Patrick Joseph Kraemer

The moving party municipality sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) that allowed the responding party's appeal and directed a zoning by-law amendment to permit an agricultural accessory building.

The municipality argued the OMB erred in law by failing to dismiss the appeal without a hearing, improperly invalidating official plan designations, and misapplying provincial policy statements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's decision was narrow, fact-specific, and did not raise questions of law of sufficient general or public importance to merit appellate review.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce a final family law order for child support, section 7 expenses, and costs by garnishing the respondent's Retirement Life Income Fund (RLIF).

The court held that under section 66(4) of the Pension Benefits Act, the amount subject to execution for support orders is limited to 50% of the money payable to the respondent in a given year.

The court ordered the respondent to elect the maximum annual withdrawal from his RLIF and direct 50% of the net amount to the applicant until the arrears and $30,000 in fixed costs are satisfied.

The applicant's request for an advance order on future section 7 expenses was dismissed.

The appellant municipality appealed a Superior Court decision that rescinded a remedial order issued against the respondent property owner for violating a property standards by-law regarding external lighting.

The appeal judge had found the order overly broad and the by-law impermissibly retrospective.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the by-law was prospective in requiring future compliance and clearly intended to affect vested rights.

The Court also found the remedial order was not overly broad, though it amended the wording slightly to conform to the by-law by adding the word 'likely'.

The remedial order was reinstated as amended.

The parties separated shortly after the respondent's employment was terminated.

He received a severance package that included common law damages and Employment Standards Act (ESA) severance.

The trial judge held that the ESA severance portion had fully accrued before the marriage and was therefore property owned by the respondent on the date of marriage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the wife's appeal on this issue, holding that an employee has no right or entitlement to ESA severance until their employment is terminated without notice.

Therefore, the uncrystallized ESA severance was not property owned by the respondent on the date of marriage.

The appeal was dismissed on all other grounds relating to business valuation, household items, and imputed income.