Adrienne Lei

The defendants brought a Rule 21.01 motion to determine if alleged defamatory statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The plaintiff failed to appear or file materials, and his request for adjournment was dismissed due to a finding that he was "playing games with the process." The court found that the statements, made in a direction to opposing counsel regarding the disbursement of funds in matrimonial and assessment proceedings, were intimately connected to judicial proceedings and thus covered by absolute privilege.

The action for defamation was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion mid-trial to withdraw admissions made in pleadings, responses to requests to admit, and an agreed statement of facts, and sought leave to rely on new documents, after discovering a significant factual mistake regarding the legal description of lands.

The defendants opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for a mistrial.

The parties ultimately resolved their motions by consent order, which allowed the withdrawal of inadvertent admissions and declared a mistrial.

The presiding judge recused himself from hearing the new trial due to having formed views on the evidence.

Directions were provided for the future course of the proceedings, including efforts to agree on evidence use and a prompt new trial.

The Member, a teacher, faced a discipline hearing for professional misconduct involving inappropriate Facebook communications with a student, purchasing alcohol and meals for students, and spending time with students outside of school hours.

The Member pled guilty to the allegations and admitted the facts.

The Discipline Committee accepted a joint submission on penalty, ordering a reprimand and a 12-month suspension of the Member's certificate of qualification and registration, noting the Member had already resigned and undertaken never to reapply to the College.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to set aside an order of the motion judge, which had dismissed his motion to set aside the Registrar's administrative dismissal of his motion for leave to appeal.

The underlying action involved allegations of professional negligence against his former counsel.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge correctly applied the test from Sickinger, which requires consideration of the merits of the appeal.

Finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the proposed appeal lacked merit, the Divisional Court dismissed the motion with costs.

In a civil procedure appeal, the appellants challenged orders permitting amendment of a statement of claim through a representation order after expiry of a limitation period.

The central issue was whether the order improperly added parties or merely corrected the naming of the legal entity represented by previously named individuals.

A majority held the request was properly treated as correction of a misnamed party, with members having notice before the limitation deadline and no demonstrated prejudice after extensive participation in the litigation.

The appeal was dismissed, with one dissenting judge who would have allowed it.

Several trade unions and the Canadian Labour Congress brought motions for leave to intervene as added parties or as friends of the court in an action challenging the constitution of the Amalgamated Transit Union.

The moving parties argued they had an interest in the proceeding because their own constitutions contained similar provisions and they could be adversely affected by the precedent.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that an interest based solely on the potential precedential effect of a decision is insufficient for intervention as an added party under Rule 13.01.

The court also denied leave to intervene as friends of the court under Rule 13.02, concluding that the proposed interveners' submissions would largely duplicate the arguments of the defendant union and would not provide a materially different perspective.

The appellant, a police superintendent acting as Incident Commander during the 2010 G20 Summit, appealed convictions for professional misconduct relating to the mass arrests of protestors at the Novotel Hotel and the intersection of Queen and Spadina.

The Hearing Officer found the arrests were unlawful and constituted an unnecessary exercise of authority, and that the appellant committed discreditable conduct by leaving detainees in inclement weather.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the Hearing Officer correctly applied the law regarding reasonable and probable grounds and the ancillary powers doctrine.

On the cross-appeals regarding penalty, the Commission found the original penalties (a reprimand and forfeiture of 10 days off) were unreasonable given the severity of the Charter breaches.

The Commission varied the penalties to the forfeiture of 20 days off for each of the two unlawful arrest convictions, to be served consecutively with the 20 days off forfeited for discreditable conduct.

The Attorney General brought a motion to quash summonses issued by defendant Michael G. Engel to two Crown attorneys, John McMahon and Paul Amenta, for examination under Rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Engel sought to examine them as part of his response to the Attorney General's summary judgment motion to dismiss Engel's crossclaim for contribution and indemnity, which alleged that Crown attorneys failed to comply with disclosure obligations in the underlying wrongful conviction action.

The court found that Engel demonstrated a reasonable evidentiary basis that the Crown attorneys could provide relevant evidence on several specific disclosure topics and that the proposed examinations would not constitute an abuse of process.

The motion to quash was dismissed, allowing examinations on four of the five identified topics.

The plaintiff, Bob Kinnear, on behalf of Local 113 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant, Lawrence J. Hanley, representing the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), from imposing a trusteeship over Local 113 and from disciplining its members.

The motion also sought to authorize Kinnear to represent Local 113 members and to have Local 113 provide the undertaking as to damages.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction to restrain the trusteeship and ordered Local 113 to provide the undertaking, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the unconscionability of International's constitution, irreparable harm to democratic rights, and that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff.

The request for a representative order was deferred.

An appeal concerning the estate of Paul Penner, who died in March 2013.

A separation agreement required Penner to maintain a $150,000 life insurance policy designating his ex-wife, Pauline McKenny, as beneficiary, with McKenny having a first charge against the estate if the policy lapsed.

Penner failed to pay premiums and the policy lapsed before his death.

McKenny commenced an action more than two years after Penner's death, which would normally be statute-barred under section 38(3) of the Trustee Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applied to the estate trustee's conduct, tolling the limitation period until at least September 25, 2013, thereby allowing McKenny's claim to proceed.

The complainants sought leave to appeal the penalty decision of a Hearing Officer regarding a police superintendent's misconduct during the 2010 G20 Summit.

The superintendent had been found guilty of unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority and discreditable conduct for ordering the 'kettling' and unlawful arrest of protestors, and was penalized with a forfeiture of 30 days off.

The Commission granted leave to appeal, finding that the appropriateness of the penalty for a senior commander in these unprecedented circumstances is of significant importance to the policing profession and the public.

The appellant private school terminated the respondent teacher's employment for cause after discovering he had falsified student grades and lied to cover up the improprieties.

The trial judge found the respondent had been wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages, including lost long-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, holding that the trial judge erred in his application of the McKinley test.

The Court found the teacher's intentional misconduct and academic fraud struck at the heart of the employment relationship, justifying summary dismissal.

The applicant estate trustee sought directions on whether the respondent's claim against the estate for $150,000, pursuant to a separation agreement, was statute-barred.

The deceased had failed to maintain life insurance as required, creating a first charge on the estate.

The estate trustee withheld information from the respondent that the life insurance policies had lapsed, delaying the respondent's discovery of her claim.

The court held that while the two-year limitation period under s. 38 of the Trustee Act applied, it was tolled by the doctrine of fraudulent concealment due to the estate trustee's unconscionable conduct in withholding material facts.

The respondent's claim was therefore permitted to proceed.

In a grievance arbitration concerning a job competition for a historical blacksmith position, the parties agreed to a Memorandum of Settlement directing a reassessment of the candidates by a jointly chosen evaluator.

The employer subsequently raised an issue of actual bias or apprehension of bias against the evaluator, arguing that his evaluation report contained demeaning and inappropriate comments about the successful candidate.

The Grievance Settlement Board found no actual bias or apprehension of bias, concluding that the evaluator's strong opinions were based on the testing results rather than preconceived animus.

However, the Board directed that the inappropriate comments be expunged from the record.

The union filed grievances alleging that the employer violated the collective agreement and the Occupational Health and Safety Act by imposing unjust discipline and engaging in workplace harassment during a staff meeting.

The meeting addressed employee misconduct, including sleeping on night shifts and abusing meal breaks.

The employer reminded nursing staff of their professional obligations to the College of Nurses of Ontario after some employees resisted the employer's directives.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the grievances, finding that the employer's comments were a reasonable and restrained response to inappropriate employee behaviour and did not constitute discipline, harassment, or intimidation.

The plaintiff sued his former family lawyer and the lawyer’s firm for negligence arising from advice and drafting of a separation agreement that waived spousal support.

The plaintiff argued that the agreement was vulnerable to challenge and that counsel failed to adequately advise him of the risks and should have ceased acting once the agreement was attacked in subsequent litigation.

The court held that the lawyer met the heightened standard of care applicable to a family law specialist, having properly explained the risks and drafted a robust spousal support waiver.

The court also found no breach in continuing the retainer and concluded that causation and damages were not established, including under a lost‑chance analysis.

The action was dismissed.

The Union filed a grievance alleging the Employer breached a prior Memorandum of Settlement regarding the Grievor's return to work.

The arbitrator found that an unknown person from the Provincial Government made an unauthorized phone call to the Grievor's doctor's office, improperly obtaining confidential medical appointment information.

This privacy breach caused the doctor to delay issuing a return-to-work certificate, resulting in the Grievor losing one week's wages.

The arbitrator held this was a clear breach of the Employer's duty to carry out the settlement in good faith.

The grievance was allowed, and the Grievor was awarded compensation for the lost week's wages plus $2,500 in damages for mental distress.

The Union filed a grievance alleging that the Employer breached a Memorandum of Settlement when an unauthorized individual from the Provincial Government called the Grievor's doctor to inquire about his appointments.

The Grievance Settlement Board found that the call was made by someone in the Provincial Government, likely the Ministry of Labour, without the Grievor's consent.

This breach of privacy caused the Grievor's doctor to delay issuing a return-to-work certificate, resulting in one week of lost wages.

The Board held that the Employer breached its duty to carry out the settlement in good faith and awarded the Grievor compensation for the lost wages plus $2,500 in damages for mental distress.

The appellant purchaser appealed the dismissal of her application for the return of a $100,000 deposit after a real estate transaction failed to close.

The purchaser had discovered an open building permit, but the application judge found this requisition could be satisfied by title insurance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the vendors were ready to close and the purchaser's failure to respond to the vendor's proposal regarding title insurance caused the transaction to fail.

The appeal was dismissed.

The purchaser applied for the return of a $100,000 deposit after refusing to close a residential real estate transaction due to an outstanding building permit on the property.

The vendors obtained a commitment from a title insurer to insure over the open permit and offered to complete the transaction with a holdback pending closure of the permit.

The court held that, under the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, a commitment for title insurance was sufficient to address the requisition regarding the open permit.

The purchaser failed to act in good faith by prematurely abandoning the transaction before the closing deadline and by not pursuing the available title insurance solution.

The purchaser was therefore in breach of the agreement and was not entitled to recover the deposit.