Court File and Parties

CITATION: R. v. T.S., 2017 ONSC 7605

COURT FILE NO.: CR-14-8188

DATE: 20171220

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

T.S.

Defendant

COUNSEL:

Robert Scott and Jeanaha Kim, for the Crown

John Fitzmaurice and Phil Campbell, for the Defendant

HEARD: October 30 and 31, 2017

RULING RE: ADMISSIBILITY OF T.S.’S STATEMENT TO POLICE

DI LUCA J.:

[1] This is a voluntariness voir dire where the Crown seeks an admissibility ruling in relation to a statement given by T.S. to police on November 10, 2014.

[2] T.S. is charged with one count of first degree murder and six counts of attempt murder. The allegations stem from a fire that occurred at T.S.’s family home on October 6, 2014. The alleged victim of the murder charge is T.S.’s adoptive mother, S.T., who died approximately one month after the fire. The alleged victims of the attempt murder charges are T.S.’s wife, K.S., and his five children.

[3] T.S. interacted with a number of police officers prior to the subject statement. While the Crown seeks a ruling only in relation to the statement given on November 10, 2014, the earlier interactions and interviews with police were tendered into evidence as they form part of the narrative and series of events that culminated with the November 10 statement.

Summary of Evidence

[4] At approximately 3:00 a.m. on October 6, 2014, police and fire services attended a call at a home located in Oak Ridges. T.S. was found lying next to S.T. in the sunroom at the back of the home. He had been seriously injured in the fire and was quickly transported to hospital. His initial interactions at the scene were with Constable Sparks, whose evidence was tendered by way of an Agreed Statement of Facts. Cst. Sparks had no meaningful interaction with T.S., other than accompanying him from the scene to hospital. While he made efforts to determine his identity, he did not ask T.S. any questions about the fire, his injuries or what happened at the home.

[5] That same day, at approximately 5:17 p.m., T.S. was visited at Sunnybrook Hospital by Constables Ross and Kettles, members of the Forensic Identification Unit of the York Regional Police. They obtained the clothes worn by T.S. as well as swabs from and photographs of his hands. When dealing with T.S., Cst. Ross explained the process and purpose of taking the swabs and photographs but he did not ask T.S. any questions about the fire or his involvement. T.S. was not a suspect at the time. That said, the police did not ask for his consent to take the swabs and photographs even though this was a step they took with T.S.’s wife, whom they had dealt with earlier. Cst. Ross could not recall any particulars of what was said by T.S., though he recalled that an interpreter was present. Cst. Kettles could not recall the presence of an interpreter and indicated that T.S. appeared to understand what was explained to him in English.

[6] The following day, October 7, 2014, T.S. was interviewed on video by two police officers, Detective Constable Gill and Detective Constable Wright. The officers were assisted by a Tamil speaking interpreter. This interview took place at the hospital and is captured on video. In the video, T.S. is seen in a hospital bed with an IV hooked up to his arm. He is in obvious pain and appears to be medicated and very drowsy.

[7] T.S. was not under arrest at this time, though he was viewed as a suspect. Cst. Gill’s plan was to attempt to obtain a cautioned statement from T.S.

[8] At the outset of the interview, following introductions, T.S. is cautioned that he is being investigated for a criminal offence. He is advised of his right to counsel. T.S. appears to understand that he has the right to speak to a lawyer and replies “I can’t do it now. I will do it later.” Cst. Gill indicates “it’s really important that we talk to you sooner than later” and then asks T.S. again whether he wishes to speak to a lawyer “now.” T.S. replies “I’m in pain. My hands – I have numbness in the hands. I can’t talk now, can talk later.” Cst. Gill reiterates that it is very important that they talk “sooner than later.”

[9] T.S. is then put in contact with his counsel, Mr. Fortini. Following the call with counsel, the interview continues. Cst. Gill attempts a number of techniques to get T.S. to engage in discussion, including:

a) He indicates that while he is a police officer, he comes from a background where he might understand the culture a bit – which in context is a reference to T.S.’s culture and background.

b) He suggests that as a father of five T.S. is doing his best to take care of his immediate and extended family and he understands how this could cause some disputes.

c) When T.S. indicates that his legs are in pain, Cst. Gill urges him to “do his best to talk” to him.

d) He advises T.S. that people have been hurt as a result of what happened in the home. He asks T.S. to explain how he was hurt.

e) He asks T.S. whether he cares about what happened to his children and whether he wants to know what happened to them.

f) He indicates to him “This is your opportunity to clear things up. Maybe it was an accident” and further “T., this is your last chance if you have any questions for me before I leave.”

[10] Towards the latter part of his interview, Cst. Wright also asks, “T., I want to ask you an important question, did you mean to hurt those people? Yes or no?”

[11] During this latter part of the interview, T.S. repeatedly indicates that he is unable to answer and unable to continue. He is slow and very soft spoken in his responses. He appears dazed and tired and it appears that he eventually falls asleep or at least shuts his eyes and stops responding. No admissions are made during this statement.

[12] A few days later on October 12, 2014, at approximately 10:22 p.m., Cst. Gill returns to Sunnybrook Hospital to arrest T.S. for seven counts of attempt murder as well as arson, uttering threats and two counts of fail to comply with probation. He is accompanied by Det. Wilcox and an interpreter. This attendance is captured on audio but not video tape. At the outset of this meeting, Cst. Gill re-introduces himself and asks T.S. if he remembers him from “the other day.” It appears that T.S. is not responding and Cst. Gill indicates words to the effect “You have to talk to me T., I am the police officer from the other day.” He then arrests T.S. and advises him of his right to counsel. T.S. indicates that he wishes to speak to counsel but not at that time preferring to wait one or two hours. Following the recital of the rights to counsel, T.S. is read a standard primary and secondary caution. Cst. Gill then summarizes the charges, the right to counsel and the caution and then says “So T., do you want to tell me anything at this time? T., this is going to be your last chance, do you want to tell me anything at this time?”

[13] T.S.’s voice can barely be heard on the audio. He sounds like he is groggy or sleepy. Indeed, Cst. Gill implores him more than once to reply audibly and to respond to the questions that are being asked.

[14] In cross-examination, Cst. Gill maintained that his purpose was not to get a statement from T.S. despite telling him that it was his last chance. He also indicated that if T.S. had started talking he would have stopped him. Lastly, he indicated that T.S.’s indication that he wished to speak to a lawyer in “one or two hours” was effectively an indication that he did not wish speak to a lawyer at that time and that as a result, he would have been free to ask questions of T.S.

[15] Cst. Gill ends this attendance by indicating that he was going to take steps to have T.S. put in touch with his counsel Mr. Fortini. In the days following, Cst. Gill takes steps to contact Mr. Fortini to advise of the charges against T.S. and to assist in making arrangements for Mr. Fortini to have contact with T.S.

[16] On November 10, 2014, Cst. Gill and Cst. Kastoun attend St. John’s Rehabilitation Hospital where T.S. had been transferred following his stay at Sunnybrook Hospital. The purpose of their attendance is to re-arrest T.S. in relation to the charge of first degree murder as by this date S.T. has succumbed to her injuries. They also want to obtain a statement from T.S. This statement lasts approximately 1 and ½ hours and is captured on video. Cst. Kastoun conducts the interview but Cst. Gill remains in the room.

[17] T.S. is lying down in a hospital bed. He is handcuffed to a rail on the bed. The officers, who are wearing suits, stand by his bedside and there is an interpreter present. T.S. appears more awake and responsive than he did in the earlier video and audiotaped interactions. His voice is clear and audible and he does not appear to be confused. That said, the officers did not get a medical update from hospital staff prior to the interview in order to determine what T.S.’s current medical condition was or what types of medications he was on.

[18] At the outset of this interview, T.S. is advised that S.T. has died and that one charge of attempt murder is now being upgraded to first degree murder. He is given his right to counsel and he is provided with a secondary caution advising him that if he has spoken to any police officer or anyone in authority it should not influence him making any statement. T.S. confirms his understanding of the secondary caution. As part of the standard caution, T.S. was asked if he wished to say anything in response to the charges. While Cst. Kastoun agreed that this was an invitation to provide a statement prior to consultation with counsel, he denied any intention to do so prior to contact with counsel.

[19] Cst. Kastoun took no other steps to repair anything that might have happened during the earlier interview and arrest by Cst. Gill. On his evidence, he was not aware of anything that had been an issue in terms of admissibility. He also denied that the reason he didn’t say anything further was to “preserve continuity” between Cst. Gill’s earlier efforts and the present interview.

[20] T.S. was then placed in contact with his counsel, Mr. Fortini. Following T.S.’s consultation with counsel, Cst. Kastoun starts the interview by telling T.S. that he does not want to ask him about the fire as he already knows what happened with the fire. He then tells T.S. that he does not judge him for what he has done and indicates that everyone has circumstances that cause them to do things.

[21] Cst. Kastoun tells T.S. that he wants T.S. to judge him not based on his prior experiences with other police officers but as an individual. He asks some questions aimed at assessing the nature of the familial relation between T.S. and the deceased. When T.S. indicates that he does not want to speak, Cst. Kastoun re-iterates that he is not there to talk about the fire as he already knows about it. He tells him this to “put his mind at ease.” He then indicates that “we’re going to have a relationship as this goes on” and “we’re gonna see each other more often.” He re-iterates for a third time that he is not there to find out about what happened with the fire.

[22] Moments later, he directly asks T.S. “what happened at house?” He tells T.S. he doesn’t need to answer but that as a matter of fairness the question needs to be asked. He tells T.S. that they have spoken with a number of witnesses including his daughter and wife. He shows T.S. a number of photos taken as part of the police investigation and he plays certain excerpts from K.S.’s statement to police. Cst. Kastoun summarizes K.S.’s statement and notes “So it’s a powerful statement. So K. says that you were upset that her family was there. And then – that you set the house and them on fire.”

[23] At this point, T.S. makes what the Crown submits are inculpatory admissions. He says, “This is why I don’t know exactly what happened.” He repeats this lack of recollection a number of times, following which Cst. Kastoun mentions that the police have also spoken to T.S.’s young son, P. and his young daughter, S. T.S. then states, “These things are – you are telling that these things happened but I – I don’t – I cannot remember.” Cst. Kastoun then states, “So you’re not telling me that you didn’t do this, you’re telling me that you don’t know why you did this.” T.S. replies in the affirmative, “I – I don’t know why I did this. Why – why – what made – what made it to do it. I don’t – I cannot – I don’t know why – why I did this.”

[24] Cst. Kastoun asks where the gas came from and T.S. explains that the he keeps gas for the lawnmower in the shed behind the house. He adds, “If it is gas then most probably I would’ve taken from there.” This portion of the interview ends with T.S. indicating, “I myself don’t – I don’t know why I did it after you are accusing me.”

[25] Shortly after these admissions, T.S. asks the police to stop the interview. He reasserts his right to silence. In response to further questions regarding his involvement, he continues to assert that he does not know why he did what he is being accused of and also doesn’t remember certain events.

[26] T.S. then signals that he is no longer prepared to speak. He states “So I’m telling the Officer kindly…this is the maximum I can tell.” What follows after this point is a series of assertions by T.S. indicating that he will not answer any further questions. The interview continues briefly, but no further admissions are made by T.S.

Legal Principles

[27] The common law confession rule seeks to balance two competing but important interests. First, the rule seeks to avoid the risk of miscarriage of justice related to the use of false or unreliable confessions. It does so by recognizing that people, including innocent people, may have any number of reasons why they confess to an offence: see R. v. Hart, 2014 SCC 52 at paras. 6-8. Second, the rule seeks to ensure that the societal interest in the effective investigation of crime is met: see R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38 at para. 33. In this regard, the rule recognizes that the police are free to use a permissible degree of persuasion in an effort to convince an accused person to speak.

[28] The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly confirmed that a confession will not be admissible if it is made in circumstances that leave a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness. The onus of proving voluntariness rests with Crown beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused is not obligated to call any evidence and the presence of a reasonable doubt on voluntariness renders the statement inadmissible.

[29] The analysis is contextual and there are no hard and fast rules as to what will render a statement involuntary. In assessing whether a statement is voluntary, the relevant factors include threats, promises, or other improper inducements, oppression, the lack of an operating mind and police trickery. The totality of the circumstances must be considered including the particularities of the accused.

[30] In R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, the Supreme Court noted that the confessions rule encompasses the right to silence, meaning the right of the accused person to make a meaningful choice about whether or not to speak to the police. The focus of the assessment is on the conduct of the police and its effect on the accused’s choice. The test is objective but the accused’s individual characteristics are a relevant consideration. Police persistence in the face of repeated assertions of the right to silence may give rise to real concerns about the voluntariness of a statement.

[31] The right to silence does not extend to a right not to be spoken to by authorities, nor does the right to silence prohibit questions. Indeed, police persuasion which falls short of denying the accused the right to choose whether to speak does not breach the right to silence.

[32] In R. v. Fernandes, 2016 ONCA 722 at paras. 33 and 34, The Court of Appeal for Ontario offered the following guidance on the concept of “oppression” in the voluntariness context:

A statement of an accused will be rendered involuntary and inadmissible where the conduct of a police officer or the circumstances of the detention are so oppressive as to raise a doubt whether the accused was able to make an independent choice to speak to the police or remain silent: Lederman, Bryant and Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 4th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis, 2014), at para. 8.63.

Examples of oppressive conditions include situations where the detainee is deprived of food, clothing, sleep, or medical attention. Excessively aggressive, intimidating questioning by the police for a prolonged period of time may also constitute oppression: Oickle, at paras. 59 to 62, R. v. Hoilett 1999 CanLII 3740 (ON CA), [1999], 121 O.A.C. 391 (C.A.), at paras. 25-26.

[33] In R. v. Brown, 2015 ONSC 3305, Fairburn J. (as she then was) discussed the concept of “inducement” and noted the following at paras. 93-96:

In the end, and of critical importance, the law allows police officers to offer inducements. Indeed, the jurisprudence has long recognized the importance of the police doing so in pursuit of solving crime. The voluntariness doctrine is not to be applied in a way that precludes this important investigative technique. As noted in Oickle, “[f]ew suspects will spontaneously confess to a crime”: at para. 57.

The police are not required to be mute in an interview, waiting for an accused to extemporaneously decide to say something. To the contrary, the police are permitted to encourage, persuade and convince a suspect to speak. They can even try to persuade a suspect that it would be in his or her interests to confess. Indeed, in Oickle, Iacobucci J. commented on the fact that in the “vast majority of cases, the police will have to somehow convince the suspect that it is in his or her best interests to confess”: Oickle, at para. 57. In applying a contextual approach, it is important to remember that the police can speak in an accusatorial and persistent manner: R. v. N.L., [2009] O.J. No. 1902, 87 W.C.B. (2d) 277 (S.C.J.), at para. 30 [N.L.]; Oickle, at paras. 2, 57; R. v. Godday, 2013 ONSC 1298, at para. 53.

What the police cannot do is offer inducements, either through the form of threats or promises, that are “strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of the subject has been overborne”: Oickle, at para. 57. See also: Spencer, at paras. 17, 19. This is often referred to as the quid pro quo.

Analysis and Findings

[34] The Crown argues that T.S.’s statement on November 10, 2014 is clearly voluntary. T.S. had an operating mind in that he knew what he was saying to police and also knew that it could be used against him. He had the assistance of an interpreter and was able to communicate in his own language. He had been cautioned on more than one occasion and he had also spoken with his counsel of choice. He was offered no inducements nor was he threatened. The manner, tone and style of police questioning did not create an atmosphere of oppression. Lastly, as is apparent from the latter portion of the statement, he was aware of and indeed exercised his right to silence.

[35] Taken together, and even when viewed in the context of the October 7, 2014 statement and the recording of the arrest and caution on October 12, 2014, the Crown argues that it has met the high threshold of proof required for admissibility.

[36] The defence argues that the Crown has fallen far short of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. The defence argues that T.S.’s will, particularly his desire to remain silent, was overborne by the persistence and content of the police questioning. The defence highlights that T.S. was in a position of vulnerability handcuffed to a hospital bed, he had learned the futility of resistance from his earlier encounters with police and he attempted every method possible of asserting his right to silence These methods included invoking the right to silence, asking the officers to speak with counsel, turning his back, asking for hospital security and adopting an “attitude of prayer.” Counsel argues that T.S.’s claimed lack of memory or knowledge of certain matters was in effect nothing more than a further manifestation of his desire to remain silent.

[37] In terms of oppression, the defence argues that the police repeatedly used language that would persuade anyone to conclude that he or she was required to speak. The language also suggested that there would be no relief from the questioning no matter how unwelcome or aggressive it may be. The language and questions combined to create a “climate of compulsion” that effectively rendered T.S. powerless to resist.

[38] The defence also argues that the police persistence in questioning T.S. despite his repeated assertions of the right to silence, is indicative of the involuntariness of his responses. Similarly, the defence argues that the subtle techniques of deception adopted in combination with the also subtle undermining of the advice that may have been given by counsel further cast doubt on the voluntariness of the statement.

[39] Lastly the defence argues that the November 10, 2014 statement is tainted by the effects of the earlier statement on October 7, 2014 and the arrest and caution on October 12, 2014. The defence points to the absence of clear language that serves to break the “continuity” between these interactions. As well, the defence notes the constant presence of Cst. Gill.

[40] The defence also alleges that the police violated T.S.’s s.10(b) rights when they asked him questions following his assertion of a desire to speak to counsel. While counsel has not, at this time, sought s.24(2) Charter relief, he argues that the s.10(b) violation is an additional factor to consider in assessing the nature of the police conduct within the voluntariness voir dire.

[41] Despite Mr. Campbell’s very able submissions, I am satisfied that the Crown has proven the voluntariness of T.S.’s November 10, 2014 statement beyond a reasonable doubt. I base this conclusion on the following:

a) I am satisfied that the conduct of Cst. Kastoun and Cst. Gill in the November 14, 2014 statement did not create a “climate of compulsion.” The police are permitted to use techniques to persuade accused persons to talk. They are not required to be mere passive interviewers and note takers. As the case law suggests, there is a line between permissible persuasion and conduct that effectively overrides a person’s free will. In this case, I find that the police did not cross that line. The interview is not very lengthy, lasting approximately one and a half hours. While T.S. is handcuffed in a hospital bed, he is lucid and responsive, in contrast to how he appears in the October 7, 2014 video. The tone and style of the questioning is professional and assertive but not aggressive or hostile. The use of “rapport building” techniques including comments suggesting that T.S. will be seeing a lot of Cst. Kastoun as the investigation progresses, does not in my view convey a “resistance is futile” sentiment sufficient to raise voluntariness concerns. The police are permitted to speak to an accused on multiple occasions. There may be a case where the repeated attempts to speak to an accused raise concerns about the voluntariness of the ultimate statement, but in my view, this is not one of those cases.

b) I agree with the defence that elements of the “Reid Technique” are employed in the interview, particularly the suggestion by Cst. Kastoun that he knows what has happened with the fire and is not interested in asking about it. However, that technique is quickly abandoned and Cst. Kastoun “cuts to the chase” and asks T.S. about happened on the night in question. Similarly, the suggestion that T.S. is “not a monster” but rather good person and a good father who “made a mistake” was not used to any great effect. While I accept that the Reid Technique has been criticised in cases where its use has been shown to have overridden the accused’s free will, I am satisfied that the use of elements of that technique in this case did not override T.S.’s will. I find that the techniques used were permissible techniques of persuasion that did not cross the line into oppression or inducement.

c) Importantly, this is not an interview where the accused person steadfastly exerts his will to remain silent and then by the end of the interview relents and answers police questions. In this case, T.S. initially tells police that he wishes to speak to counsel. He is given the primary caution and asked whether he has anything to say in response to the charges and he is asked whether he understands the caution. He responds “I will speak to my lawyer I’ll ask – I’ll answer those questions.” Following a consultation with counsel, T.S. is confronted with excerpts of his wife’s statement wherein she describes her version of events regarding the evening of the fire. He is also told that the police have spoken to some of his children who have revealed that T.S. does not like his wife’s family and that he and his wife argue. Lastly, T.S. is told that his daughter has indicated that he threw “oil” on people, threatened to kill kids and then lit something on fire and threw it. At this point in the interview, T.S. made certain admissions. However, he shortly thereafter, at approximately page 33 and following, of the transcript, asserts that he is not going to answer any further questions and in fact does not. During part of this colloquy, T.S. states “I was listening to you….I was able to answer all the questions so… far, but now I’m not in a position to go ahead.” He then invites Cst. Kastoun to speak to his lawyer, indicates that he wishes hospital security brought to the room, and repeatedly tells the officers to leave. He answers no further questions and the interview ends. In my view, this is not demonstrative of an interview where the accused’s will was overborne by police techniques. Rather it demonstrates that T.S. decided to answer some questions and then nothing further. Indeed this is exactly what he says when he states “So I’m telling the Officer kindly…this is the maximum I can tell.”

d) I do not find that the November 10, 2014 statement was tainted by what happened in the earlier encounters on October 7 and October 12, 2014. I do not find that the police effectively positioned the November 10, 2014 interview as a continuation of the earlier interactions. On this issue, I note that the October 7, 2014 interview did not progress very far. T.S. clearly appears medicated and it appears that he falls asleep during the interview. I also note that the October 12, 2014 interaction was not a formal interview. It was not video recorded and no attempt was made to conduct a formal interview. I accept that the police may well have been hoping to get a statement on that occasion, but nothing ultimately happened. While Cst. Gill was present and took the lead on October 7 and 14, 2014, the November 10, 2014 interview was conducted by Cst. Kastoun. A secondary caution was read to T.S. and Cst. Kastoun also tried to build a personal rapport by asking T.S. to judge him alone and not on the basis of prior involvement with police. While I find that the implicit message may have been that the police could and would continue to come see T.S. as the investigation progressed, I do not find, nor do I have a reasonable doubt, that this implicit message resulted in his will being overborne. I do not find, nor do I have a reasonable doubt, that the police offered a quid pro quo.

e) Lastly, T.S. was placed in contact with counsel of choice. On the evidence before me, arrangements were made in advance of the November 10, 2014 statement to have defence counsel available for a consultation. I accept that there appears to be a breach of s. 10(b) on both November 10, 2014 and October 12, 2014 to the extent that the reading of the standard police caution which contains an invitation to make a statement was done after T.S. indicated a desire to speak to counsel but before he had a chance to do so. However, I am not satisfied that this breach impacts the voluntariness analysis in any fashion. In neither instance, did T.S. answer any questions before consulting with counsel.

Prejudicial Effect versus Probative Value

[42] The defence also argued that if the statement was found to be voluntary, it should nonetheless be excluded because its prejudicial effect far outweighs its probative value. In this regard the defence argues that the majority of the statement is an attempt by T.S. to exercise his right to remain silent and as such it has no probative value whatsoever. It is also prejudicial in that it leaves the impression that he is being evasive despite the fact that he is well within his rights to resort to silence. Moreover, the defence argues that the purportedly inculpatory references in the statement cannot properly be seen as inculpatory. Rather, they are the manifestations of the right to silence and desire to stop the police questioning.

[43] In my view, on its face the statement contains an admission of involvement in starting the fire along with an explanation for where the gasoline that may have been used in the fire came from. I agree with the defence that these admissions are not crystal clear and there is an argument that T.S. is merely responding to and adopting the accusations that were levelled against him. That will be for the jury to determine. The jury will also be able to assess his repeated assertions of “I don’t remember” in view of his admissions of involvement. The statement is clearly and significantly probative of the issues at trial.

[44] I agree that there is some potential for prejudice in two regards. First, portions of the statement can be seen as an attempt to invoke the right to silence, which has no evidentiary value against the accused. The prejudice in this regard can be cured with proper instructions relating to the right to silence. Further, while the jury may find that many of the comments were assertions of the right to silence, not all of them were. To give an example, the jury may well find that the assertions of “I don’t remember” which were argued before me as alternate attempts to invoke the right to silence, could be either expressions of actual absence or perhaps feigned absence of memory.

[45] The second area for potential prejudice relates to the long monologues in the latter part of the statement around the point in time when T.S. stops answering questions. The monologues are not evidence and they include pleas to emotions and sympathy and other techniques used by police to encourage detainees to speak. In submissions, the defence argued that the statement could not be edited because the editing would remove context. In my view, the statement can be edited to minimize any potential prejudice that might relate to the monologues and emotive techniques that did not result in any response from T.S.

[46] When I balance the probative value against the prejudicial effect, I am satisfied that the statement should not be excluded. Should the defence feel that any edits or redactions are appropriate, I am prepared to hear further submissions on the issue.

Conclusion

[47] I am satisfied that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement is voluntary. As well, I find that its probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. It can be received in evidence.

Di Luca J.

Released: December 20, 2017

CITATION: R. v. T.S., 2017 ONSC 7605

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

T.S.

Defendant

RULING RE: ADMISSIBILITY T.S.’s statement to police

Di Luca J.

Released: December 20, 2017