Heidi Rubin

The defendants brought a Rule 20 motion for summary judgment in an action alleging negligence, breach of privacy, and the tort of intrusion upon seclusion arising from defence counsel’s conduct in prior motor vehicle accident litigation.

The plaintiff alleged that defence counsel improperly disclosed medical records to defence experts, served motion materials containing personal information on third parties, and obtained university transcripts without consent.

The court held that all impugned conduct occurred within the context of the underlying litigation and was carried out pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure or court orders.

Because the actions were legally authorized and necessary to defend the prior claim, the elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion were not established.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial and no viable cause of action, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim.

The appellant purchaser appealed the dismissal of her application for the return of a $100,000 deposit after a real estate transaction failed to close.

The purchaser had discovered an open building permit, but the application judge found this requisition could be satisfied by title insurance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the vendors were ready to close and the purchaser's failure to respond to the vendor's proposal regarding title insurance caused the transaction to fail.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for directions seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to undergo a mental examination to determine whether she was a person under a legal disability requiring representation by a litigation guardian.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act to compel a mental examination in the context of Rule 7 proceedings.

The court held that it does have jurisdiction to order such an examination and that doing so would not violate s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, given the procedural safeguards governing such orders.

However, because the plaintiff expressed willingness to undergo a voluntary assessment and provide an updated report addressing her litigation capacity, the court declined to order a compulsory examination at that stage.

The defendants’ motion was adjourned pending the plaintiff’s completion of the voluntary assessment and anticipated motion to continue the proceeding without a litigation guardian.

The self-represented appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents in the fixed amount of $2,500.

The purchaser applied for the return of a $100,000 deposit after refusing to close a residential real estate transaction due to an outstanding building permit on the property.

The vendors obtained a commitment from a title insurer to insure over the open permit and offered to complete the transaction with a holdback pending closure of the permit.

The court held that, under the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, a commitment for title insurance was sufficient to address the requisition regarding the open permit.

The purchaser failed to act in good faith by prematurely abandoning the transaction before the closing deadline and by not pursuing the available title insurance solution.

The purchaser was therefore in breach of the agreement and was not entitled to recover the deposit.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing their action for delay.

The action, which involved a long-standing neighbour dispute, was dismissed after the plaintiffs failed to set it down for trial within the prescribed time limits.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that the plaintiffs had adequately explained most of the delay, the failure to set the action down was due to inadvertence, the motion was brought promptly, and the defendant suffered no significant prejudice.

The court set aside the dismissal order and granted a short extension to set the action down for trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion in writing seeking various forms of relief, including an order preventing the registrar from dismissing the action for delay.

Counsel for one defendant delivered notice requiring that the motion be heard orally under Rule 37.12(5)(d).

During a case conference, the court declined to grant an open-ended order preventing administrative dismissal and instead directed the plaintiffs to request a status hearing before the case management judge.

The court further directed that if the plaintiffs wished to proceed with the motion, they should promptly obtain a hearing date in consultation with defence counsel.

The applicants, who were self-represented litigants, sought leave to appeal a costs award from a motion judge.

They argued they were entitled to compensation for personal time devoted to the litigation, challenging the common law rule regarding costs for self-represented litigants and claiming it violated s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the motion judge correctly applied binding legal principles and that the Charter arguments were without merit.

The court noted that leave to appeal a costs award is granted sparingly, and the applicants failed to demonstrate strong grounds or an error in principle.

Self-represented plaintiffs sought costs after successfully defending a summary judgment motion.

They claimed compensation for their own time spent litigating as well as disbursements and legal advice obtained from counsel.

The court applied the principles governing costs for self-represented litigants, requiring proof of opportunity cost demonstrating that remunerative activity was foregone.

As no evidence of lost income or opportunities was provided, the court declined to award costs for the litigants’ personal time.

However, the court allowed recovery of actual out-of-pocket legal expenses and disbursements and declined to set off earlier reserved costs due to defence counsel’s disregard of page limits imposed by the court.

The appellant chiropractor appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct for failing to attend a mandatory Record Keeping Workshop, and the resulting 60-day suspension.

The appellant argued the Committee lacked jurisdiction because it did not require proof of a formal Council resolution making the workshop mandatory.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that official College notices were sufficient evidence that attendance was mandatory, especially since the appellant never opened his mail from the College.

The penalty was upheld as reasonable given the appellant's history of ignoring College communications.

The appellants, commercial tenants, were locked out by their landlord for rent arrears.

To regain entry, they signed minutes of settlement and a promissory note guaranteeing the landlord's lawyer's fees.

When sued on the settlement, the appellants brought a third party claim against the lawyer for economic duress.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the third party claim, finding that the lawyer's routine conduct in advancing her client's position did not constitute the illegitimate pressure required for economic duress.

Following a successful appeal by the City of Toronto on a single issue, the Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement.

Because several issues from the original application remained undetermined and were remitted to the Superior Court, the Court of Appeal set aside the application judge's costs order and reserved the costs of both the original application and the appeal to the judge determining the remitted issues.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision quashing a by-law that prohibited commercial parking lots and private parking enforcement agencies from issuing private parking tickets.

The application judge had found the by-law ultra vires, reasoning that trespassers are not 'consumers' under the consumer protection licensing power in s. 150(2) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge applied an overly restrictive interpretation of 'consumer protection'.

Applying a broad and purposive approach, the Court found that 'consumer' includes any person with whom a licensed business transacts, engages, or deals directly, including alleged trespassers from whom the business seeks to extract payment.