Claire L'Heureux-Dubé

Two Indian bands, the Wewaykum (Campbell River) and Wewaikai (Cape Mudge), claimed each other's reserve lands, alleging the federal Crown breached its fiduciary duty during the reserve creation process in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Both bands sought declarations and equitable compensation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Crown fulfilled its fiduciary obligations by acting with loyalty, good faith, and ordinary prudence.

The Court found that both bands had historically acknowledged the other's entitlement to their respective reserves, making equitable relief inappropriate due to laches and acquiescence.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that the bands' claims were statute-barred by the applicable limitation periods.

The appellant requested access to personal information held by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

CSIS refused to disclose the information, claiming exemptions under the Privacy Act for national security and foreign confidences.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 51 of the Privacy Act, which mandates in camera and ex parte hearings when these exemptions are claimed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory ex parte provision did not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

However, the mandatory in camera provision violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1 because it was overly broad.

The Court read down s. 51(2)(a) to apply only to the ex parte submissions.

On a cross-appeal, the Court held that the law enforcement exemption in s. 22(1)(b) is not limited to current investigations.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At his trial, the Crown cross-examined him extensively on incriminating statements he had made while testifying at his brother's separate trial for the same murder, where he had invoked section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the cross-examination violated section 13 of the Charter because there was a realistic danger that the prior testimony could be used to incriminate him, not merely to test his credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent was dismissed from his employment after his daughter and wife accused his employer (who was his brother-in-law) of sexual abuse.

The respondent filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of marital and family status.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enumerated grounds of marital and family status in the Ontario Human Rights Code are broad enough to encompass discrimination based on the particular identity of a complainant's spouse or family member.

The Court found that the respondent was arbitrarily disadvantaged based on stereotypical assumptions about his familial affiliations, constituting prohibited discrimination.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant lent the respondent money to purchase a condominium, secured by a hypothec.

The respondent defaulted, and the appellant sought to take the property in payment.

Under art. 2778 of the Civil Code of Québec, a creditor must obtain court authorization to take property in payment if the debtor has discharged one-half or more of the obligation secured by the hypothec.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 'obligation secured by the hypothec' includes both capital and interest.

Because the respondent had paid more than half of the combined capital and interest, the appellant was required to obtain judicial authorization.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents, staff lawyers with the federal Department of Justice, sued the federal Crown for breach of contract regarding salary disparities.

During discovery, the government claimed Cabinet confidentiality over certain documents under s. 39 of the Canada Evidence Act, including some previously listed as producible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 39 provides absolute protection once information is validly certified by the Clerk of the Privy Council, and the common law concept of waiver does not apply.

The Court also upheld the constitutionality of s. 39, finding it does not impermissibly infringe on the core jurisdiction of superior courts or unwritten constitutional principles.

The appellant was tried by a jury for attempted murder.

The jury intended to return a guilty verdict, but due to the foreman's stuttering or coughing, the trial judge and others heard 'not guilty'.

The verdict was recorded as not guilty, and the jury and accused were discharged.

Shortly after, a court officer discovered the error.

The trial judge reconvened the jury over the next few days and eventually changed the recorded verdict to guilty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a trial judge has a narrow post-discharge jurisdiction to correct a verdict if it does not require the jury to reconsider its decision, this jurisdiction is lost if there is a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Given the jury's extensive dispersal and potential exposure to media, a reasonable apprehension of bias existed.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants claimed that lands set aside for the Ross River Band in the Yukon Territory constituted a reserve under the Indian Act, entitling them to a tax exemption.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that no reserve was legally created because there was no intention to create a reserve on the part of Crown agents with the authority to bind the Crown.

The Court found that while lands were set aside for the band's use, the statutory framework and royal prerogative require both an act of setting apart and a clear intention to create a reserve, which was absent in this case.

The respondent filed complaints with the Commissioner of Official Languages regarding language rights violations.

During the investigation, witnesses were promised confidentiality.

The respondent later requested access to the personal information in the investigation files under the Privacy Act.

The Commissioner refused to disclose certain interview notes, relying on the exemption in s. 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act for information that could reasonably be expected to be injurious to lawful investigations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the exemption can apply to concluded investigations to protect future ones, the Commissioner failed to establish a reasonable expectation of injury in this specific case.

The Court ordered the disclosure of the personal information but denied access to non-personal information.

The appellant broadcaster sought injunctive relief against parties assisting Canadian residents to subscribe to and decode U.S. direct-to-home satellite programming.

The appeal turned on whether s. 9(1)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act imposed a blanket prohibition on decoding encrypted subscription programming signals unless authorized by a lawful distributor in Canada, or only prohibited decoding of signals from licensed Canadian distributors.

Applying the modern contextual approach to statutory interpretation, the Court held the provision unambiguously creates an absolute prohibition with a limited exception and aligns with the broader broadcasting and copyright regime.

The Court refused to answer the stated Charter questions because the record did not support constitutional adjudication.

The appellants, Air Ontario pilots, brought an action against the respondents, Air Canada pilots, for breach of contract based on the union constitution after the respondents refused to implement an arbitration award integrating their seniority lists.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the historical legal fiction of a web of contracts between individual union members is no longer necessary or practical.

Instead, the Court recognized that a trade union is a legal entity capable of entering into a contract of membership with each individual member, and therefore, union members cannot be held personally liable to one another for breaching the union constitution.

The respondent artist authorized the reproduction of his paintings on paper posters.

The appellant art galleries purchased these posters and used a chemical process to transfer the ink from the paper onto canvas, which they then sold.

The artist obtained a seizure before judgment of the canvas-backed reproductions, claiming copyright infringement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the transfer process did not constitute a 'reproduction' under section 3(1) of the Copyright Act, as no new copies were created.

The Court distinguished between economic rights and moral rights, finding that the artist was improperly asserting a moral right in the guise of an economic right to justify the seizure.

The appellant was rendered a quadriplegic in a motor vehicle accident when the impaired driver failed to negotiate a sharp curve on a rural road.

The trial judge apportioned 35% liability to the municipality for failing to post a warning sign.

The Court of Appeal overturned this finding.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, holding that the trial judge's finding of negligence was a question of mixed fact and law that should not be overturned absent a palpable and overriding error.

The Court clarified the standards of review for questions of law, fact, and mixed fact and law.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder after shooting a criminal accomplice in the back of the head.

He claimed self-defence, testifying that he believed the victim and another accomplice were planning to kill him.

The trial judge left the defence to the jury but made errors in the charge.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the defence of self-defence lacked an 'air of reality' because there was no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that the accused reasonably believed he had no alternative but to kill the victim.

Therefore, the defence should not have been left to the jury, and the errors in the charge were harmless.

The parties entered into a joint venture for a golf course and residential development.

They reached a prior oral agreement regarding the dimensions of the land subject to a development option.

The appellant fraudulently drafted the written contract to reflect a much smaller parcel of land, and the respondent signed it without reading the specific clause.

When the respondent discovered the error, he sought rectification of the contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial judge's decision to grant rectification, finding that the respondent's lack of due diligence in reading the contract was not a bar to equitable relief, particularly given the appellant's fraud.

However, the Court declined to restore the trial judge's award of punitive damages, concluding that the substantial compensatory damages awarded were sufficient to achieve the goals of retribution, deterrence, and denunciation.

The appellant was injured after falling on a municipal sidewalk and successfully sued the municipality for gross negligence at trial, despite failing to provide written notice within the required seven days.

The trial judge found she was physically and mentally incapable of complying due to hospitalization and medication.

The Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'unsound mind' in s. 47 of the Limitations Act includes a lack of mental capacity from any source to perform the requisite steps.

The Court found the Court of Appeal wrongly interfered with the trial judge's factual findings, which did not amount to a palpable and overriding error.

The appellant was severely injured in a car accident and treated by the respondent orthopaedic surgeon.

The respondent failed to diagnose a spinal fracture, leading to delayed immobilization, and the appellant was eventually diagnosed with paraparesis.

The trial judge found no fault and no causation.

The Court of Appeal found the respondent committed a fault by failing to conduct proper neurological tests and immobilize the patient, but upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the accident itself, not the medical fault, caused the paraparesis.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the Court of Appeal's intervention on the standard of care and its factual findings on causation, and declined to apply a presumption of causation.

The New Brunswick legislature enacted Bill 7, which abolished the system of supernumerary judges and replaced it with a panel of retired judges paid on a per diem basis.

The respondents, who were supernumerary judges, challenged the constitutionality of the legislation, arguing it violated the guarantees of judicial independence under s. 11(d) of the Charter and the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislation was unconstitutional because it violated the institutional dimension of financial security by eliminating an economic benefit without referring the matter to an independent, effective, and objective commission.

The Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for six months but allowed the respondents to benefit from it immediately.

The respondents' claim for damages was dismissed as there was no evidence of bad faith by the government.

The parents of a child born with Down syndrome sued the mother's doctor for failing to advise her of testing that would have revealed the condition.

The trial judge awarded damages for the child's care up to age 19, plus an $80,000 contingency for adult care, finding that the state would cover adult group home costs.

The Court of Appeal increased the award, holding that post-trial amendments to the Family Relations Act made the parents legally responsible for adult care.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the doctor's appeal and restored the trial judgment, concluding that the child would withdraw from the parents' charge upon entering a group home, meaning the statutory support obligation would not apply and the state would bear the costs.

During a lawful strike and lockout, the union engaged in secondary picketing at retail outlets and other locations.

The employer obtained an interlocutory injunction prohibiting picketing at secondary locations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that secondary picketing is generally lawful unless it involves tortious or criminal conduct.

The Court rejected the 'illegal per se' doctrine, finding that the wrongful action model best balances the interests of free expression under section 2(b) of the Charter with the protection of third parties from undue economic harm.

The appeal was dismissed.