Susan Heakes

The applicant sought judicial review (treated as an appeal) of a Law Society Appeal Panel decision that upheld findings of professional misconduct and a penalty of suspension and practice restrictions.

The applicant argued the panel erred in denying disclosure of certain investigation files, ignoring evidence, and imposing an unreasonable penalty, and also raised a new issue of delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Appeal Panel's decisions on disclosure and factual findings were reasonable, declining to hear the new issue of delay due to an insufficient record, and concluding the penalty was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division decision that denied his application for a paralegal license on the basis that he was ungovernable.

The applicant argued that the Chair of the Hearing Panel should have recused herself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the Appeal Panel lacked independence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Appeal Panel reasonably concluded there was no apprehension of bias and that the tribunal's structure met the requisite degree of independence as directed by the legislature.

The appellant lawyer appealed findings of professional misconduct and a six-month suspension imposed by the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The misconduct arose from his representation of a severely injured client and the client's spouse amidst family conflicts over care and property.

The lawyer was found to have acted in a conflict of interest, breached court orders, commissioned a misleading affidavit, and delayed a settlement to prevent a Law Society complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Law Society Appeal Panel's decision reasonable and the penalty well within the appropriate range for the serious departure from professional standards.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel upholding the revocation of his licence for misappropriating funds from his family's company and his former law firm.

He argued that his absolute discharge from bankruptcy estopped the Law Society from finding he misappropriated funds, and that the panel failed to account for proper disbursements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that issue estoppel did not apply because the Law Society was not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings and the issues were different.

The court also found the panel's factual findings regarding the misappropriation were reasonable.

The applicant, a paralegal candidate, sought judicial review of a Law Society Hearing Panel decision that quashed his motion challenging the constitutional validity of By-law 4 during his good character hearing.

The Hearing Panel had concluded it lacked institutional competence to conduct broad constitutional inquiries into the governance of the Society.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, agreeing that the Hearing Panel correctly held it had no jurisdiction to deal with the broad issue of the by-law's validity, and that such questions are appropriately raised before a court of original jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society of Upper Canada Appeal Panel, arguing that the Hearing Panel's refusal to grant an adjournment beyond a certain date unless he undertook not to practice amounted to a denial of natural justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Hearing Panel properly exercised its discretion by weighing the serious risk to the public interest against the appellant's right to counsel.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Law Society Hearing Panel decision that revoked his licence for practising while suspended.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application because the applicant had not exhausted his statutory right to appeal to the Appeal Panel.

The Court also noted that the application lacked merit, as the Hearing Panel's decision was reasonable.

The appellant, executor of the estate of John F. McLennan, appealed a decision ordering the discharge of a collateral mortgage and the payment of approximately $5.7 million in property sale proceeds to the estate of John K. McLennan.

The appellant argued that a 1996 assignment agreement transferred both the collateral mortgage and the deceased's personal guarantee to the father's estate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings that the assignment agreement only transferred the collateral mortgage, which was worthless without the underlying debt and personal guarantee.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal received submissions concerning the costs of the appeal and a request to vary the award of costs of the trial.

The court fixed the appellant's costs of the appeal at $7,000 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The request to vary the award of costs of the trial was dismissed.

The appellant wrongfully terminated a 36-month agency contract with the respondent after 15 months.

The contract contained a clause allowing the appellant to terminate on three months' notice after the 18th month.

The trial judge awarded damages based on the full 36-month term discounted by 25 percent for the likelihood of early termination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the early termination clause defined the upper limit of the appellant's liability for damages, and reduced the damages to reflect a 22-month period.