Jamie Gibson

The trustee in bankruptcy moved for a phase-one determination that profit payments made by Douglas Grozelle to net winners in a fraudulent Ponzi scheme were void as against creditors and recoverable for the estate.

The court found the hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme, held insolvency and fraudulent intent could be inferred globally, and concluded the payments were void under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and not saved by good-faith or good-consideration defences.

The court approved a two-stage insolvency process: common liability issues resolved summarily now, with individualized quantum determinations in phase two.

The winners’ cross-motion for broad directions attacking the trustee’s process and authority was dismissed.

The Gendelman Defendants sought to vary a Mareva order for the third time, requesting authorization to sell a property (Ravel Property) and access proceeds for legal fees, increased living expenses, and repayment of third-party debts.

The Plaintiff opposed the variation.

The court applied the four-part Credit Valley test for varying Mareva injunctions, finding that the Gendelman Defendants failed to establish they had no other assets available, were not fully transparent about their finances and income, and did not adequately explain significant discrepancies in their net worth statements or the nature of the debts they sought to repay.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the strong prima facie case of the Plaintiff regarding alleged misappropriation of funds.

The applicants, judgment creditors of the respondents for over $26 million USD arising from a fraudulent lending scheme, moved to discontinue the payment of living expenses and legal fees to the respondents and their related trusts from the receivership estate.

The trusts brought a cross-motion to strike the Receiver's Eleventh Report, arguing the Receiver exceeded its mandate by tracing funds and making observations about badges of a sham trust.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the Receiver acted within its court-ordered investigatory powers and did not usurp the court's role.

The court granted the applicants' motion to terminate funding, holding that the respondents had exhausted their appeals, were now judgment debtors, and failed to meet the test for funding from frozen assets, as they had not provided full disclosure and the funds belonged to their creditors.