Patrick Joseph Kraemer

The applicants, who purchased a residential property, sought declaratory relief against the City of Cambridge after the City denied municipal services, asserting the property's transfer violated the Planning Act due to a 1950 by-law.

This by-law deemed the original plan of subdivision not to be a registered plan for subdivision control purposes and was registered in the Registry office but not noted on the Land Titles parcel register after conversion.

The court found that the applicants were entitled to rely on the Land Titles register's "mirror" and "curtain" principles, as the 1950 by-law directly affected title and thus constituted an encumbrance requiring registration on the Land Titles register to be effective against bona fide purchasers without actual notice.

Furthermore, the by-law, as a "claim" under the Registry Act, had expired due to the City's failure to register a notice of claim within the statutory period.

The City's "floodgates" argument was rejected.

The application for declaratory relief was granted, affirming the validity of the applicants' title and transfer.

The Court of Appeal heard two appeals: a dependant support appeal and a costs appeal.

The dependant support appeal concerned whether the deceased had a "settled intention" to treat a non-biological child as his own for the purpose of dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The application judge dismissed the dependant support claim, partly due to the mother's failure to disclose the child's true parentage.

The costs appeal challenged a substantial indemnity costs award against the mother and grandmother, which the application judge based on a finding of a "false narrative." The Court of Appeal dismissed the dependant support appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the deceased's knowledge of parentage was a relevant factor in determining "settled intention" given the short relationship.

However, the Court allowed the costs appeal, finding no basis for the "false narrative" conclusion or egregious conduct, and substituted the costs award with partial indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking their claim against an individual respondent, Linda Ross, for piercing the corporate veil and oppression remedy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the piercing the corporate veil claim, finding no direct link between the alleged wrongful conduct and the liabilities.

However, it found that the allegations of value stripping by Ms. Ross, knowing of corporate liabilities, arguably supported a claim under the oppression remedy, as it constituted unlawful corporate manoeuvres against which creditors could not protect themselves.

The appeal was allowed in part, granting leave to amend the statement of claim for the oppression remedy.

The plaintiffs sued for breach of a non-residential lease.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 to stay proceedings based on an arbitration clause and to strike claims against the individual defendant, Linda Ross, for interference with contractual relations and oppression under the Business Corporations Act.

The plaintiffs cross-moved for a discovery plan.

The court dismissed the motion to stay, interpreting the arbitration clause as applying only to rent for extended terms, not collection of unpaid rent.

The court struck the claim for interference with contractual relations against Linda Ross based on the Said v. Butt doctrine.

The court also struck the oppression remedy claim and personal liability claim against Linda Ross, finding that the pleadings did not establish a basis for piercing the corporate veil or an actionable tort beyond a breach of contract by the corporation.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for a discovery plan was granted.

The defendants (Filips) brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiffs (Ross and Campbell) for $617,209.59.

The Filips argued that the plaintiffs failed to make full and frank disclosure on damages in their ex parte motion for default judgment and that their previous counsel's significant personal and professional issues constituted a plausible excuse for their default.

The court found that the plaintiffs indeed failed to disclose material facts (a lower appraisal report) on damages, which alone was sufficient to set aside the judgment under Rule 39.01(6).

Additionally, applying the five-factor test from Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, the court found the Filips' explanation for default plausible, an arguable defence on the merits (both liability and damages), and that setting aside the judgment served the interests of justice, despite the Filips' prior fraudulent conveyance attempt.

The default judgment was set aside, and a schedule for the action was ordered.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application in contested estate proceedings challenging the validity of powers of attorney executed by their mother in 2013.

The appellants sought to invalidate the 2013 powers of attorney and reinstate 1995 powers of attorney.

The central issue was whether the testator had the requisite capacity to execute the 2013 powers of attorney.

The application judge found that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of capacity with clear evidence on a balance of probabilities.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence or exercise of discretion.

The applicant sought costs following a successful motion compelling the respondent to produce outstanding financial undertakings, answers under advisement, refused questions, and a business valuation.

The respondent argued for no costs due to mixed results.

The court found the applicant largely successful, as the ordered productions would likely fulfill her needs, and deemed the respondent's failure to provide financial production unreasonable.

The court awarded the applicant full costs of $14,138.74, payable within 30 days, finding her counsel's bill reasonable given the complexity and the respondent's unreasonable conduct.

Rodica Leu and Jonel Joca, married for 24 years, brought competing motions concerning the equalization of net family property following their divorce.

Key disputes involved the treatment of two loans from the husband's parents (one for the matrimonial home, one for a taxi licence) and the valuation of the husband's taxi licence.

The court granted the wife's motion for summary judgment, declining to rule on the enforceability of the matrimonial home loan but directing funds into court for future determination.

The taxi licence loan was assigned zero value due to the expiration of the limitation period.

The court accepted the expert's valuation of the taxi licence at $171,119 and dismissed the husband's arguments for notional disposition costs.

Ultimately, the husband was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $4,022.55 to the wife, along with $30,000 in costs.

The appellant appealed from orders made over ten years prior determining equalization, child support, and spousal support in a family law proceeding.

The appellant had failed to appear at trial in 2007 and at a subsequent motion to set aside the trial order in 2008.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence demonstrating the appellant's serious mental health issues, including PTSD and major depressive disorder, which rendered her incapable of attending the proceedings.

The court found that the appellant's absence was excused and that procedural fairness required setting aside the trial and motion orders.

The court ordered a new trial to determine the issues of equalization and support, set aside a garnishment order, and required the respondent to return garnished funds with interest.

The respondent moved to delist an appeal pending the outcome of outstanding matters in the Superior Court.

The Court of Appeal considered whether it should exercise its discretion to delist the appeal or allow it to proceed as scheduled.

The court determined that the appeal court was the appropriate forum to address the fundamental issue on appeal regarding whether an order made in the absence of the appellant should stand.

The motion was dismissed and the appeal was permitted to proceed as scheduled.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis.