Tycho Manson

The Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) sued Quebecor Media Inc., Sun Media Corporation, TVA Group Inc., Jerry Agar, and Avi Benlolo for defamation.

The claim arose from statements published in print and broadcast media in 2014, alleging that CUPW and its members were terrorist sympathizers and supported Hamas, following a demonstration where CUPW flags were seen near a Hamas flag.

The court addressed CUPW's standing as an unincorporated association to sue for defamation, finding it had standing.

The court then examined the defamatory meaning of the impugned statements and the defendants' defences of truth, fair comment, responsible communication, and statutory privilege.

The court found that the defendants successfully established the defence of fair comment, as their opinions were honestly held and based on a sufficient factual substratum, and also discharged their duty of responsible communication and statutory privilege.

The action was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, Mastronardi Produce Limited (MPL), sued the defendant, Rainbow Acres Inc. (RAI), for $516,686.40 for unpaid seeds and packaging materials.

RAI conceded the principal debt but argued it was largely statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and disputed the 18% interest rate.

The court found that MPL successfully rebutted the presumption of discoverability, determining the claim was not discoverable until 2014 due to the nature of the long-standing commercial relationship and ongoing payment efforts.

The court also found that the debt constituted a running account, and RAI's partial payments and signed acknowledgements reset the limitation period.

However, the court declined to apply the 18% contractual interest rate, finding no implied agreement, and instead awarded pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the default rates prescribed by the Courts of Justice Act.

Following a previous endorsement, the defendant submitted a bill of costs seeking an additional $4,919.11.

The court declined to award the additional costs, noting that while the plaintiff failed to advance the matter for five years, the defendant also sat idle.

The court maintained its previous minimal costs order to avoid encouraging defendants to sit idle during litigation.

The plaintiff commenced a defamation action against his brother in 2015.

Apart from the exchange of pleadings, no steps were taken for over five years.

At a status hearing, the plaintiff argued the delay was justified by overlapping family estate litigation, his mother's instructions to wait, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court rejected these explanations, finding no evidence of efforts to advance or settle the matter, and inferred the plaintiff had intended to abandon the action until the defendant commenced a separate defamation suit in 2020.

The action was dismissed for delay.

In a defamation action arising from a book alleging the plaintiff engaged in workplace sexual harassment, the defendants brought a motion to anonymize the non-party complainant who made the allegations.

The complainant was summoned as a witness for an upcoming Anti-SLAPP motion and feared reputational harm and privacy violations if identified.

Applying the Sierra Club test, the court granted the motion, finding that the complainant's privacy interests were high and the salutary effects of the order outweighed any deleterious effects on the open court principle.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its defamation action following a Rule 21 motion.

The motion judge had held that the appellant's notices did not comply with s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act because they failed to sufficiently specify the matters complained of.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the notices clearly specified the statements and inferences from the internet broadcast and newspaper article, and were sufficiently specific to allow the respondents to know the essence of the complaint and decide how to respond.

In a defamation action arising from a newspaper article, the plaintiff brought a motion seeking multiple forms of interlocutory relief, including an order requiring verbal negotiation of a discovery plan, written examinations for discovery, production records regarding access to a related statement of claim, removal of the allegedly defamatory article from a website, a further and better affidavit of documents, and amendments to pleadings.

The court held it lacked jurisdiction to compel verbal negotiations and confirmed that parties may choose written communications regarding discovery planning.

The court also declined to interfere with the defendants’ right to conduct oral discovery and found no evidence supporting further documentary production.

Applying the heightened test for interlocutory injunctions in defamation matters, the court concluded the words complained of were not obviously defamatory and the pleaded defences were not clearly bound to fail.

The motion was largely dismissed, with only consent amendments to the plaintiff’s reply permitted.

The defendants brought a Rule 21 motion seeking determination of questions of law in a defamation action arising from a television broadcast and newspaper article alleging the plaintiff union supported a terrorist organization.

The defendants argued the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient notice under s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act and also challenged the legal capacity of an unincorporated trade union to sue in defamation.

The court held that the written notices provided by the plaintiff did not sufficiently specify the matter complained of as required by the statute, despite the plaintiff later identifying specific impugned words in the statement of claim.

Because proper notice is a mandatory precondition to bringing a libel action, the failure constituted a complete bar to the proceeding.

The court further commented that the legal capacity of trade unions to sue in defamation remains unsettled but declined to determine that issue on a Rule 21 motion.

The applicant sought judicial review of an order by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the Ministry of the Attorney General to disclose records provided under the Casino Rama Revenue Agreement.

The applicant argued the records contained commercial information and their disclosure would cause harm.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's finding that the records related to the administration of funds, not commercial operations, and that the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence of expected harm.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.