The appellant, Phillip Rodd, appealed a decision ordering the forfeiture of his firearms and a three-year weapons prohibition under s. 117.05(4) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the application judge’s findings on the basis of misapprehension of evidence, reliance on hearsay, and failure to consider the appellant’s circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the application judge properly considered all evidence, including hearsay, and applied the correct legal test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, D.K.S., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellate court found that the trial judge made material errors in assessing the complainant's evidence, specifically regarding a significant inconsistency in her testimony about the duration of the alleged touching, and misapprehended evidence from a defence witness regarding the complainant's time outside the building.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to apply proper care when assessing the appellant's credibility, given his language difficulties, and erroneously discounted his good character evidence.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended documentary evidence (Uber records, Google timeline, text messages) and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal found that the Uber and Google documents were inconsequential and did not constitute a misapprehension of evidence.

While the text messages did contradict the complainant's testimony regarding the exact time of the assault, the court found this error immaterial to the overall credibility of her narrative, especially given the strong credibility findings made by the trial judge.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant, Wojciech Kuleczka, appealed a Justice of the Peace's decision to impose a one-year weapons prohibition and forfeit seized firearms under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code.

The original decision was based on concerns about the appellant's mental stability, specifically detailed hallucinations he experienced, which led to high-risk police responses.

The appellant argued the Justice unreasonably inferred risk from his mental health history and misapprehended evidence from his doctors.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Justice's conclusion reasonable given the unexplained nature of the hallucinations and the potential for recurrence, which raised legitimate public safety concerns despite the appellant's lack of prior violence or misuse of firearms.

The accused, Wilton Williams, pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the quantity of fentanyl and cocaine, and numerous mitigating factors, such as the offender's lack of criminal record, youthfulness, remorse, significant rehabilitative efforts (obtaining welding qualifications), strong family support, and the impact of anti-Black racism on his life choices.

The court emphasized that deterrence and denunciation are primary objectives in fentanyl trafficking cases, but rehabilitation remains important, especially when social context evidence is presented.

The court found that a conditional sentence would be consistent with sentencing principles, promoting rehabilitation without endangering community safety, and would be more effective than institutional custody in ensuring the offender remains on a positive path.

The appellant, convicted of dangerous driving and arson, appealed only the arson conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding the cause of the fire, specifically in excluding the possibility that a cigarette accidentally caused it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court affirmed the trial judge's entitlement to accept or reject expert testimony and to conclude, based on the evidence, that the fire was intentionally set by the appellant.

The appellant, Preston Darnell Scott, appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence.

The Crown alleged he acted as the getaway driver in a home invasion.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's inference of knowledge regarding the co-accused's masks and the sufficiency of reasons, as well as the fitness of the six-and-a-half-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's inference of knowledge was reasonable despite an "unfortunate" choice of words, and that the reasons were sufficient.

The court allowed the sentence appeal only to grant credit for pre-sentence custody, reducing the sentence by 23 days.

The appellant, a teacher assistant, was convicted of assault for grabbing a seven-year-old boy by the throat.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding video timestamps and erred in rejecting the defence of corrective force under s. 43 of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the timestamp evidence was not properly authenticated as real evidence, and even if it were, it did not render the verdict unreasonable.

The court also upheld the trial judge's rejection of the s. 43 defence, concluding that the force was applied out of anger and frustration, not for educative or corrective purposes, and therefore did not meet the requirements for justification under the section.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in her credibility assessment by suggesting his evidence was tailored to the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed a legal error by impugning the appellant's credibility on this basis, as it undermined his constitutional right to be present at trial and make full answer and defence.

The court determined this error played a significant role in the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.