Eric Purtzki

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and administering a stupefying drug, and brought an application for a stay of proceedings on the basis that his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The trial judge found that the total delay exceeded the Jordan ceiling but was justified by the transitional exceptional circumstance and dismissed the application.

A majority of the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erroneously characterized delay occasioned by the appellant's re-election of another mode of trial as a discrete exceptional circumstance, but upheld the dismissal on the basis of the transitional exceptional circumstance.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's re-election was not done legitimately to respond to the charges and the resulting 13-month delay should have been characterized as defence delay.

The appellant Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial after the majority found the trial judge had misapprehended evidence by failing to address prior inconsistent statements made by the complainant to a friend shortly after the alleged sexual assault.

The Supreme Court restored the conviction, agreeing with the dissenting judge below that the trial judge's failure to specifically address those inconsistencies did not constitute a failure to consider or give effect to them.

The Court held that even if there was error, the inconsistencies were not sufficiently significant to have caused a miscarriage of justice, as the threshold for establishing a miscarriage of justice through misapprehension of evidence requires that the error could have affected the outcome.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a drug offence at trial, after which the trial judge entered a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment arising from a dial-a-dope operation.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay and remitted the matter for sentencing, finding the trial judge had misapprehended the evidence and misapplied the legal test for entrapment.

The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the phrase "enters a verdict of guilty" in s. 691(2)(b) of the Criminal Code encompasses an order setting aside a permanent stay where that order is tantamount to entering a verdict of guilty, thereby grounding the appellant's appeal as of right.

Applying the framework from R. v. Ahmad, the Court held that the police had reasonable suspicion, before placing the call, that the phone number was being used for drug dealing, based on a detailed tip corroborated by vehicle and licence plate information linked to a person with an extensive history of suspected dial-a-dope activity.

The appeal was dismissed, a verdict of guilty entered, and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of dangerous driving causing death under s. 249(4) of the Criminal Code after the trial judge found reasonable doubt as to mens rea, despite finding the actus reus established.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction, finding the trial judge committed an error of law.

The Supreme Court of Canada (4-1) dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made two inter-related errors of law: he applied a wrong legal principle by treating momentariness of excessive speeding as categorically insufficient to establish mens rea, and he failed to apply the correct test from R. v. Roy by not assessing what a reasonable person would have foreseen and done in the accused's circumstances.

The dissent would have restored the acquittal, finding no identifiable legal error tainting the trial judge's reasonable doubt.

A Métis federal inmate challenged correctional authorities’ use of psychological and actuarial risk tools for Indigenous offenders, alleging statutory and Charter breaches.

The Court held that authorities breached their duty under s. 24(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act by continuing to rely on the tools without taking reasonable steps to confirm validity for Indigenous persons.

The Court declined to find violations of ss. 7 or 15 of the Charter on the evidentiary record.

Declaratory relief was granted in light of the prolonged and ineffective grievance history, but no broader injunctive remedy was ordered.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of Criminal Code dangerous offender provisions, arguing overbreadth under s. 7 and gross disproportionality under s. 12 of the Charter.

The majority held s. 753(1) permits considering future treatment prospects at designation and that s. 753(4.1) does not create an unconstitutional presumption of indeterminate detention.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld both provisions as constitutional, with a partial dissent that would have struck down s. 753(4.1) and ordered a new sentencing hearing.

In this criminal appeal, the Court considered when corroborative evidence can establish the threshold reliability required to admit hearsay under the principled exception.

The Crown sought admission of a co-accused’s video re-enactment implicating the respondent in two murders after the declarant refused to testify.

A majority held the trial judge relied on corroborative evidence that did not sufficiently answer the specific hearsay danger of fabrication, and concluded threshold reliability was not met.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial remained in place, with a dissent that would have restored the convictions.

The appeal addressed whether retrospective application of expanded sexual-offender prohibition orders in s. 161(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code infringed the right to the lesser punishment under s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Court held both amendments constituted punishment and therefore limited s. 11(i) when applied to pre-amendment offences.

Under s. 1, retrospective application of the no-contact condition in s. 161(1)(c) was not justified, but retrospective application of the Internet prohibition in s. 161(1)(d) was justified.

The appeal was allowed in part and the order was varied accordingly.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a bestiality count arising from sexualized conduct involving an animal and a complainant.

The central issue was whether penetration is an essential element of bestiality under s. 160 of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that the term retained its established legal meaning requiring penetration, and found no clear legislative intent in the 1955 or 1988 amendments to expand the offence.

The Court emphasized that expanding criminal liability is a legislative function, not a judicial one.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding penetration is not required.

In this criminal appeal as of right, the Court considered whether the confinement element required for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) was made out where the accused blocked the victim from escaping before the killing.

The Court held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the forcible or unlawful confinement was distinct and independent from the act of killing.

The appellate intervention substituting second degree murder was therefore unwarranted.

The conviction for first degree murder was reinstated and the appeal was allowed.

The Court held that probation orders attached to a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding two years are not invalidated by prior or subsequent sentences imposed on other occasions.

It interpreted section 731(1)(b) as referring to the term imposed at the sentencing hearing in question, while confirming that probation cannot accompany sentences imposed at one sitting that produce continuous custody over two years.

The appeals were dismissed and the impugned probation orders remained valid.