Adrienne Lei

The applicant sought to vary an interlocutory injunction previously granted on April 4, 2025, which restrained a blockade at the entrance of its premises at 2801 Howard Avenue.

The applicant sought to expand the injunction to include multiple additional addresses and a public street.

The respondents argued that the variation required the applicant to meet the full test for a civil injunction, including the stringent requirements under section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act for labour disputes.

The court found that the context had fundamentally changed from the original April order, as the parties were now engaged in a labour dispute following a lockout.

The court granted the motion in part, expanding the injunction to include the entrance at 305 Charles Street but rejecting the broader expansion sought.

The court found that the respondents had unlawfully obstructed two entrances for unreasonably lengthy periods but did not find evidence of other unlawful picketing or risk of physical harm.

The plaintiff, a German-trained lawyer with a PhD in law, sued his former family law counsel for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from their representation in a motion to change a parenting order.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to investigate the facts, warn him of the case's weaknesses and cost risks, and ensure he understood the legal advice.

The defendants represented the plaintiff in a motion to change a 2012 consent order that limited his parenting time with his two sons.

The motion was based on a claimed material change in circumstances—the plaintiff's new employment with reduced travel requirements.

The motion was dismissed by Justice McWatt, who found no material change in circumstances because the plaintiff testified at trial that his new job required international travel, contradicting his affidavit and employer's letter.

The court dismissed the negligence and fiduciary duty claims, finding the defendants met the standard of care, the plaintiff was aware of the risks, and he would have proceeded with the motion regardless of advice.

Following the settlement of the main class proceeding, the defendant and third party plaintiff brought a consent motion to dismiss the third party claims against the remaining third parties.

The court granted the order dismissing the third party action with prejudice and without costs.

The defendants (appellants) appealed a motion judge's order that dismissed their motion to dismiss a solicitor's negligence action for lack of legal capacity.

The plaintiff (respondent) had sued the appellants in his personal capacity, alleging negligence in an appeal they handled for his late brother's Estate.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by not addressing who retained the appellants; it was the Estate, not the plaintiff personally.

Therefore, the plaintiff lacked the personal capacity to bring the solicitor's negligence claim.

The appeal was allowed, and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff's lawyers brought a motion to remove the defendants' lawyer of record, alleging an actual or perceived conflict of interest in her joint representation of all three defendants.

The plaintiff was never a client of the challenged lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a possibility of real mischief or that the proper administration of justice required the removal.

The court also found that the motion was brought for a tactical advantage, given the nearly two-year delay in bringing it after the issue was first raised.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order dismissing his action against the respondents (his former legal counsel) under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

The appellant had alleged that the respondents failed to follow his instructions, misled and deceived him, and failed to provide competent legal services in an unjust dismissal case under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge found that the same issue had been previously determined by Adjudicator Monteith, whose findings were upheld by the Federal Court on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in dismissing the action as an abuse of process and affirming the costs award.

The appellant, president of the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), appealed the dismissal of a motion to strike an action brought by four rank-and-file members of the International's Toronto-based affiliate, Local 113.

The members sought a declaration that certain provisions of the International's Constitution were void for unconscionability, arguing these provisions prevented disaffiliation.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to strike but granted a temporary stay pending exhaustion of the International's constitutional amendment process.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the dismissal of the motion to strike and the temporary stay, finding the action presented arguable issues of unconscionability and that the court had jurisdiction to determine the matter.

The defendants brought a Rule 21.01 motion to determine if alleged defamatory statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The plaintiff failed to appear or file materials, and his request for adjournment was dismissed due to a finding that he was "playing games with the process." The court found that the statements, made in a direction to opposing counsel regarding the disbursement of funds in matrimonial and assessment proceedings, were intimately connected to judicial proceedings and thus covered by absolute privilege.

The action for defamation was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion mid-trial to withdraw admissions made in pleadings, responses to requests to admit, and an agreed statement of facts, and sought leave to rely on new documents, after discovering a significant factual mistake regarding the legal description of lands.

The defendants opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for a mistrial.

The parties ultimately resolved their motions by consent order, which allowed the withdrawal of inadvertent admissions and declared a mistrial.

The presiding judge recused himself from hearing the new trial due to having formed views on the evidence.

Directions were provided for the future course of the proceedings, including efforts to agree on evidence use and a prompt new trial.

In a civil procedure appeal, the appellants challenged orders permitting amendment of a statement of claim through a representation order after expiry of a limitation period.

The central issue was whether the order improperly added parties or merely corrected the naming of the legal entity represented by previously named individuals.

A majority held the request was properly treated as correction of a misnamed party, with members having notice before the limitation deadline and no demonstrated prejudice after extensive participation in the litigation.

The appeal was dismissed, with one dissenting judge who would have allowed it.

Several trade unions and the Canadian Labour Congress brought motions for leave to intervene as added parties or as friends of the court in an action challenging the constitution of the Amalgamated Transit Union.

The moving parties argued they had an interest in the proceeding because their own constitutions contained similar provisions and they could be adversely affected by the precedent.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that an interest based solely on the potential precedential effect of a decision is insufficient for intervention as an added party under Rule 13.01.

The court also denied leave to intervene as friends of the court under Rule 13.02, concluding that the proposed interveners' submissions would largely duplicate the arguments of the defendant union and would not provide a materially different perspective.

The plaintiff, Bob Kinnear, on behalf of Local 113 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant, Lawrence J. Hanley, representing the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), from imposing a trusteeship over Local 113 and from disciplining its members.

The motion also sought to authorize Kinnear to represent Local 113 members and to have Local 113 provide the undertaking as to damages.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction to restrain the trusteeship and ordered Local 113 to provide the undertaking, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the unconscionability of International's constitution, irreparable harm to democratic rights, and that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff.

The request for a representative order was deferred.

The Attorney General brought a motion to quash summonses issued by defendant Michael G. Engel to two Crown attorneys, John McMahon and Paul Amenta, for examination under Rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Engel sought to examine them as part of his response to the Attorney General's summary judgment motion to dismiss Engel's crossclaim for contribution and indemnity, which alleged that Crown attorneys failed to comply with disclosure obligations in the underlying wrongful conviction action.

The court found that Engel demonstrated a reasonable evidentiary basis that the Crown attorneys could provide relevant evidence on several specific disclosure topics and that the proposed examinations would not constitute an abuse of process.

The motion to quash was dismissed, allowing examinations on four of the five identified topics.

An appeal concerning the estate of Paul Penner, who died in March 2013.

A separation agreement required Penner to maintain a $150,000 life insurance policy designating his ex-wife, Pauline McKenny, as beneficiary, with McKenny having a first charge against the estate if the policy lapsed.

Penner failed to pay premiums and the policy lapsed before his death.

McKenny commenced an action more than two years after Penner's death, which would normally be statute-barred under section 38(3) of the Trustee Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applied to the estate trustee's conduct, tolling the limitation period until at least September 25, 2013, thereby allowing McKenny's claim to proceed.

The applicant estate trustee sought directions on whether the respondent's claim against the estate for $150,000, pursuant to a separation agreement, was statute-barred.

The deceased had failed to maintain life insurance as required, creating a first charge on the estate.

The estate trustee withheld information from the respondent that the life insurance policies had lapsed, delaying the respondent's discovery of her claim.

The court held that while the two-year limitation period under s. 38 of the Trustee Act applied, it was tolled by the doctrine of fraudulent concealment due to the estate trustee's unconscionable conduct in withholding material facts.

The respondent's claim was therefore permitted to proceed.

The plaintiff sued his former family lawyer and the lawyer’s firm for negligence arising from advice and drafting of a separation agreement that waived spousal support.

The plaintiff argued that the agreement was vulnerable to challenge and that counsel failed to adequately advise him of the risks and should have ceased acting once the agreement was attacked in subsequent litigation.

The court held that the lawyer met the heightened standard of care applicable to a family law specialist, having properly explained the risks and drafted a robust spousal support waiver.

The court also found no breach in continuing the retainer and concluded that causation and damages were not established, including under a lost‑chance analysis.

The action was dismissed.

The purchaser applied for the return of a $100,000 deposit after refusing to close a residential real estate transaction due to an outstanding building permit on the property.

The vendors obtained a commitment from a title insurer to insure over the open permit and offered to complete the transaction with a holdback pending closure of the permit.

The court held that, under the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, a commitment for title insurance was sufficient to address the requisition regarding the open permit.

The purchaser failed to act in good faith by prematurely abandoning the transaction before the closing deadline and by not pursuing the available title insurance solution.

The purchaser was therefore in breach of the agreement and was not entitled to recover the deposit.