Adrienne Lei

The appellant brought a motion seeking an extension of time to file an appeal from a Notice of Proposal to refuse his registration as a real estate salesperson.

The statutory 15-day appeal period expired on November 3, 2025, and the appeal was filed 74 days late on January 16, 2026.

Applying the Manuel factors, the Tribunal found that despite the significant delay caused by the appellant's former counsel, the appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal, there was minimal prejudice to the Registrar, and the appeal had some merit given the sparse particulars of alleged academic misconduct in the Notice of Proposal.

The motion for an extension of time was granted.

The York University Staff Association (YUSA) and the Black Legal Action Centre (BLAC) brought motions for leave to intervene in a judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

YUSA sought to intervene as an added party under Rule 13.01, while BLAC sought to intervene as a friend of the Court under Rule 13.02.

The applicant consented, but the respondent university opposed.

The Divisional Court granted both motions, finding that YUSA had a significant interest in the workplace procedures at issue and that BLAC would provide a useful systemic perspective on anti-Black racism without expanding the issues or causing undue delay.

Two organizations, York University Staff Association (YUSA) and Black Legal Action Centre (BLAC), sought leave to intervene in an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The underlying decision dismissed most of the applicant's discrimination claims for being outside the one-year limitation period.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to intervene.

The court found that YUSA did not have a direct interest in the narrow limitation period issue before the court, and that BLAC would not provide a distinct perspective from the applicant and risked introducing irrelevant peripheral issues.

The applicant sought to vary an interlocutory injunction previously granted on April 4, 2025, which restrained a blockade at the entrance of its premises at 2801 Howard Avenue.

The applicant sought to expand the injunction to include multiple additional addresses and a public street.

The respondents argued that the variation required the applicant to meet the full test for a civil injunction, including the stringent requirements under section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act for labour disputes.

The court found that the context had fundamentally changed from the original April order, as the parties were now engaged in a labour dispute following a lockout.

The court granted the motion in part, expanding the injunction to include the entrance at 305 Charles Street but rejecting the broader expansion sought.

The court found that the respondents had unlawfully obstructed two entrances for unreasonably lengthy periods but did not find evidence of other unlawful picketing or risk of physical harm.

The plaintiff, a German-trained lawyer with a PhD in law, sued his former family law counsel for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from their representation in a motion to change a parenting order.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to investigate the facts, warn him of the case's weaknesses and cost risks, and ensure he understood the legal advice.

The defendants represented the plaintiff in a motion to change a 2012 consent order that limited his parenting time with his two sons.

The motion was based on a claimed material change in circumstances—the plaintiff's new employment with reduced travel requirements.

The motion was dismissed by Justice McWatt, who found no material change in circumstances because the plaintiff testified at trial that his new job required international travel, contradicting his affidavit and employer's letter.

The court dismissed the negligence and fiduciary duty claims, finding the defendants met the standard of care, the plaintiff was aware of the risks, and he would have proceeded with the motion regardless of advice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave for the former trial solicitor of Michael Scott De Longte to intervene in the appeal, limited to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court found the solicitor’s participation necessary to complete the record and assist in the proper adjudication of the issue, as the allegations of ineffective assistance were central to the appeal and mirrored in a related professional negligence action.

The court also declared that solicitor-client privilege had been waived by Mr. De Longte and set out a schedule for the exchange and filing of fresh evidence, cross-examinations, and facta.

No costs were awarded on the motion.

The self-represented appellant sought to appeal an endorsement of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division that denied his motion to reinstate previous appeals and set aside a vexatious litigant order.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the proceeding for want of jurisdiction.

The Court found that the endorsement was not a final order giving rise to a statutory right of appeal under section 49.38 of the Law Society Act.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the proposed appeal as an abuse of process.

Following the settlement of the main class proceeding, the defendant and third party plaintiff brought a consent motion to dismiss the third party claims against the remaining third parties.

The court granted the order dismissing the third party action with prejudice and without costs.

The appellant brought a motion before a panel of the Divisional Court to set aside the dismissal of his appeal by a case management judge.

The appeal had been dismissed for delay after the appellant repeatedly failed to comply with case management scheduling orders to perfect his appeal.

The panel dismissed the motion, finding that the case management judge had jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal without a formal motion, that filing an amended notice of appeal does not restart the time for perfection, and that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The defendants (appellants) appealed a motion judge's order that dismissed their motion to dismiss a solicitor's negligence action for lack of legal capacity.

The plaintiff (respondent) had sued the appellants in his personal capacity, alleging negligence in an appeal they handled for his late brother's Estate.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by not addressing who retained the appellants; it was the Estate, not the plaintiff personally.

Therefore, the plaintiff lacked the personal capacity to bring the solicitor's negligence claim.

The appeal was allowed, and the action dismissed.

The employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision to substitute a 30-day suspension for the dismissal of a flight attendant who had unlatched refreshment trolleys during a flight.

The employer argued the arbitrator's reasoning was illogical and failed to address safety concerns.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's decision was reasonable, justified, and transparent under the Vavilov standard, as the arbitrator reasonably concluded the misconduct was not as grave as the employer believed and lacked malice.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, commenced an action against the respondent for damages for solicitor's negligence.

The motion judge struck out the claim for lack of legal capacity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that under s. 71 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, a bankrupt's property, including causes of action, vests in the trustee in bankruptcy, depriving the bankrupt of the capacity to initiate the action.

The plaintiff's lawyers brought a motion to remove the defendants' lawyer of record, alleging an actual or perceived conflict of interest in her joint representation of all three defendants.

The plaintiff was never a client of the challenged lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a possibility of real mischief or that the proper administration of justice required the removal.

The court also found that the motion was brought for a tactical advantage, given the nearly two-year delay in bringing it after the issue was first raised.

During a legal strike, graduate student teaching assistants engaged in picketing and protests.

Following the strike, the university disciplined them under the Student Code of Conduct.

The students sought judicial review, arguing that under the Back to Class Act and the Labour Relations Act, a labour arbitrator had exclusive jurisdiction over discipline related to strike activities.

The Divisional Court agreed and quashed the university tribunal's decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the university's appeal, confirming that the specific, strike-ending legislation mandated that any dispute concerning discipline for activities during the strike be determined through grievance arbitration.

The respondent, a re-elected city councillor, filed a supplementary financial statement showing he exceeded the allowable campaign spending limit for expressions of appreciation.

Under s. 88.23(2) of the Municipal Elections Act, this triggered automatic forfeiture of his office.

The application judge granted relief from forfeiture, finding the error was inadvertent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act because s. 88.23(2) is a statutory penalty and the legislative scheme deliberately precludes such relief.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a grievance arbitration award that substituted a thirty-day suspension for the termination of an employee.

The Divisional Court stayed the application as premature, noting that the arbitrator had remitted the matter back to the parties and remained seized of the issue of whether reinstatement was an appropriate remedy.

The court held that judicial review should wait until the final disposition of the remedy to avoid overlapping work and inconsistent decisions.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order dismissing his action against the respondents (his former legal counsel) under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

The appellant had alleged that the respondents failed to follow his instructions, misled and deceived him, and failed to provide competent legal services in an unjust dismissal case under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge found that the same issue had been previously determined by Adjudicator Monteith, whose findings were upheld by the Federal Court on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in dismissing the action as an abuse of process and affirming the costs award.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award dismissing its grievance against the employer airline.

The union claimed the employer breached a promise made during collective bargaining not to award travel passes with a higher priority to any other unionized group.

The arbitrator found the promise was narrow and did not extend to discretionary special passes awarded to pilots.

The Divisional Court held the arbitrator's decision was reasonable and that the arbitrator did not err in failing to address a sex discrimination argument that was not properly raised at the hearing.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicants, graduate students and teaching assistants at York University, sought judicial review of a University Tribunal decision disciplining them for misconduct during a legal strike.

The Tribunal had assumed jurisdiction under the Student Code.

The Divisional Court quashed the Tribunal's decision, holding that the essential character of the dispute was labour-related and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator under the Labour Relations Act and the Back to Class Act.

The Court also found exceptional circumstances to hear the judicial review despite the applicants not exhausting internal appeals, and noted the Tribunal's process was procedurally unfair.

The appellant, president of the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), appealed the dismissal of a motion to strike an action brought by four rank-and-file members of the International's Toronto-based affiliate, Local 113.

The members sought a declaration that certain provisions of the International's Constitution were void for unconscionability, arguing these provisions prevented disaffiliation.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to strike but granted a temporary stay pending exhaustion of the International's constitutional amendment process.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the dismissal of the motion to strike and the temporary stay, finding the action presented arguable issues of unconscionability and that the court had jurisdiction to determine the matter.