Lisa Mallia

The applicant, Antonio Caruso, brought an application under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP provisions) seeking to stay disciplinary proceedings against him at the Law Society Tribunal and for declarations regarding the Law Society of Ontario's conduct.

The court, on its own initiative, considered dismissing the application under Rule 2.1.01 for being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction to dismiss tribunal proceedings under s. 137.1, noted the absence of a civil proceeding to which s. 137.1 could apply, and determined that the relief sought properly belonged before the Tribunal or Divisional Court.

The application was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, duplicating issues already before the Tribunal and potentially the Court of Appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of interim decisions made by the Law Society of Ontario and the Law Society Tribunal regarding scheduling and a recusal request in an ongoing disciplinary proceeding.

The court dismissed the applications summarily under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the applications were patently premature, as the administrative proceedings had not yet concluded and there were no exceptional circumstances justifying fragmentation of the process.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by a single member of the Law Society Tribunal, Appeal Division, which struck his appeal book for including fresh evidence without leave.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, emphasizing that courts should not interfere in ongoing administrative proceedings absent exceptional circumstances.

The applicant was directed to exhaust his internal remedies by bringing a motion to admit fresh evidence before the panel hearing his appeal.

The applicant, a lawyer, brought an interim motion seeking to nullify his suspension by the Law Society of Ontario for non-payment of a costs award.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the applicant had already paid the costs award, rendering the issue moot, and was currently suspended for entirely different reasons related to professional misconduct.

The court found the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence, failed to serve the Attorney General regarding his constitutional challenge, and failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured him.

The Law Society Tribunal brought a motion for directions regarding its participation status in an appeal before the Court of Appeal.

The Tribunal sought to participate as of right in the appeal of a judicial review decision, claiming automatic party status based on its participation in the underlying Divisional Court proceedings.

The applicant, Matthew Riddell, opposed the Tribunal's participation.

The court directed that the Tribunal's motion for leave to appeal proceed without the Tribunal's participation, finding insufficient basis for automatic party status and noting the Tribunal's lack of substantive participation before the Divisional Court.

The applicant sought a stay of conduct and reinstatement proceedings before the Law Society Tribunal pending her application for judicial review of several interlocutory rulings.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the applicant failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify intervening in ongoing administrative proceedings.

The court noted the availability of an adequate alternative remedy through the internal appeal structure and found that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the disciplinary process to proceed in the public interest.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant lawyer sought judicial review of a decision by the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, which had overturned a Hearing Division decision and ordered her interlocutory suspension pending a conduct application.

The Law Society alleged the applicant was involved in the misuse of trust funds and had facilitated the practice of law by her suspended former partner, with whom she had resumed a romantic relationship.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Appeal Division reasonably concluded the Hearing Division had misapprehended evidence amounting to an error of law, and that the interlocutory suspension was necessary to protect the public interest.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division decision that denied his application for a paralegal license on the basis that he was ungovernable.

The applicant argued that the Chair of the Hearing Panel should have recused herself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the Appeal Panel lacked independence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Appeal Panel reasonably concluded there was no apprehension of bias and that the tribunal's structure met the requisite degree of independence as directed by the legislature.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Law Society Appeal Panel decision upholding a $17,500 costs award against him.

The costs were awarded after the applicant abandoned his third application for a paralegal license just days before the good character hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Hearing Panel retained jurisdiction to award costs despite the abandonment, properly considered the applicant's history of abandoning and reinstating applications as an abuse of process, and afforded the applicant procedural fairness.

The court fixed costs of the judicial review at $5,000.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their third party claim against the respondent.

The motion judge had concluded that Captain Pulley had not been designated within the meaning of an Indemnity and that a paragraph of the Indemnity applied only to claims by non-union members against union members.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge improperly weighed evidence and drew inferences of fact, particularly given the absence of evidence based on personal knowledge from the respondent concerning the practice of making designations.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment set aside, and costs of $15,000 awarded to the appellant.