Heidi Rubin

The defendants brought a Rule 20 motion for summary judgment in an action alleging negligence, breach of privacy, and the tort of intrusion upon seclusion arising from defence counsel’s conduct in prior motor vehicle accident litigation.

The plaintiff alleged that defence counsel improperly disclosed medical records to defence experts, served motion materials containing personal information on third parties, and obtained university transcripts without consent.

The court held that all impugned conduct occurred within the context of the underlying litigation and was carried out pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure or court orders.

Because the actions were legally authorized and necessary to defend the prior claim, the elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion were not established.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial and no viable cause of action, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim.

The defendants brought a motion for directions seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to undergo a mental examination to determine whether she was a person under a legal disability requiring representation by a litigation guardian.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act to compel a mental examination in the context of Rule 7 proceedings.

The court held that it does have jurisdiction to order such an examination and that doing so would not violate s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, given the procedural safeguards governing such orders.

However, because the plaintiff expressed willingness to undergo a voluntary assessment and provide an updated report addressing her litigation capacity, the court declined to order a compulsory examination at that stage.

The defendants’ motion was adjourned pending the plaintiff’s completion of the voluntary assessment and anticipated motion to continue the proceeding without a litigation guardian.

The purchaser applied for the return of a $100,000 deposit after refusing to close a residential real estate transaction due to an outstanding building permit on the property.

The vendors obtained a commitment from a title insurer to insure over the open permit and offered to complete the transaction with a holdback pending closure of the permit.

The court held that, under the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, a commitment for title insurance was sufficient to address the requisition regarding the open permit.

The purchaser failed to act in good faith by prematurely abandoning the transaction before the closing deadline and by not pursuing the available title insurance solution.

The purchaser was therefore in breach of the agreement and was not entitled to recover the deposit.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing their action for delay.

The action, which involved a long-standing neighbour dispute, was dismissed after the plaintiffs failed to set it down for trial within the prescribed time limits.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that the plaintiffs had adequately explained most of the delay, the failure to set the action down was due to inadvertence, the motion was brought promptly, and the defendant suffered no significant prejudice.

The court set aside the dismissal order and granted a short extension to set the action down for trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion in writing seeking various forms of relief, including an order preventing the registrar from dismissing the action for delay.

Counsel for one defendant delivered notice requiring that the motion be heard orally under Rule 37.12(5)(d).

During a case conference, the court declined to grant an open-ended order preventing administrative dismissal and instead directed the plaintiffs to request a status hearing before the case management judge.

The court further directed that if the plaintiffs wished to proceed with the motion, they should promptly obtain a hearing date in consultation with defence counsel.

Self-represented plaintiffs sought costs after successfully defending a summary judgment motion.

They claimed compensation for their own time spent litigating as well as disbursements and legal advice obtained from counsel.

The court applied the principles governing costs for self-represented litigants, requiring proof of opportunity cost demonstrating that remunerative activity was foregone.

As no evidence of lost income or opportunities was provided, the court declined to award costs for the litigants’ personal time.

However, the court allowed recovery of actual out-of-pocket legal expenses and disbursements and declined to set off earlier reserved costs due to defence counsel’s disregard of page limits imposed by the court.