Éric Marcoux

The appeal concerned whether police misconduct findings that were administratively expunged from an officer’s disciplinary record under provincial regulation remain subject to first party criminal disclosure.

The Court held that administrative expungement for police discipline purposes does not alter the constitutional disclosure regime, does not erase the underlying finding, and does not convert relevant misconduct records into third party records subject only to an O’Connor application.

Applying Stinchcombe, O’Connor and McNeil, the Court clarified that relevance is a low, utility-based threshold, that police must triage and transmit relevant misconduct information to the Crown, and that the Crown remains the ultimate arbiter of relevance with a duty to inquire when put on notice of potentially relevant information.

The appeal was dismissed, the motion to file further evidence was allowed, and solicitor-client costs were awarded to the accused against the police appellant.

The appellant was convicted under s. 145(3) of the Criminal Code for twice failing to present himself at the door of his residence when police attended to verify compliance with his bail curfew condition.

The central issue on appeal was whether the mens rea for the failure-to-comply offence is to be assessed on a subjective or objective standard.

The Court held unanimously that the Crown must establish subjective fault, requiring proof that the accused breached the bail condition knowingly or recklessly.

The Court further articulated that bail conditions must be imposed with restraint, tailored to the individual accused's risks, and subjected to rigorous review by all participants in the bail system.

Because the courts below applied an objective standard of fault, the convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered on the two counts of failing to attend at the door.