Thomas Arbogast

The Crown appealed after the British Columbia Court of Appeal set aside a second degree murder conviction, holding that hearsay testimony from the accused's brother regarding an overheard phone call in which the accused admitted to killing the victim was inadmissible.

The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge did not err in admitting the brother's testimony as a party admission: the evidence was capable of non-speculative meaning and thus relevant, it fell within the party admission exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule, and the trial judge did not err in the discretionary balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The Court also held there was no error in the trial judge's answer to the jury's mid-deliberation question regarding the definition of bodily harm.

The dissenters agreed with the majority's analytical framework but concluded that, on the facts, assessing the relevance of the overheard statements was an exercise in pure speculation and the evidence should not have been admitted.

The applicants, members of the Blueberry River First Nations Band Council, sought a mandatory order requiring the resumption of twice-monthly regular Council meetings and compelling the Chief Operating Officer to process a petition for the removal of the Chief under the Band's Custom Code.

Governance had been deadlocked due to internal disputes.

The Federal Court found that the Custom Code clearly required regular meetings and that the right belonged to the Band members.

The Court ordered the resumption of regular meetings and directed the Chief Operating Officer to carry out her administrative functions regarding the removal petition, emphasizing that compliance with the Custom Code and previous court orders is mandatory.

The appellant was convicted of five carjackings, with direct evidence linking him to one incident and similar fact evidence linking him to four others.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two grounds relating to the trial judge's jury charge on similar fact evidence, arguing the judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess such evidence and group membership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the charge faithfully followed the two-step process established in R. v. Perrier and was sufficient to ensure the jury did not improperly use group activity to identify the appellant without specific linkage to the individual acts.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder involving two women killed in similar circumstances.

The trial judge admitted similar fact evidence and DNA evidence from hair samples the appellant had voluntarily provided during the investigation of the first murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury should have been instructed to apply the criminal standard of proof to the similar fact evidence, and that the use of his hair samples in the second investigation violated his Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a jury may consider similar fact evidence if they conclude on a balance of probabilities that the same person committed the acts, and that the unconditional consent to provide hair samples extinguished any expectation of privacy.