168 days. He was locked down for part of the day on 43 more occasions. He was triple-bunked, which is to say he was held in a cell with two other people, for 8 days.
81During lockdowns prisoners are confined to their cells, with no access to common areas, outdoor spaces, or programming. They have limited or no access to showers and telephones. The information sheet attached to the institutional records states that,
“During lockdowns inmates are given 30 minutes to complete phone / shower and in some cases yard. (The Superintendent may cancel phone and shower program based on institutional needs and security concerns).”
Mr. Crawford has described the impact of these conditions on him personally in his affidavit, at para. 16:
During lockdowns, depending on the length of the lockdown, I would not be permitted to leave my cell to use the phone, to shower, or to get any fresh air. When there were full lockdowns, occasionally there was a “shower program” where I would be let out of my cell for up to 30 minutes to either use the phone or take a shower. There was not enough time to do both, so I would have to choose between taking a shower and using the phone to contact loved ones. The shower program was not always available during lockdowns, and I would sometimes go days without access to a shower or phone.
82Mr. Crawford also described some of the broader impacts of lockdowns and overcrowding at the TSDC. He explained that tensions would run high in these circumstances and violence would often result. Mr. Crawford was himself assaulted by another inmate on March 15, 2024 while speaking on the phone. This incident was witnessed by corrections officers and documented in a Use of Force Occurrence Report filed in these proceedings.
83In R. v. Nsiah, 2017 ONSC 769 at para. 19, Goldstein J. characterized detention under lockdown in bleak terms:
In other words, the lockdowns represent a modern form of the harsh Dickensian conditions that motivated the Victorian movement towards prison reform. The lockdowns are a regressive form of punishment that is [sic] represents the opposite of an enlightened penal regime.
84Historically, jails (or gaols as they were known in Britain and Upper Canada prior to Confederation) were used to house accused persons pending trial. As Goldstein J. observes, conditions were notoriously poor. Time in jail was not typically a sentence that could be imposed within the common law jurisdictions. Instead, punishments for crimes tended to take the form of fines, physical inflictions of pain, executions, and banishment (or transportation as it was known). Prison as a punishment is a relatively new development in the history of crime and punishment. Transformative penal reforms of the late 18th and early 19th centuries brought with them the creation of the penitentiary. These represented the first uses of incarceration itself as a sentence. This was meant to be a more humane and rehabilitative response to criminality than what had come before. In 1835, Kingston Penitentiary became the first penitentiary in what would later become Canada. I refer to this history in order to emphasize that inhumane forms of pre-trial detention are the unfortunate remnants of centuries past.
85Today, incarceration as a punishment continues to be carried out in federal penitentiaries, where the sentence is two years or more. Where the sentence is less than two years, sentences are served in provincial reformatories. By contrast, provincially run remand centres are primarily designed to hold accused persons awaiting trial. There is no question that some accused people must be detained pending trial. However, it must be remembered that these people are entitled to the legal presumption of innocence, and that time spent in remand facilities is not intended to be a punishment. It is a painful irony then that conditions in these facilities are worse than in the penitentiaries and reformatories which are intended to punish: R. v. Summers, supra, at para. 2; R. v. Charley, 2019 ONSC 6490 paras. 14-22.
86In R. v. Duncan, supra, the Court of Appeal held that additional credit may be given, over and above Summers credit, to account for particularly harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody: see, also, R. v. Nasogaluak, supra, at paras. 5 & 49; R. v. Charley, supra, at para. 36. It is important to appreciate and maintain the clear distinction between "Summers" credit and “Duncan” credit. As the Court of Appeal clarified in R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344 at para. 50:
A “Duncan” credit is given on account of particularly difficult and punitive presentence custody conditions. It must be borne in mind the 1.5:1 "Summers" credit already takes into account the difficult and restrictive circumstances offenders often encounter during pretrial custody: Summers, at paras. 28-29. The “Duncan” credit addresses exceptionally punitive conditions which go well beyond the normal restrictions associated with pretrial custody.
87From the time of his arrest on January 8, 2024 until his warrant expiry date of September 4, 2025, Mr. Crawford was serving the remainder of his sentence for aggravated assault. He was, however, housed at the TSDC on account of the outstanding charges, rather than Collins Bay penitentiary where he had otherwise been serving sentence. I am aware that this is not pre-sentence custody that can be credited against the sentence I impose here. The fact Mr. Crawford was on parole when he committed these offences is an aggravating factor, and the consequence of him being recommitted to jail to serve the remainder of his previous sentence is not generally a mitigating factor: R. v. Lavalee, 2006 ABCA 324 at para. 7; R. v. Jenkins, supra, at para. 63. That being said, Mr. Crawford served out his sentence at a provincial remand facility rather than being returned to a federal penitentiary. I am prepared to accept that the conditions in the former are markedly worse than what would be expected in the latter: R. v. Charley, supra, paras. 14-22. I consider it appropriate to take into account the harsh conditions at the TSDC, as those conditions resulted directly from the charges before me, and there is no other practical forum in which to address this concern: see R. v. Jama, 2021 ONSC 4871 at para. 52.
88From January 8, 2024 to September 4, 2025, while serving his prior sentence, Mr. Crawford was subjected to lockdowns for most or all of the day on 59 days. He was subjected to lockdowns for part of the day on 4 more occasions. The reason given in each case was “staff shortage.”
89From September 4, 2024 to May 1, 2025, while awaiting trial on this matter and not subject to any prior sentence, Mr. Crawford was locked down for all or most of the day on 95 days. He was locked down for part of the day on 27 more occasions. The reason given in all cases was “staff shortage.”
90As the sentencing was adjourned in order for counsel to address the concerns raised by the Court, Mr. Crawford kept his own records of additional lockdowns, which he filed as an exhibit to a further affidavit. From May 1, 2025 to June 10, 2025, he recorded 14 lockdowns which lasted all day and 12 more lasting part of the day. I accept this evidence. The defence was not challenged on these representations and they are entirely consistent with the documented history of lockdowns provided by the institution for the many months preceding this time period.
91In total, of the 549 days Mr. Crawford spent at the Toronto South Detention Centre, he was locked down for most or all of the day on 168 days. He was locked down for part of the day on 43 more occasions. He was locked down for three or more consecutive days on nine separate occasions. And he was triple-bunked for 8 days.
92The conditions in Ontario’s remand centres have long been condemned by judges of this province. In 2020, Stribopoulos J. reviewed five years of jurisprudence touching on this issue in R. v. Asif, supra, at paras. 65-67:
65 Periodic lockdowns are somewhat unavoidable in any detention facility -- for example, those resulting from security incidents or where inclement weather causes an unexpected staff shortage. In recent years, the courts have repeatedly raised concerns about prisoners held in remand facilities in this province being subject to lockdown in their cells due to persistent staffing shortages. Lockdowns resulting from chronic understaffing are concerning because they are preventable.
66 The government must devote adequate resources to the operation of remand centres. It is required to ensure that the conditions in these facilities comport with those basic standards expected in a modern constitutional democracy like Canada. Anyone subject to incarceration is entitled to humane treatment, especially so in remand facilities where prisoners are mostly awaiting trial and are presumed to be innocent.
67 Judges have described the continued prevalence of this problem in increasingly alarming terms. They have characterized the situation as "shocking": R. v. Oksem, 2019 ONSC 6283, at para. 28; "unacceptable": R. v. Sanchez, 2019 ONSC 5272, at para. 53; R. v. Elmi, 2017 ONCJ 830, at para. 38; a form of "degradation": R. v. Charley, 2019 ONSC 6490, at para. 67; "close to unconscionable": R. v. Nguyen, 2017 ONCJ 442, at para. 39; "regressive": R. v. Nsiah, 2017 ONSC 769, at para. 19; contrary to "minimum standards established by the United Nations": R. v. Inniss, 2017 ONSC 2779, at para. 38; "inexcusable": R. v. Hussain-Marca, 2017 ONSC 4033, at para. 43; and "oppressive": R. v. Doyle, 2015 ONCJ 492, at para. 53.
68 Recently, after a careful survey of the many judicial pronouncements calling out this problem, Schreck J. concluded that its persistence, despite repeated condemnation by the judiciary, compels the inescapable conclusion that these "inhumane conditions" are "a form of deliberate state misconduct": R. v. Persad, 2020 ONSC 188, at para. 34.
93The evidence in this case suggests no meaningful progress has been made since then. In fact, all of the stated reasons for the lockdowns in this case were “staff shortage.”
94A number of decisions which have been released over the last five years also show that nothing has changed: see, for example, R. v. Brown, 2020 ONCA 196 at paras. 6-12; R. v. Baldwin, 2021 ONSC 7025 at paras. 62-74; R. v. Jama, supra, at paras. 51-53; R. v. Clarke-Brown, 2021 ONCJ 378, at paras. 41-50; R. v. Lee, 2021 ONSC 7672 at paras. 50-51; R. v. Kalongo, 2022 ONSC 3891 at paras. 77-84; R. v. Hassan, 2023 ONSC 5040 at paras. 25-30 & 45-48; R. v. Raja, 2024 ONCJ 456 at paras. 55-63; R. v. Gorgievski, 2024 ONSC 5899 at paras. 31-35; R. v. Shaikh, 2024 ONSC 774 at paras. 16-31; R. v. Pintyi, 2025 ONSC 3371 at paras. 53-56.
95As a practical matter, this makes no sense. If the government of Ontario seeks to protect the public through the use of incarceration and pre-trial detention, it undermines its own objectives by failing to properly staff and maintain its jails. Substandard conditions in pre-trial detention are routinely reducing the sentences offenders receive, exposing the public to increased risk of re-offence.
96Beyond any utilitarian concern, however, the state has a moral imperative to care for its citizens, even those accused of crimes.
97I gave the Crown the opportunity to call evidence to explain what has long been an unacceptable state of affairs. No evidence was presented. It is abundantly clear by now that the state has failed, through mismanagement or simple lack of funding, to fulfill its fundamental obligations to prisoners who are detained in the remand facilities of Ontario.
98In R. v. Marshall, supra, at paras. 51-52, the Court of Appeal emphasized that Duncan credit is a mitigating factor on sentence and need not take the form of a specific deduction in terms of days or months. The Court confirmed there is no error in apportioning a specific deduction, so long as it does not take on unwarranted significance and skew the calculation of the ultimate sentence: see, also, R. v. Ramjoolie, 2020 ONCA 791 at paras. 63-65.
99I have chosen to identify a specific reduction in sentence for the deplorable conditions in pre-trial detention, in order that the public see clearly why the sentence is shorter than it should be and understand why it is so: see R. v. Sheikh, supra, at paras. 21-31. I will reduce the sentence I would otherwise have imposed by 6 months.
100To all of the judicial condemnations that have come before, I would add my own: the state of remand facilities in Ontario, specifically the Toronto South Detention Centre, is unworthy of us as a society and diminishes all the people of this province.
Conclusion
101I accept the invitation of the Crown and defence to disregard the facts relating to the drug offences. Essentially they jointly withdraw their request that I consider these facts pursuant to s. 725(1)(b.1).
102In that circumstance I find that a fit and proper sentence in this case would have been a global sentence of 7.5 years in jail. In order to account for particularly harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody, I will reduce the sentence I impose by 6 months and impose a sentence of 7 years. This is not a deduction for pre-sentence custody, but rather the result of my consideration of a mitigating factor on sentence that I have chosen to quantify, pursuant to R. v. Duncan, supra.
103The sentence will be subject to a formal reduction for time spent in pre-sentence custody. I will note 309 days on the record in connection with count 1. Credit will be given at the rate of 1.5 to 1 for 464 days, pursuant to R. v. Summers, supra.
104The resulting sentence is 5 years, and 9 months as of today, concurrent on each of the robbery charges set out in counts 1 and 8. I will impose sentences of 1 year on each of the charges of wearing a disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence contained in counts 2 and 9, concurrent to each other, and concurrent to the sentence for the robberies.
105The victim surcharge will be waived, given the lengthy period of time Mr. Crawford has spent in custody and will spend serving his sentence. There will be a DNA order in connection with the two primary designated offences of robbery. There will be a s. 109 weapons prohibition for life.
Released: July 17, 2025
Signed: Justice Peter N. Fraser
1My review of the recording of the guilty plea proceeding revealed that the Crown had inverted the drug amounts when reading the facts into the record. The agreed statement of facts refers to 22.82 grams of fentanyl, 29.53 grams of powder cocaine and 8.88 grams of crack cocaine. The Crown read in the following: “Just under 9 grams of fentanyl, just under 23 grams of powder cocaine and just under 30 grams of crack cocaine.” I did not detect this variance until the later stages of these proceedings. When I raised this with counsel on July 3, 2025, the Crown advised that I should proceed on the basis of what was read out in court.
2The cases provided by counsel included R. v. Johnson, 2015 ONSC 80 and R. v. Greene, 2024 ONSC 5155. I do not believe these cases stand for the proposition that offences considered under this section should be treated in a categorically more lenient way than if they had been the subject of a guilty plea. I reviewed other cases dealing with s. 725(1)(b.1) but, ultimately, I was not able to discern a clear methodology through which to consider these offences: see, R. v. Edwards, 2001 ONCA 24105; R. v. Howlett, 2002 ONCA 45068; R. v. Barrett, 2012 ONSC 82; R. v. Cedros, 2007 ONCJ 556.
3The Crown later withdrew the CDSA information, which was also before me, after sentence had been imposed on the Criminal Code charges.
4These words have frequently, and perhaps wrongly, been attributed to the nineteenth-century Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky. The apocryphal nature of the quotation itself changes nothing. For, in my respectful view, the power of the statement derives not from its provenance, but from the self-evident truth it expresses.