Brian Shell

The plaintiffs, members of a local union, brought a motion to amend the style of cause in their action against their international and local unions, which were unincorporated associations.

The plaintiffs sought to exclude themselves from the defendant class, arguing that a litigant cannot be both a plaintiff and a defendant in the same action.

The court granted the motion, allowing the plaintiffs to file an amended statement of claim with the proposed style of cause, which explicitly excluded the plaintiffs from the defendant class, and formally appointed the union presidents as representative defendants nunc pro tunc.

The appellant, president of the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), appealed the dismissal of a motion to strike an action brought by four rank-and-file members of the International's Toronto-based affiliate, Local 113.

The members sought a declaration that certain provisions of the International's Constitution were void for unconscionability, arguing these provisions prevented disaffiliation.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to strike but granted a temporary stay pending exhaustion of the International's constitutional amendment process.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the dismissal of the motion to strike and the temporary stay, finding the action presented arguable issues of unconscionability and that the court had jurisdiction to determine the matter.

The appellants, representing regional airline pilots, sued Air Canada pilots for unlawful act conspiracy, alleging they unlawfully prevented the implementation of a merged seniority list.

The trial judge dismissed the claims, finding that some defendants committed no unlawful acts due to their right to dissent, and that the unlawful acts of others did not cause the loss of a chance to implement the list because Air Canada would never have agreed to it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the rank-and-file members did not breach their union contracts and that the chance of implementing the merged list was de minimis.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award upholding the termination of three employees for assaulting a replacement worker during a strike.

The arbitrator found the assault was premeditated and unprovoked, and that the employees were dishonest during the proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's findings of fact were reasonable, supported by the evidence, and entitled to the highest level of deference.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash ongoing proceedings before the Ontario Labour Relations Board, arguing that the Board's mid-hearing decision to require will-say statements and limit examination-in-chief to thirty minutes was procedurally unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no prospect of real unfairness on the record and noting that judicial review of administrative action during a pending hearing should generally be avoided until the hearing is completed.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, which had ruled that a law firm was not in a conflict of interest and could continue representing the respondents.

The law firm had previously represented the applicant local union before it was placed in trusteeship.

The Divisional Court applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determining the standard of review was correctness.

Applying the MacDonald Estate test, the Court found the law firm possessed relevant confidential information and there was a risk of prejudice to the former client.

The application was granted, the Board's decision was quashed, and the law firm was ordered to cease acting against its former client.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their third party claim against the respondent.

The motion judge had concluded that Captain Pulley had not been designated within the meaning of an Indemnity and that a paragraph of the Indemnity applied only to claims by non-union members against union members.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge improperly weighed evidence and drew inferences of fact, particularly given the absence of evidence based on personal knowledge from the respondent concerning the practice of making designations.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment set aside, and costs of $15,000 awarded to the appellant.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision.

The arbitrator had to determine the meaning of 'without prejudice' in a prior arbitration decision and whether the current case was essentially the same as the prior one.

The Divisional Court applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determined the standard of review was reasonableness, and found the arbitrator correctly applied labour arbitration principles rather than strict common law concepts.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, Air Ontario pilots, brought an action against the respondents, Air Canada pilots, for breach of contract based on the union constitution after the respondents refused to implement an arbitration award integrating their seniority lists.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the historical legal fiction of a web of contracts between individual union members is no longer necessary or practical.

Instead, the Court recognized that a trade union is a legal entity capable of entering into a contract of membership with each individual member, and therefore, union members cannot be held personally liable to one another for breaching the union constitution.

The appellant was laid off due to a strike by another local of his union at his place of employment.

He applied for unemployment insurance benefits but was denied on the basis that he was 'financing' the strike under s. 44(2)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, because a portion of his mandatory union dues was diverted to the International Union's strike fund.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'financing' requires active and voluntary involvement by the claimant.

The mandatory payment of union dues did not constitute financing the labour dispute, and the appellant was therefore entitled to benefits.

The appellant lost his employment due to a strike and subsequently found secondary employment working three days a week at a hospital.

He left the hospital job for medical reasons and applied for unemployment insurance benefits.

The Commission denied benefits under s. 44(1) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, arguing he was not 'regularly engaged in some other occupation' because he intended to return to his original employer after the strike.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'regularly engaged' refers to the regularity of the work schedule, not the duration or permanence of the employment.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was entitled to benefits.