Wendy L. Rubin

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting a victim during a physical altercation and immediately fleeing the scene.

At trial, the appellant conceded to manslaughter but claimed the shooting was accidental, lacking the intent for murder.

The Crown argued the appellant's immediate flight without hesitation indicated murderous intent.

The trial judge instructed the jury to be careful with the post-offence conduct evidence.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge should have given a 'no probative value' instruction regarding his flight.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the evidence of lack of hesitation was relevant to intent and the jury charge was adequate.

The Court further held that even if there was an error, it was harmless and saved by the curative proviso.

The appellant pleaded guilty to three offences, including two hybrid offences where the Crown elected to proceed summarily.

He received the maximum six-month sentence for each hybrid offence.

The appellant appealed, arguing the maximum sentence could only be imposed on the 'worst offender committing the worst offence'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that the 'worst offender, worst offence' principle no longer constrains the imposition of a maximum sentence where it is otherwise appropriate under the sentencing principles in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code, particularly proportionality.

The appellant was arrested for second degree murder and advised of his right to counsel.

During police interviews, he repeatedly asserted his right to silence, stating he did not want to talk.

The interviewing officer persisted in questioning him, and the appellant eventually made incriminating admissions.

The trial judge admitted the statements, finding them voluntary and not obtained in breach of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that police persistence in questioning a detainee who has asserted the right to silence does not automatically violate section 7, provided the statements remain voluntary and the detainee is not denied the freedom to choose whether to speak.

The accused was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit sexual assault and sentenced to imprisonment followed by probation.

The probation order required him to abstain from alcohol and drugs and to submit to bodily substance testing on demand to monitor compliance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while an abstention condition is authorized, sentencing judges have no statutory authority under the Criminal Code to compel the provision of bodily samples for enforcement purposes as part of a probation order.