Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18202/TRESA

In the matter of a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal from a Notice of Proposal to refuse to register the appellant under the Trust in Real Estate Services Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30, Sched. C (the “Act”),

Between:

Tharaneetharan Vinayagamoorthy

Appellant

And

Registrar, Trust in Real Estate Services Act, 2002

Respondent

DECISION and ORDER ON MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL

ADJUDICATOR: Laura Hodgson

For the Appellant: Adrienne Lei, Counsel

For the Respondent: Shane Smith, Counsel

Heard by way of written submissions

OVERVIEW

1The Appellant brings a motion seeking an extension of time to file an appeal from the Notice of Proposal (“NOP”) to refuse his registration as a salesperson under the Trust in Real Estate Services Act (“the Act”).

2The NOP was served on the Appellant on October 17, 2025. The statutory appeal period of 15-days after service of the NOP expired on November 3, 2025. The Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal and Notice of Motion for an extension to appeal with the Licence Appeal Tribunal on January 16, 2026.

3The Registrar, Trust in Real Estate Services Act, 2002 opposes the motion.

ISSUE

4The issue to be determined is whether the appellant has established reasonable grounds to support an extension of time to file his appeal.

RESULT

5The justice of the case warrants an extension of time for filing the appeal and the motion is granted.

ANALYSIS

6Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch G, gives the Tribunal the discretion to grant an extension of time where there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.

7In Manuel v. Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492, the Divisional Court ruled that, on a motion to extend the time to appeal to the Tribunal, the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires that the extension be granted. The factors to be considered in making that determination are:

a) the existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

b) the length of the delay;

c) prejudice to the other party; and

d) the merits of the appeal.

8No single factor is determinative.

Bona Fide Intention to appeal within the appeal period

9As noted, the NOP was issued to the appellant on October 17, 2025. That same day the appellant’s counsel (not his current counsel) advised counsel for the Registrar that the appellant intended to appeal the NOP. Days later, on October 23, 2025, the appellant’s counsel sent the Registrar a letter of objection to the NOP. After the statutory deadline for the filing of an appeal with the Tribunal (November 3, 2025) passed, the Registrar issued a Final Notice regarding the refusal to register the appellant.

10On November 20, 2025, the date the Final Notice was received, the appellant’s counsel contacted counsel for the registrar and requested an extension of time “to prepare an appeal”. The appellant’s counsel was advised to proceed with the appeal while counsel for the Registrar sought instructions with respect to consenting to the extension. On December 3, 2025, counsel for the Registrar advised that it would not oppose the motion for an extension of time to file an appeal.

11The appellant retained new counsel and on January 8, 2026, this counsel advised the Registrar that it would be filing a Notice of Appeal and a Notice of Motion for an extension to file. Counsel for the Registrar indicated that motion would now be opposed.

12The appellant’s Notice of Motion and Notice of Appeal were filed on January 16, 2026.

13I find that appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period. It is undisputed that the appellant clearly asserted an intention to appeal immediately upon receiving the NOP on October 17, 2025. The sincerity of this intention is tempered by the protracted delay by the appellant and his original counsel to take the necessary steps to file a Notice of Appeal within the statutory period. This 15-day appeal period was clearly indicated on the NOP. Nonetheless, I find the appellant formed an intention to appeal within the appeal period.

Length of Delay

14The Registrar submits that the 74-day delay is significant and that the appellant provided no reasonable explanation.

15I agree that the length of delay from the end of the 15-day filing period is significant. I would also note that it is aggravating that the appellant waited an additional 57 days after realizing the appeal period had lapsed before filing the requisite material with the Tribunal. This weighs against granting the motion for an extension.

16Based on the submissions and affidavit materials before me it appears that the appellant’s counsel made unfortunate decisions and either did not understand the appeal process or failed to give it priority. The courts have noted that, as a general principle, the client “should not suffer the consequences of [its] lawyer’s oversight or inattention”: Kudrocova v. Kronberger, 2021 ONCA 563. Even if I accept that delay resulted from error by counsel, this is not a determinative factor here.

Prejudice to Other Party

17The Registrar does not assert any specific prejudice and states that it is “not a strong factor either way”.

18I agree that any prejudice flowing to the Registrar from the delay is minimal at most. I recognize that limitation periods exist to allow parties, such as the Registrar, to organize and conduct themselves with certainty and to provide some finality to proceedings. In the circumstances here, I find there is no impact on the Registrar’s ability to respond to the appeal.

Merits of the Appeal

19I must only be satisfied that there is some merit to the appeal based on the submissions before me. Although styled as an appeal, pursuant to subsection 14(5) of the Act, the hearing before the Tribunal would be de novo. This is not an exercise in prejudging the hearing outcome. At this time, my assessment of the merits hinge on the reasons for the refusal and on the grounds asserted by the appellant.

20The NOP to refuse the appellant’s licence issued in October 2025 only contains bare allegations of academic misconduct occurring over five years ago with no particulars provided. There are no details or reference to evidence forming the Registrar’s foundation for asserting reasonable grounds to refuse the appellant’s licence.

21The appellant, in its Notice of Appeal, notes that there was never a hearing or decision issued with respect to the alleged academic misconduct in 2020/2021 and asserts that he has been denied procedural fairness.

22Given the sparse information provided by the Registrar I find, for the purposes of this motion, the appellant has established there is some merit to the appeal. This weighs in favour of granting the extension.

Conclusion

23After careful consideration, I find that when balancing the factors, the justice of the case supports granting an extension. The appellant has established reasonable grounds to support an extension of time. While the length of delay is clearly significant, the appellant had an intention to appeal within the time period, there is very limited prejudice to the Registrar, and there exists some merit to the appeal. Accordingly, I am satisfied that, in the circumstances here, the interests of justice would be served by extending the time to file the Notice of Appeal.

ORDER

24The appellant’s motion to extend the time to file its appeal is granted.

Released: February 10, 2026

____________________

Laura Hodgson

Adjudicator