Karin M. Pagé

This appeal concerns the application of Ontario's anti-SLAPP provision, s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, in a defamation action arising from negative online reviews posted by a client against contractors.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the public interest in the expression outweighed the harm.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by unduly focusing on SLAPP hallmarks, failing to adequately consider reputational harm, and not qualitatively assessing the value of the respondent's vitriolic expression.

The Court conducted a fresh analysis, concluding that the significant harm to the appellants' professional reputations outweighed the minimal public interest in the malicious and scurrilous statements, reinstating the defamation action.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defamation action against him.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that partial summary judgment was inappropriate because the issues were intertwined with claims against other defendants and a trial was already scheduled.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that partial summary judgment could lead to inconsistent findings and would not achieve a proportionate, cost-effective, and timely dispute resolution given the upcoming trial.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action brought by the plaintiffs, a home renovation contractor and his wife.

The action arose from a Reddit post by the defendant calling the plaintiffs 'fraudsters' and 'scammers' after a contract dispute.

The court found the expression related to a matter of public interest.

Although the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiffs failed to show they suffered any financial harm, as their YouTube business was thriving and their renovation business had closed before the post.

The court concluded the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression outweighed the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue, and dismissed the action.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision dismissing an anti-SLAPP motion.

The appellants (B'nai Brith Canada et al.) sought to dismiss a defamation action brought by the respondent (Canadian Union of Postal Workers - CUPW) under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The defamation action arose from press releases published by B'nai Brith alleging CUPW supported terrorism and was anti-Semitic due to its association with a Palestinian union.

The motion judge found CUPW had a substantial case for defamation and that the appellants' defences (justification, fair comment, responsible communication) had serious flaws, and that the public interest favoured allowing the action to proceed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no reviewable error in the application of the anti-SLAPP test, including the assessment of the appellants' defences and the public interest balancing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action initiated by the plaintiff union.

The defendants contended the action was an illegitimate attempt to suppress freedom of expression on a matter of public interest.

The court found that while the litigation had some elements of SLAPP, it was not the type of action the legislature intended to stop at a preliminary stage.

The defamation action appeared to have substantial merit, and the defendants' pleaded defences were not certain to succeed.

The court was not persuaded that the plaintiff's principal objective was to stifle criticism.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss was denied.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff mortgagee's action for negligent distribution of insurance proceeds, arguing the claim was barred by a one-year limitation period in the policy and that the plaintiff suffered no damages.

The defendant alternatively sought to transfer the proceeding from Ottawa to Kingston.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the insurer's conduct created a separate cause of action subject to the discoverability rule and whether the plaintiff suffered damages due to loss of control over the proceeds.

The court also dismissed the transfer motion, as the defendant failed to show Kingston was a significantly better venue.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its defamation action following a Rule 21 motion.

The motion judge had held that the appellant's notices did not comply with s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act because they failed to sufficiently specify the matters complained of.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the notices clearly specified the statements and inferences from the internet broadcast and newspaper article, and were sufficiently specific to allow the respondents to know the essence of the complaint and decide how to respond.

The defendants brought a Rule 21 motion seeking determination of questions of law in a defamation action arising from a television broadcast and newspaper article alleging the plaintiff union supported a terrorist organization.

The defendants argued the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient notice under s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act and also challenged the legal capacity of an unincorporated trade union to sue in defamation.

The court held that the written notices provided by the plaintiff did not sufficiently specify the matter complained of as required by the statute, despite the plaintiff later identifying specific impugned words in the statement of claim.

Because proper notice is a mandatory precondition to bringing a libel action, the failure constituted a complete bar to the proceeding.

The court further commented that the legal capacity of trade unions to sue in defamation remains unsettled but declined to determine that issue on a Rule 21 motion.