Garth Barriere

The appellant Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial after the majority found the trial judge had misapprehended evidence by failing to address prior inconsistent statements made by the complainant to a friend shortly after the alleged sexual assault.

The Supreme Court restored the conviction, agreeing with the dissenting judge below that the trial judge's failure to specifically address those inconsistencies did not constitute a failure to consider or give effect to them.

The Court held that even if there was error, the inconsistencies were not sufficiently significant to have caused a miscarriage of justice, as the threshold for establishing a miscarriage of justice through misapprehension of evidence requires that the error could have affected the outcome.

The appellant was convicted under s. 145(3) of the Criminal Code for twice failing to present himself at the door of his residence when police attended to verify compliance with his bail curfew condition.

The central issue on appeal was whether the mens rea for the failure-to-comply offence is to be assessed on a subjective or objective standard.

The Court held unanimously that the Crown must establish subjective fault, requiring proof that the accused breached the bail condition knowingly or recklessly.

The Court further articulated that bail conditions must be imposed with restraint, tailored to the individual accused's risks, and subjected to rigorous review by all participants in the bail system.

Because the courts below applied an objective standard of fault, the convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered on the two counts of failing to attend at the door.

The appeal addressed whether retrospective application of expanded sexual-offender prohibition orders in s. 161(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code infringed the right to the lesser punishment under s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Court held both amendments constituted punishment and therefore limited s. 11(i) when applied to pre-amendment offences.

Under s. 1, retrospective application of the no-contact condition in s. 161(1)(c) was not justified, but retrospective application of the Internet prohibition in s. 161(1)(d) was justified.

The appeal was allowed in part and the order was varied accordingly.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a bestiality count arising from sexualized conduct involving an animal and a complainant.

The central issue was whether penetration is an essential element of bestiality under s. 160 of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that the term retained its established legal meaning requiring penetration, and found no clear legislative intent in the 1955 or 1988 amendments to expand the offence.

The Court emphasized that expanding criminal liability is a legislative function, not a judicial one.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding penetration is not required.