Richard C. C. Peck

In this criminal appeal, the accused challenged a perjury conviction arising from testimony given at an inquest following a conducted-energy-weapon incident at an airport.

The accused argued unreasonable verdict, misapprehension of evidence, issue estoppel, and abuse of process, including the Crown’s pursuit of an alleged collusion theory.

The Court held that no reviewable factual error or misapprehension was established and upheld the conviction substantially for the provincial appellate reasons.

A dissenting justice would have ordered a new trial on the basis that the collusion finding was unreasonable and tainted other findings.

The accused appealed his perjury conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

A majority of the Court dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons given by the majority in the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial for substantially the reasons of the dissent below.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges of breach of trust, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to obstruct justice.

The appellant argued that the evidence from the preliminary inquiry only showed he attempted to assist a friend navigate the criminal justice system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the totality of the evidence, including intercepted communications and the appellant's use of his position to access court officials, was sufficient to justify the committal to stand trial.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to quash their committal for trial.

They argued the preliminary inquiry justice lost jurisdiction by refusing to allow them to call witnesses who had provided information relevant to judicial pre-authorizations, which they intended to use to establish Charter breaches.

The preliminary inquiry justice and the appeal judge treated the proposed witnesses as sub-affiants who could only be cross-examined with leave.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the witnesses were properly characterized as sub-affiants and that the refusal to allow their cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry did not impair the appellants' right to make full answer and defence.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of two unsavoury witnesses.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning, instructing the jury to look for confirmation of their testimony.

The appellants appealed, arguing the warning failed to instruct the jury that confirmatory evidence must be independent and material.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that while the warning was not a model to follow, the charge as a whole adequately conveyed the need for special scrutiny and the danger of convicting on unconfirmed evidence.

The Court also applied the curative proviso to an error in the trial judge's instructions on drawing inferences from proven facts.

The accused was convicted of four offences relating to the sexual abuse of a child and uttering a threat.

The trial judge re-opened the trial to hear fresh alibi evidence but ultimately confirmed the convictions.

The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions on the basis that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient to explain how he resolved contradictions in the complainant's evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, were functionally sufficient and explained the basis for the verdict.

The appellants appealed their extradition committals, arguing that section 32(1)(b) of the Extradition Act infringed section 7 of the Charter because it did not require evidence to be certified as available for trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals and remitted the matters to the extradition judges to be determined in accordance with the concurrent decision in United States of America v. Ferras, which upheld the constitutionality of the provisions.

The appellant fatally shot a trespasser who refused to leave his home.

At trial for second degree murder, the appellant claimed the shooting was accidental and that he intended to use his shotgun solely to intimidate the trespasser in defence of his property.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the underlying offence of careless use of a firearm had been made out and refused to instruct the jury on the defence of property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge erred by encroaching on the exclusive domain of the jury to decide whether an offence has been proven on the facts, and by failing to leave the defence of property to the jury.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a cult leader, was convicted of multiple sexual offences against teenage girls.

At trial, the judge admitted evidence of each count as similar fact evidence for the others, and restricted the defence from cross-examining one complainant on the absence of references to sexual abuse in her teenage diary.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the admission of the similar fact evidence, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, the Court held that the trial judge erred in restricting the cross-examination on the diary, as the complainant's privacy interest did not substantially outweigh the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered for the counts relating to that specific complainant, while the other convictions were upheld.

The respondents were convicted of manslaughter and aggravated assault following a drive-by shooting, based primarily on eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions, finding the trial judge's reasons inadequate for failing to sufficiently analyze the frailties of the identification evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the trial judge's reasons met the functional test set out in Sheppard, as they clearly explained the basis for accepting the identification evidence and permitted meaningful appellate review.

The appellant confessed to a murder to an undercover police officer.

The conversation was surreptitiously recorded pursuant to a judicial authorization.

At trial, the judge found the authorization invalid and excluded the tape and transcript under s. 24(2) of the Charter, but allowed the officer to testify about the conversation using the transcript to refresh his memory.

The officer's testimony was essentially a verbatim recitation of the transcript.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the officer's recitation of the transcript violated s. 8 of the Charter, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, as the confession was freely volunteered and the police acted in good faith.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after an elderly woman was robbed, hog-tied, and left to die of asphyxiation.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury by applying the 'beyond de minimis' standard of causation from Smithers rather than the 'substantial cause' standard from Harbottle.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Smithers standard applies to all homicide offences, including second degree murder, while the Harbottle standard applies only to first degree murder under s. 231(5) to determine if the accused's participation warrants the increased stigma and penalty.

The Court suggested that trial judges may express the Smithers standard positively as a 'significant contributing cause'.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated his right to freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the prohibition on possession of child pornography infringes s. 2(b), it is largely justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect children from harm.

However, the Court found the law overbroad in two peripheral applications: self-created expressive material held exclusively for personal use, and private recordings of lawful sexual activity created by or depicting the accused for private use.

The Court read in exceptions for these two categories and upheld the law, allowing the Crown's appeal and remitting the matter for trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The appellant was convicted of five counts of sexual assault.

During deliberations, the jury requested further instructions on the definition of reasonable doubt.

In his recharge, the trial judge instructed the jury that they must be unanimous in their doubt to give the benefit of that doubt to the accused.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this instruction was a clear error that tainted the earlier instructions on reasonable doubt, creating a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon after boarding a public transit train with a .22 calibre rifle wrapped in his jacket.

He argued that he concealed the rifle only to avoid alarming other passengers, and that a firearm is not a 'weapon' under the Criminal Code unless intended to be used as such.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a firearm is always a weapon under section 2 of the Criminal Code.

The Court further held that the mens rea for the offence of carrying a concealed weapon is established when the accused intentionally conceals an object they know to be a weapon.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm against a minor.

The central issue was the admissibility of a note written by the complainant 45 minutes after the incident and whether there was sufficient confirmatory evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the conviction.