Trent Morris

The applicant, owner of a Junior A hockey team, sought a mandatory interlocutory injunction to reinstate its membership in the Central Canada Hockey League after being terminated for unpaid league fees.

The court determined the relief sought was mandatory, requiring the applicant to establish a strong prima facie case.

Although the applicant demonstrated irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction, the motion was dismissed because the applicant failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the termination process was flawed or unjust, and failed to provide a sufficient undertaking as to damages.

The Appellant appealed the Niagara Escarpment Commission's approval of a development permit for a wedding event venue on agricultural lands.

The Applicants brought a motion to dismiss the appeal without a hearing, arguing the issues had been previously litigated in multiple prior appeals.

The Hearing Office found that the requirements for res judicata and issue estoppel were met, as the issues had been previously decided or were outside its jurisdiction.

The Hearing Office concluded the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success, was frivolous and vexatious, and was not in the public interest.

The motion to dismiss was granted.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the order of Gilmore J. dated November 18, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing, awarding costs to the responding parties in the all-inclusive amount of $7,500.

The applicants, judgment creditors from US proceedings involving fraudulent lending schemes, brought a motion to declare certain trusts established by the respondents as invalid shams.

The receiver's investigation traced funds from the fraudulent schemes to the trust properties and identified numerous 'badges of fraud'.

The respondents failed to produce evidence refuting the receiver's findings.

The court applied the McGoey factors, found the trusts were a sham, and ordered the trust assets to be part of the receivership estate available to creditors.

The respondents brought a motion to remove the applicant's counsel, alleging a conflict of interest because counsel acted for the applicant personally, as Estate Trustee, and for the Estate, and arguing counsel might become witnesses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that counsel acts for the Estate Trustee, not the Estate, and there was no evidence of a conflict or that counsel would need to testify.

The court also ordered the respondents to provide outstanding disclosure, pay $15,000 in costs thrown away for a previously adjourned hearing, and directed that any proceeds from the sale of a disputed condominium be paid into court.

The applicants, judgment creditors of the respondents for over $26 million USD arising from a fraudulent lending scheme, moved to discontinue the payment of living expenses and legal fees to the respondents and their related trusts from the receivership estate.

The trusts brought a cross-motion to strike the Receiver's Eleventh Report, arguing the Receiver exceeded its mandate by tracing funds and making observations about badges of a sham trust.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the Receiver acted within its court-ordered investigatory powers and did not usurp the court's role.

The court granted the applicants' motion to terminate funding, holding that the respondents had exhausted their appeals, were now judgment debtors, and failed to meet the test for funding from frozen assets, as they had not provided full disclosure and the funds belonged to their creditors.

Following a successful summary judgment motion to enforce four mortgages, the plaintiff mortgagee sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis as provided in the standard charge terms.

The defendants argued for partial indemnity costs, noting the plaintiff initially claimed interest exceeding the criminal rate and provided inaccurate discharge statements.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs for the steps up to the summary judgment motion due to the plaintiff's improper conduct, but awarded substantial indemnity costs for the motion itself because the defendants persisted in an unsuccessful misrepresentation defence.

Total costs were fixed at $63,772.65.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment on a series of mortgages granted to the defendants.

The defendants counterclaimed, alleging an oral agreement that the plaintiff would pay out all outstanding executions against them, and argued the mortgages charged a criminal rate of interest.

The court found no evidence of the alleged oral agreement.

While the initial discharge statements contained illegal interest rates, the court applied notional severance to enforce the principal amounts advanced and the stipulated interest rates (18% and 24%).

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff for the principal amounts and possession of the properties, while the defendants' counterclaim regarding the discharge statements was allowed to proceed.

The plaintiff, MEJJ Enterprises Inc., sought costs after largely succeeding in its claim for unpaid property taxes and lease payments and successfully defending a $5,000,000 counterclaim alleging failure to build a promised structure.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the plaintiff's request for substantial indemnity due to a lack of reprehensible conduct by the defendants.

The court significantly reduced the plaintiff's requested costs due to issues with the bill of costs, including duplication from multiple counsel and lack of itemization, and excluded costs related to voluntary mediation.

The court found that both parties contributed to the decade-long delay in the proceedings but did not reduce the costs award further on that basis, noting the plaintiff's bill had already been adjusted for duplication.

The plaintiff landlord sued the defendant tenants for unpaid rent and property taxes under a commercial lease for a golf driving range.

The defendants counterclaimed, alleging the landlord breached an oral agreement to finance and build a year-round deck structure, and breached the duty of good faith by orchestrating their default.

The court found that the parol evidence rule did not bar consideration of unsigned collateral agreements, but concluded the evidence did not support the defendants' claim that the landlord promised to pay for the deck.

The counterclaim was dismissed, and the plaintiff was awarded $63,000 for unpaid rent and taxes.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment on several high-interest, short-term mortgages in default.

The defendant mortgagors counterclaimed, alleging they were induced to sign the mortgages based on the plaintiff's oral misrepresentations that it would fund the removal of several executions registered against them.

The court found that determining whether such an agreement existed relied heavily on credibility.

Consequently, the court ordered a mini-trial under Rule 20.04(2.2) to hear viva voce evidence from the key deponents before deciding the summary judgment motion.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiffs in a mortgage enforcement action.

The defendants' counsel had served a Notice of Intent to Defend and requested a brief indulgence due to the defendants' cognitive disabilities, but the plaintiffs' counsel obtained default judgment without replying or providing notice.

The court found the plaintiffs' counsel's actions to be unprofessional and set aside the default judgment as of right.

Alternatively, the court found the defendants had an arguable defence on the merits, alleging unconscionability, undue influence, and deficient independent legal advice regarding the mortgage.

The motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the defendants on a substantial indemnity basis.

A non-party, Dennis Cibulka, brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of foreclosure and to be added as a defendant in an action concerning a residential property he has occupied since 1959.

The court found that Cibulka was a necessary party to the action and that the interests of justice favored granting the relief sought.

The motion to set aside default judgment was made promptly upon Cibulka learning of it, there was a reasonable prospect of payment if the mortgage was enforceable, and significant net equity in the property would otherwise result in a windfall to the plaintiff.

The court granted the motion, adding Cibulka as a defendant, setting aside the default judgment, and awarded costs to Cibulka.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant's counsel withdrew one month prior to the appeal hearing, and the appellant requested an adjournment to retain new counsel.

The Court of Appeal denied the adjournment request, finding no basis to grant it.

The respondent argued the appeal lacked merit, noting that the summary judgment was granted after the appellant failed to comply with court-ordered indulgences regarding payment of costs and filing of material, and that the material would not have raised a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Moving Parties, Net Connect Installations Inc., ICT North Inc., Wayne LaPlante, and Charleen Wunderlich, sought full indemnity costs against the Responding Parties, Mobile Zone Inc., Mohammad Shahzad, Swati Damle, and Systec Communications Inc., following their complete success on a motion for summary judgment.

The court found the Responding Parties engaged in egregious conduct, including fraudulent depletion of funds, fabrication of documents, dissipation of assets despite a Mareva Injunction, and delaying tactics.

Citing principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, the court determined that this was a rare case warranting full indemnity costs to indemnify the successful litigants and deter inappropriate behaviour.

The Moving Parties were awarded $144,991.11 in full indemnity costs, jointly and severally.

The moving parties brought a motion for summary judgment regarding a breach of contract and misappropriation of funds by the responding parties.

The parties had an oral agreement for the sale and installation of satellite services.

The responding parties alleged the existence of a joint venture and subsequent oral agreements that altered the terms, and counterclaimed for damages.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the responding parties fabricated the subsequent agreements and unlawfully transferred funds belonging to the moving parties to Pakistan.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the moving parties for $155,836.32 in damages and $21,000 for unpaid loans, and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The defendant Gregory Carter brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against him, primarily relying on expert witness immunity.

The plaintiff Rory Sheehan had sued Carter for a report prepared for his ex-wife's family law proceedings, alleging issues with Carter's qualifications as a Psychological Associate and his out-of-court statements regarding his credentials.

The court found that Carter's role as an expert witness, including his report and related out-of-court communications about his qualifications, fell within the scope of absolute expert witness immunity.

The court also noted serious causation and damages issues for the plaintiff.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against Gregory Carter.

The applicant estate trustee sought directions on whether the respondent's claim against the estate for $150,000, pursuant to a separation agreement, was statute-barred.

The deceased had failed to maintain life insurance as required, creating a first charge on the estate.

The estate trustee withheld information from the respondent that the life insurance policies had lapsed, delaying the respondent's discovery of her claim.

The court held that while the two-year limitation period under s. 38 of the Trustee Act applied, it was tolled by the doctrine of fraudulent concealment due to the estate trustee's unconscionable conduct in withholding material facts.

The respondent's claim was therefore permitted to proceed.

In three related securities class action appeals, the court reconsidered whether a statutory secondary-market misrepresentation claim under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act is time-barred unless leave is obtained within the s. 138.14 limitation period.

The court overruled Timminco and held that, for purposes of s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the statutory claim is asserted when the representative plaintiff pleads the statutory cause of action, the supporting facts, and an intention to seek leave within a timely commenced class proceeding.

The court also upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the s. 138.8 leave standard as screening out hopeless claims, while holding that the Green certification decision erred in failing to consider certifying common negligent misrepresentation issues other than reliance.

The plaintiffs' appeal in Green was allowed in part and the defendants' appeals in Silver and Celestica were dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction requiring the franchisor to reinstate them in control of a pharmacy during a contractual management period following notice that the franchise relationship would not be renewed.

The dispute arose under an associate agreement governed by the Arthur Wishart Act and included interpretation of provisions allowing the franchisor to assume management control during the final 60 days before expiry.

The court held the requested relief was a mandatory injunction requiring the plaintiffs to demonstrate a strong prima facie case.

The plaintiffs failed to establish even a serious issue to be tried, as the agreement clearly permitted the franchisor to assume management upon expiry by effluxion of time.

Claims of irreparable harm were speculative and the balance of convenience favoured the franchisor.