15 total
Withdrawn offer still supported elevated costs against the insurer.
This was a costs decision following a jury verdict in an insurance coverage dispute arising from a commercial fire loss.
The plaintiff recovered the balance of an endorsement after the insurer denied liability despite an alleged promise to pay if a code-compliant structure was rebuilt.
The court held that full indemnity costs were not justified on the misconduct record, but gave elevated weight to indemnity, the insurer's serious misconduct, and a reasonable withdrawn offer to settle under Rule 49.13.
Costs were fixed at $200,000 plus HST and $50,000 in disbursements, and prejudgment interest was awarded at an averaged 2.15% rate over the ten-year period.
Bank's motion to set aside dismissal for delay denied after 17-month litigation inaction.
The plaintiff bank brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.
The action, commenced in 2018 under simplified procedure rules, had not progressed past the exchange of productions after nearly eight years.
The court applied the four-factor test from Piedrahita v. Costin, finding that while the motion was brought promptly and the defendant suffered no actual prejudice from the delay, the plaintiff failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for abandoning litigation steps for 17 months in favour of settlement discussions, and did not establish inadvertence.
The court held that the values of timeliness and efficiency outweighed the absence of prejudice, and dismissed the motion.
Default judgment granted against consenting defendant without binding co-defendant's rights.
The moving party brought a motion for default judgment against all defendants except one who had defended the action.
A co-defendant objected to judgment against one of the undefended defendants on the basis that it might conflict with findings made in a related family law proceeding, where the trial judge had rejected the existence of an unregistered mortgage in favour of the plaintiff.
The court found that the consenting defendant's failure to defend and consent to judgment was operative against him personally, and that it did not bind the defending co-defendant.
Judgment was granted against the consenting defendant without prejudice to the defending defendant's right to crossclaim, move to stay enforcement, or oppose recognition of the debt in any bankruptcy proceeding.
The court granted a stay of an order requiring the removal of property encroachments pending appeal.
The respondents sought to confirm the south boundary of their land and remove alleged encroachments placed by the moving parties, including a fence, hound building, and cement pad.
The trial judge found in favour of the respondents after a 13-day trial, confirming the boundary and ordering removal of the encroachments within 120 days, along with nominal damages of $2,000.
The moving parties appealed and sought a stay of the judgment pending appeal.
The motion judge granted the stay, finding that while the appeal was weak on factual grounds, the balance of convenience favoured staying the order to preserve the status quo on the rural property pending the appeal.
Defendants breached the Occupiers' Liability Act by applying ineffective pure salt to an icy sidewalk.
A personal injury claim arising from a slip and fall on January 3, 2019 on the premises of St. Lawrence College of Applied Arts and Technology in Cornwall, Ontario.
The plaintiff suffered a significant fracture injury when he slipped on a sidewalk leading to a medical office building.
Damages were agreed; the trial concerned liability only.
The defendants were the College and its winter snow and ice removal contractor.
The court found that the defendants breached their duty of care under the Occupiers Liability Act by using pure salt on sidewalks in extremely cold temperatures (-10°C or colder) when salt is chemically ineffective, and by failing to use sand or ice melt as required by contract or recommended by best practices.
The court found the defendants liable and found no contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part.
Applicant's injuries found to be predominantly minor; removal from Minor Injury Guideline denied.
The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.
The respondent denied benefits on the basis that the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).
The applicant argued she suffered psychological injuries and a concussion, which would warrant removal from the MIG.
The Tribunal found insufficient evidence linking the applicant's psychological complaints to the accident, noting they were attributed to family and work stress.
The Tribunal also found the medical evidence did not support a concussion diagnosis.
Consequently, the Tribunal held the applicant's injuries were predominantly minor and she was not entitled to the disputed treatment plan or interest.
The court dismissed a motion to compel defence medical examinations due to the defendants' unexplained delay and failure to seek an extension for late expert reports.
The defendants in a motor vehicle accident case brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend three defence medical examinations, months before a scheduled jury trial.
The plaintiff opposed, citing the defendants' non-compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure and a consent order that set a deadline for expert reports, which the defendants missed.
The court dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable explanation for the defendants' significant delays in arranging the examinations and bringing the motion.
The court emphasized that compelling attendance for examinations whose resulting reports would be presumptively inadmissible at trial, due to the missed deadlines and lack of a motion to extend time for service, was contrary to principles of efficiency and proportionality.
The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to strike a jury notice, finding no grounds to grant leave or override the defendants' vested right to a jury trial.
The plaintiff brought a motion to strike a jury notice and sought leave to bring the motion after the action had been set down for trial.
The court denied leave, finding no evidentiary basis to explain the significant delay in bringing the motion.
Furthermore, even if leave had been granted, the court would not have struck the jury notice.
The defendants had served the jury notice prior to January 1, 2020, thereby preserving their substantive legal right to a civil jury trial under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 76, despite the action originally proceeding under simplified procedure.
The plaintiff's arguments regarding proportionality, efficiency, and judicial resources were deemed insufficient to override this vested right.
Application for accident benefits dismissed due to non-compliance with information requests and expired limitation period.
The applicant sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) and physiotherapy following a motor vehicle accident.
The respondent denied the benefits, arguing the applicant failed to provide requested employment and medical documents.
The Tribunal found the applicant did not comply with section 33 requests for information without a reasonable explanation, disentitling him to IRBs.
Furthermore, the applicant failed to provide objective medical evidence demonstrating a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of his pre-accident employment.
The claim for physiotherapy was dismissed as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period.
The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial due to the trial judge's lack of legal analysis and unsupported factual findings.
The appellants appealed a trial judgment that awarded damages and other relief to the respondents in a land development dispute.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons lacked sufficient analysis for various causes of action, including fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and duty of honest performance.
The appellate court also identified factual findings that were not supported by the evidence, particularly concerning drainage responsibilities.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal noted problematic judicial conduct during the trial, including an ill-advised bifurcation of the trial and comments that suggested a lack of impartiality.
The appeal was allowed, the judgment below was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.
Plaintiff's motion to amend claim granted and insurer's motion to strike coverage declarations dismissed.
The plaintiff moved to amend the statement of claim, and the defendant insurer moved under Rule 21 to strike out a portion of the claim seeking declarations regarding insurance coverage.
The defendant argued that adjudicating coverage issues in the main action was premature and contrary to the Insurance Act.
Relying on a recent decision of the same court, the judge granted the plaintiff's motion to amend and dismissed the defendant's motion to strike.
Action dismissed as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01; request for vexatious litigant declaration denied.
The defendants requisitioned the dismissal of the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiff, a lawyer, had commenced multiple proceedings attempting to re-litigate issues from a prior action where he was removed as counsel of record.
The court found the statement of claim to be an impermissible collateral attack and an abuse of process, dismissing the action.
However, the court declined the defendants' request for declaratory relief to bar the plaintiff from future litigation, noting such an order requires a formal application under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.
No costs were awarded.
A correcting charge was sufficient to address a juror's independent internet research during deliberations.
The appellants, Ronald Patterson and his family, appealed the dismissal of their motions to strike the jury and declare a mistrial in a motor vehicle personal injury action.
During jury deliberations, a juror accessed extrinsic information (Fault Determination Rules) online and shared it.
The trial judge conducted an inquiry, issued a correcting charge, and dismissed the motions.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge properly inquired into the extrinsic information and effectively addressed its prejudicial effect with a correcting charge, which the jury was presumed to have followed.
The court found no misapprehension of evidence or patent unreasonableness in the trial judge's decision.
A child protection agency's motion for summary judgment was dismissed because expert evidence is not always required to prove institutional negligence.
The plaintiff, Stefan Darcy Vernon, sued North Eastern Ontario Family and Children’s Services (NEOFCS) for negligence, alleging failure to investigate and protect him from abuse by his father.
NEOFCS moved for summary dismissal, arguing that the plaintiff failed to provide an expert report on the applicable standard of care for a child protection agency.
The court found NEOFCS's expert report inadmissible due to improper submission.
The court determined that expert evidence was not necessarily required for the plaintiff's claim of institutional negligence under the Child and Family Services Act, nor for allegations of egregious professional negligence that might fall under established exceptions.
Consequently, the court found a genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the motion for summary judgment with costs to the plaintiff.
The court dismissed a motion to stay proceedings in favour of arbitration, finding the arbitration clauses ambiguous and the plaintiffs' allegations of a fraudulent scheme outside their scope.
The defendants brought a motion to stay the plaintiffs' proceeding in favour of arbitration, citing arbitration clauses in enrollment and license agreements.
The court dismissed the motion, finding the arbitration clauses ambiguous and contradictory with exclusive jurisdiction clauses.
The court also determined that the individual defendants and the Canadian Association of Correactology were not parties to the arbitration agreements.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs' allegations of a fraudulent scheme, misrepresentation, and breaches of the Arthur Wishart Act and Private Career Colleges Act fell outside the scope of the arbitration clauses and raised serious public policy concerns regarding the legality of the defendants' business, making a stay inappropriate and a partial stay unreasonable due to intertwined issues.