Alexandra Laurel White

The City of Pickering brought a motion requesting partial approval of Official Plan Amendment No. 38 (OPA 38), which facilitates redevelopment and intensification along the Kingston Road Corridor.

Several site-specific appeals had been filed against OPA 38.

Based on uncontroverted expert planning evidence, the Tribunal found that the unappealed portions of OPA 38 are consistent with the Provincial Planning Statement and conform to the Growth Plan and Regional Official Plan.

The Tribunal granted the motion and approved OPA 38 in part, noting that this partial approval would not prejudice the remaining site-specific appeals.

The appellant insurer appealed a judgment declaring a life insurance policy valid, arguing fraudulent misrepresentation by the insured regarding a criminal conviction.

The policy had been in force for over five years, triggering an incontestability clause under the Insurance Act, requiring the insurer to prove fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal and motion to admit fresh evidence.

While acknowledging the application judge erred in disregarding admissions of the conviction, the Court found this error did not alter the ultimate conclusion that the insurer failed to prove the misrepresentation was made with the intent required for civil fraud (knowledge or recklessness), concluding it was likely due to mistake or negligence.

The defendant, Desjardins Global Asset Management Inc., brought a motion to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, to stay the action on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The court found that it had jurisdiction over Desjardins due to its physical presence and business operations in Ontario, distinguishing it from cases requiring a "real and substantial connection" analysis.

Regarding forum non conveniens, the court determined that Quebec was not "clearly more appropriate" than Ontario, as both forums were equally capable and convenient.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant property owner appealed a summary judgment order finding it liable for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit after the respondent remediation company cleaned up a 20,000-litre canola oil spill on its property.

The appellant argued it received no direct benefit and that the respondent had no expectation of payment from it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant received a negative benefit by avoiding a potential remediation order from the Ministry of the Environment, and that the services were requested by an officer and director of the appellant.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that its claim for breach of contract was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the claim was discoverable when the appellant received an arborist report detailing the respondent's substandard work.

Because the action was commenced more than two years after the receipt of the report, the appeal was dismissed.

The defendant sought leave to amend its statement of defence to assert adverse possession and add a counterclaim claiming ownership of disputed land.

The plaintiff argued the amendment constituted withdrawal of an admission because the original defence relied on acquiescence, which would defeat an adverse possession claim.

The court held that the original pleading did not clearly amount to an admission but assumed it might and applied the test for withdrawal of admissions.

The proposed amendment raised a triable issue, the defendant provided a reasonable explanation based on newly discovered aerial photographs supporting historical possession, and no non-compensable prejudice was established.

Leave to amend the pleading and assert the counterclaim was granted.

The plaintiff appealed a decision setting aside a Master's order that allowed her to add an independent contractor and a truck driver as defendants after the expiry of the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plaintiff failed to act diligently after learning of the independent contractor's involvement and did not provide a reasonable explanation for the delay under section 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court varied the costs order to reflect the proposed defendants' success on the motion.

The self-represented plaintiffs abandoned their motion for leave to appeal an order.

The defendants sought costs for the abandoned motion.

The court affirmed the defendants' presumptive entitlement to costs but reduced the quantum claimed, disallowing time spent on legal research and avoiding duplication of time between counsel.

Costs were fixed at $1,492.50.

The nine-year-old applicant child, a Crown ward, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board for release from a secure treatment program.

The child had been admitted on an emergency basis due to severe behavioural outbursts.

The Board found that the child did not have a mental disorder as defined by the Child and Family Services Act, and that his actions were not a result of a mental disorder.

The Board concluded that the criteria for emergency admission under subsection 124(2) of the Act were not met and ordered the child's release.

The applicant child applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board for release from a secure treatment program, arguing the criteria for emergency admission under the Child and Family Services Act were not met.

At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant withdrew the application.

The applicant explained that her mother, who had provided surety for her in a separate criminal matter, threatened to withdraw the surety if the applicant was released from the treatment centre, which would result in the applicant returning to custody.

The child applicant sought an order releasing her from a secure treatment program.

She had been admitted on an emergency basis following escalating parent-child conflict and aggressive behaviour.

The Board reviewed the admission summary and found that the child did not have a mental disorder as defined by the Child and Family Services Act, as her condition did not grossly impair her capacity to make reasoned judgments.

The application was granted and the child's release was ordered.