Marianne Wright

An appeal concerning the constitutionality of security screening measures implemented at police headquarters.

The chief of police instituted a security protocol requiring all persons entering the building to pass through metal detection and bag screening.

A resident who regularly attended public meetings of the police services board refused to submit to screening and was denied entry.

The application judge found the security protocol violated freedom of expression rights and was not prescribed by law.

The appellate court reversed, holding that while the protocol limited freedom of expression, it was prescribed by law through the occupier's common law powers and the statutory duty to ensure safety under the Occupiers' Liability Act, and was justified as a reasonable limit under the Charter.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful constitutional application by the applicant against the Chief of Police, with no relief granted against the Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB).

The applicant, self-represented, sought costs including fees and disbursements against both respondents.

The court declined to award costs against the TPSB due to the limited scope of relief sought against it and its role in assisting the court on a jurisdictional issue.

Against the Chief of Police, the court applied the two-part test from *Fong v. Chan* for awarding costs to self-represented litigants, requiring demonstration of time and effort doing lawyer's work and incurred opportunity cost by forgoing remunerative activity.

The applicant failed to demonstrate foregone remunerative activity, as his decision to pursue lower-paying part-time work predated the litigation and was a quality-of-life choice.

Therefore, no fees were awarded.

However, the court ordered the Chief of Police to pay the applicant's reasonable disbursements, as the applicant was successful in advancing constitutional rights in the public interest.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of a practice instituted by the Chief of Police requiring all individuals entering police headquarters to submit to a security search.

The applicant argued this violated his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it was a condition precedent to attending public meetings of the Toronto Police Services Board held in the building.

The court found that attending a public government meeting is protected expression and the searches infringed this right.

The court further held the infringement was not justified under s. 1 because the Chief of Police lacked statutory authority under the Occupiers' Liability Act or the Occupational Health and Safety Act to impose warrantless searches as a condition of entry to a public meeting.

A declaration was granted.

The applicant sought access to a sealed information used to obtain a search warrant executed at his residence, where no firearms or contraband were found and no charges were laid.

A prior order had directed that the warrant materials be unsealed and disclosed in redacted form, leaving the issue of which public institution was responsible for vetting the materials to protect confidential informer privilege.

The Attorney General of Ontario and the police each argued the other bore the responsibility.

The court held that informer privilege is jointly owned by the Crown and the informer and that the Attorney General bears the legal responsibility for protecting the privilege.

Accordingly, the Attorney General must perform the editing of the sealed search warrant materials, with assistance from the police as necessary.